Intergenerational mobility of young Europeans:

A comparative analysis of social and political consequences by Schuck, Bettina
  
BETTINA SCHUCK 
 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
OF YOUNG EUROPEANS 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. rer. pol. 
im Fach Politikwissenschaft 
 
an der 
 
Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Bettina Schuck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disputation am 21. März 2018 
Veröffentlichung im April 2019 
 
Erstgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Jale Tosun 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Reimut Zohlnhöfer  
 i 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis sets out to investigate social and political consequences of young Europeans’ 
experiences of intergenerational mobility, i.e., achieving a higher or lower socioeconomic 
status than one’s parents. In particular, it aims at providing a better understanding of how 
young Europeans’ (aged 35 and younger) experience of intergenerational mobility shapes 
their well-being and normative support for the welfare state. Apart from a descriptive 
overview on the status quo of intergenerational mobility among young Europeans in three 
dimensions (educational mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobil-
ity), the main objective of the empirical analyses is to investigate the extent to which the 
psychological experience of intergenerational mobility, independent from the direct im-
pact of one’s own and parental socioeconomic status, affect different dimensions of well-
being and political attitudes. To this end, I apply diagonal reference models, the only 
method suitable to disentangle the effects of mobility, social origin, and social destina-
tion. 
With respect to possible consequences of intergenerational mobility for the young peo-
ple’s well-being, I investigate several hypotheses about individual and societal 
differences between mobile and non-mobile individuals. In line with the theoretical pre-
diction that psychological mobility effects are more likely to occur in status-based 
societies, I find net mobility effects in Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Yet, contrary to the theoretical expectations, I also find net mobility effects in the Nordic 
countries.  
In terms of political consequences of intergenerational mobility of young Europeans, I 
test two competing sets of hypotheses about differences in normative welfare state atti-
tudes between mobile and non-mobile individuals. Thereby, the first set relies on material 
self-interest as the main determinant for welfare state support, while the second set is 
based on factors beyond material self-interest, such as deservingness perceptions. The 
empirical findings do not support the prediction of mobile individuals being more sym-
pathetic with benefit recipients. This arguably owes to the fact that the well-known 
determinant material self-interest apparently plays a similar role in determining normative 
welfare state attitudes for the mobile as for the non-mobile.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Today’s youth are faced with disadvantageous conditions that have given rise to a series 
of pessimistic predictions for their future life chances. These conditions, affecting a whole 
generation of current and prospective labour market entrants, were largely caused by the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent rise of youth unemployment. Youth un-
employment rates all over Europe reached unprecedented levels, with every second young 
person affected in some member states (Tosun, 2015). While unemployment rates in gen-
eral have risen due to the recession, it was the young who shared a particularly high 
burden and suffered the most. Against this background, concerns have been raised re-
garding the risk of a whole generation of young Europeans becoming a ‘lost generation’ 
(Shildrick, 2015: 491). Others dubbed today’s youth the ‘bad luck’ generation due to their 
bad luck in entering the labour market during years of economic crisis, predicting not 
only temporary discomfort but also long-term consequences such as lower future wages 
and distrust of the political and economic system (International Labour Organization, 
2011: 6). Yet, it is not only the contemporary circumstances with the economic crisis and 
its aftermath fuelling pessimistic predictions about the life chances of today’s young Eu-
ropeans, but also long-term trends that predated the recent recession. Among those are 
tightening youth labour markets and heightened competition for graduate jobs (Furlong, 
2015). The experience of the economic crisis for a whole generation of labour market 
entrants becomes even more visible when comparing to older generations. Starting with 
the post-war generation, who experienced a constant economic upswing, the structural 
change and massive educational expansion made upward social mobility the most likely 
experience for most people in decades. With the recent economic recession and the com-
pletion of higher education for a majority of citizens, governments and citizens – for the 
first time in decades – have expressed fears of the current young generation ending up 
worse off than their parents’ generation (Eurofound, 2017). Linked to this is the fear of a 
whole generation becoming lost by getting trapped in a spiral of poverty and exclusion.  
Against this pessimistic background, this thesis sets out to improve our understanding of 
social and political consequences of today’s young Europeans’ mobility experience, 
where young Europeans are defined by the age group up to 35. In contrast to the predom-
inantly labour-market-oriented research on young Europeans today, this thesis takes a 
different perspective by explicitly putting today’s intergenerational mobility experience 
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of young Europeans into focus. More specifically, I will start by analysing the status quo 
of intergenerational mobility today, capturing various dimensions of intergenerational so-
cial mobility such as educational mobility, economic mobility and expected mobility.  
Taking this analysis of intergenerational upward and downward mobility of young Euro-
peans as a starting point, subsequent analyses will focus on potential risks associated with 
intergenerational downward mobility and the chances of intergenerational upward mobil-
ity, respectively. Potential consequences I investigate include well-being outcomes like 
life-satisfaction, self-reported general health and psychological distress as well as politi-
cal consequences, like normative welfare state attitudes. The subsequent chapters will 
furthermore show that the investigation of mobility consequences is a very long-standing 
research objective in social stratification research with lots of questions unresolved de-
spite its long tradition. In this vein, the investigation of young Europeans’ 
intergenerational mobility is not only relevant to the pressing sociopolitical consequences 
described earlier, but also from an academic point of view.  
Before coming to basic debates and the state-of-the-art findings of social mobility re-
search in Europe, I will first provide a short introduction of key concepts in social 
mobility research, lay out the topic’s relevance from a political, economic and social point 
of view and briefly describe the research objectives, and research design of this thesis. 
The introduction will then conclude with an outline of chapters.  
1.1 What is social mobility? An introduction to key concepts 
Social mobility can be approached and investigated in various forms. For example, social 
mobility studies can be divided into two broad types of studies, which differ in the defi-
nition of their baseline, i.e. the starting point from where mobility is assessed. Studies on 
intergenerational mobility investigate the relationship between people’s current circum-
stances and those from which they originated. The study of the relationship between 
parental class position and an individual’s current class position would be one example 
for these kinds of studies. In contrast, studies of intragenerational mobility refer to social 
mobility over an individual’s life course. A typical approach would be to measure career 
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mobility from the first job to a state of occupational maturity.1 Yet despite the importance 
of distinguishing those two types of mobility studies, intragenerational mobility has to be 
considered a part of intergenerational mobility (Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 273f.). 
In this thesis, the focus will be on intergenerational mobility of young Europeans from a 
country comparative perspective.  
Aside from their reference point, social mobility studies typically differ in the respective 
dimension of life they investigate, depending on the discipline and research interest. For 
example, sociologists typically focus on mobility across social class and occupation, 
whereas economists typically analyse the economic dimensions of mobility in the form of 
income, wage, or earnings mobility.2 It is important to note that the choice of one or the 
other mobility dimension will be decisive for the research results. Beller and Hout (2006a: 
22), for example, emphasise that ‘[a]nalyses of occupational mobility and analyses of 
income mobility provide different pictures of people’s prospects, because they ask differ-
ent questions’. Saunders (2010: 34f.) similarly stresses that class mobility and income 
mobility capture completely different things. Class mobility serves as a very broad indi-
cator of people’s life chances compared to income mobility, because it captures various 
aspects of life like, e.g., earnings, employment security, retirement pensions, education, 
cultural capital, economic assets, health, self-esteem, and authority. Moreover, class is 
considered to give a more reliable picture of long-term life prospects since it tends to be 
more constant than income.  
But not only do perspectives and underlying research questions differ between class and 
income mobility – methodological implications do, too. To name just one example, meas-
uring intergenerational mobility is oftentimes only possible by using occupational class 
mobility, since past income data are hard to remember and scarcely available. In contrast, 
using income as a mobility indicator does offer quite some advantages. It is easily meas-
urable and understandable, and statistical tools for analysing income data, i.e. real 
                                                 
1 Occupational maturity is considered to be reached in an individual’s mid-thirties (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 
2011). 
2 For an overview on sociological literature, see e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004a); 
for an overview on economics literature, see e.g., Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and 
Devereux (2011). 
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numbers instead of categories, are strong. However, social desirability and recall prob-
lems when it comes to past incomes (even worse in the case of having to recall one’s 
parents’ income) may introduce serious measurement error (Saunders, 2010).  
Both the income and class mobility literature emphasise the role of education as a trans-
mission mechanism for income and class mobility. Therefore, educational mobility is 
another important mobility dimension investigated by both disciplines. It is a widespread 
concept that may under certain circumstances be more easily measurable than occupation 
or income mobility. For example, information on parental educational levels may be 
much easier to recall for respondents compared to parental income. Information on cur-
rent educational attainment may also be easier to collect than income and occupation, 
since income data is generally hard to collect (due to social desirability issues) and not 
every person has an occupation. Educational mobility has the big advantage of being 
measurable for those that do not currently have or never had a job, particularly young 
people who have not yet finished the transition from school-to-work.  
Young people without current or previous income due to their unemployment and early 
stage of career are very hard to classify in terms of occupational or income mobility. For 
example, for occupational mobility, mobility researchers recommend to either leave out 
the unemployed from mobility analyses, assume them to occupy the lowest occupational 
class, or classify them based on their previous job (Rose and Harrison, 2010).  
Either of these alternatives is unsatisfactory. Excluding the young unemployed from mo-
bility analyses is not an option when research questions refer exactly to this age group. 
Assuming them to occupy the lowest occupational class would treat all unemployed 
equally, regardless of their very diverse chances of re-integration into the labour market 
and the associated life chances (such as, e.g., subjective well-being or health). And clas-
sifying the young unemployed according to their previous job is not applicable for those 
who have never held a job before. Especially for today’s young generation in Europe, a 
classification into income or occupational mobility categories may be more problematic 
than ever with youth unemployment rates at unprecedented, high levels and the accom-
panying delayed transitions to the labour market.  
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In light of the aforementioned arguments, I argue that educational mobility constitutes 
the measurement instrument of choice for intergenerational mobility of young Europeans 
today. However, I do also acknowledge the limitations and disadvantages of this concept. 
Comparability of educational levels across countries is a difficult task and posits a huge 
challenge for comparative research on educational mobility. Comparative research on ed-
ucational mobility crucially depends on a comparable measurement of educational 
attainment. This thesis will therefore rely on a validated and cross-nationally tested frame-
work of educational attainment measurement in order to tackle this challenge.  
Besides the actual mobility dimension, distinguishing between absolute and relative mo-
bility belongs to the key concepts of social mobility. Absolute mobility reveals patterns 
of movement between class of origin and destination and is normally based on a mobility 
table depicting a cross-tabulation of social origin and destination. Absolute mobility oc-
curs if the class structure changes between two points of time due to war or structural 
change. For example, the declining demand for jobs in the agricultural sector due to in-
dustrialisation during the 20th century forced a lot of people to be mobile, meaning that 
absolute mobility is dependent from the marginal distribution of the mobility table. In 
contrast, relative mobility refers to the chances of an individual belonging to a certain 
category of social origin to reach a specific destination relative to individuals with a dif-
ferent social origin. It is thus independent from the marginal distribution of social classes 
and independent from changes in the occupational structure. Breen (2010b: 417f.) illus-
trates the difference between relative versus absolute mobility in a concrete example:  
‘Suppose that my father was a clerk and that I am a manager: then, in abso-
lute terms I have been upwardly mobile. But suppose that, in my father’s 
generation, being a clerk gave him a class position that was better than half 
of the population, whereas, in my generation, being a manager puts me in a 
position which is better than, say, 40 per cent of the population. Then, in 
relative terms I have been downwardly mobile because my rank is worse 
than my father’s.’ 
Breen’s example shows how ‘pure exchange mobility’ (Morgan, 2006: 5) gives insight 
into the association between class of origin and destination, whereas absolute mobility 
allows for insights in the degree of openness of a society net of differences in the occu-
pational structure (Breen, 2004a: 3f.; Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 273f.). This 
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openness is frequently referred to as social fluidity, or ‘the extent to which the chances of 
access to class positions are equally or unequally distributed’ (Breen, 2004a: 4).  
In addition to the distinction between relative versus absolute mobility, total mobility 
additionally divides into vertical and horizontal mobility, which refers to the evaluation 
of an individuals’ class destination in comparison to the class of origin. If origin and 
destination are equivalent in prestige, income or whatever dimension the status compari-
son is based on, I speak of horizontal mobility. If, however, the destination status is 
considered higher (upward mobility) or lower (downward mobility) than the origin status, 
I speak of vertical mobility. Social mobility studies predominantly focus on the latter kind 
of mobility, since upward and downward mobility are directly connected to an improve-
ment or deterioration of life chances (Diaz-Bone and Weischer, 2015: 275). In the case 
of intergenerational downward mobility, another frequently used term is counter-mobil-
ity, meaning a ‘work-life movement which has the effect of returning an individual back 
to his class of origin, following some initial shift away on his entry into employment’ 
(Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 1977: 274). To give an example of counter-mobility, some-
one who is downwardly mobile, e.g. because he or she fails to reproduce the parental 
level of education, can be expected to show extra effort in terms of occupational mobility 
over his or her life course and thereby catch up with those who kept their parents’ level 
of education (Diewald, Schulz and Baier, 2015).  
Another important conceptual difference in social mobility research is the distinction be-
tween actual mobility (based on the measurement of an objective difference between 
parental and child situation) and perceived mobility (based on the subjective perception 
of intergenerational change in status). Previous research (Kelley and Kelley, 2009) shows 
that the perception of moving upward or downward is important on top of the actual 
movement up- or down the social ladder. Mobility consequences are influenced by peo-
ple’s perceptions, even when controlling for actual mobility (Kelley and Kelley, 2009) 
and will therefore be included in the analyses of mobility consequences as far as possible.  
Finally, there is one portrayal commonly used to illustrate the social mobility process and 
its underlying mechanisms, which should not be failed to mention: the so-called origin-
education-destination (OED) triangle, which presents how social origin and destination 
are related through a direct and an indirect pathway. The indirect pathway illustrates that 
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an individual’s educational attainment is strongly associated with one’s social origin and 
that an individual’s destination is in turn dependent on educational attainment. However, 
in addition to this indirect pathway from origin to destination mediated by education, 
there is another direct link between social origin and destination (see, e.g., Goldthorpe, 
2014). 
To conclude, we have seen that social mobility can be investigated from completely dif-
ferent angles, including:  
• intergenerational vs. intra-generational (= life-course) mobility, 
• horizontal vs. vertical (= upward and downward) mobility, 
• absolute (= observed) vs. relative mobility (= net of structural change),  
• actual (= objective) vs. perceived (= subjective) mobility, and 
• economic vs. occupational vs. educational mobility.  
Furthermore, the OED triangle depicts the direct and indirect pathway from social origin 
to destination with education as an important mediator between social origin and destina-
tion. Having laid out the different key concepts including their underlying aims as well 
as advantages and disadvantages, the remainder of this thesis will focus on intergenera-
tional, vertical, and absolute mobility.3 It will make use of indicators of past mobility 
experiences (in particular, educational and economic mobility) as well as expected mo-
bility experiences for the future.4  
1.2 The political, economic and social relevance of social mobility 
It comes as no surprise that the topic of social mobility has attracted lasting interest among 
social scientists for decades. For various reasons, it can be considered relevant from a 
political, economic and social perspective. At the same time, it should be noted that it is 
not a purely academic interest that is driving research on social mobility, but that social 
mobility in recent years – despite rarely being mentioned explicitly in policy debates – 
                                                 
3 Having defined the focus of this thesis, I will use the terms ‘intergenerational mobility’ and ‘social mo-
bility’ as synonyms throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
4 More details about the indicators used can be found in Chapter 4. 
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has also emerged as an important field of action for policymakers on different levels (Eu-
rofound, 2017). One example is the aim of fostering social cohesion by improving 
chances of social mobility, a topic pushed by both the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU) (OECD, 2011; Council 
of Europe, 2010). For example, the ‘New Strategy and Council of Europe Action Plan for 
Social Cohesion approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 7 
July 2010’ explicitly requests member states to promote social mobility as an essential 
part of their bigger aim of social cohesion:  
‘With regard to building a secure future for all, member states are invited to 
[…] make special additional provisions – particularly policies for the promo-
tion of social mobility for all – to support young people in disadvantaged 
situations.’(Council of Europe, 2010: 10; emphasis added) 
As for another example, social mobility had already attracted the interest of EU policy-
makers when the European Commission designated the year 2006 as the ‘European Year 
of Workers’ Mobility’, stressing the importance of labour market and occupational mo-
bility for the enlarged EU (see, e.g., Bukodi and Róbert, 2006). Since then, fuelled by 
citizens’ and governments’ increasing concern of younger generations having – for the 
first time in decades – fewer chances of upward mobility, the increasing interest and 
growing public debate on social mobility also urged the EU to initiate several research 
projects on the topic (see, e.g., Eurofound, 2017; Nunn, 2012; Bukodi and Róbert, 2006). 
Not least, fostering social mobility is also included as an essential part of the Europe 2020 
strategy since one of the European Commission’s top priorities is to ensure equality of 
opportunity for all throughout the life cycle (Eurofound, 2017). In light of this, the Euro-
pean Commission consultation for the European Pillar of Social Rights identified various 
factors that are considered barriers to achieving equal opportunities and promoting the 
widening inequalities. Among those are unequal access to childcare, education, and health 
(Eurofound, 2017).  
Besides this interest on the supra-national level, the topic also gained substantial attention 
on the national level. For example in Britain, social mobility is currently a highly debated 
topic both in academia and in politics. Bukodi et al. (2014: 1) name ‘social mobility […] 
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now a matter of greater political concern in Britain than at any time previously’. As an-
other example, in Germany, media attention fuels fears of an end to upward mobility by 
warnings of a downward elevator effect (Storost, 2014).5  
But why is social mobility such a much-discussed topic both for academics and politi-
cians? A brief look at its political, economic, and social relevance might answer this 
question. The political and social relevance of social mobility are closely related and de-
rive from the close connection of concepts like intergenerational mobility, 
intergenerational persistence of life outcomes, the intergenerational transmission of ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and equality of opportunities. An open society reflects the 
fact that individual life chances do not (only) depend on social origin, i.e. they are not 
determined by birth. It was Sorokin (1927) who almost a century ago established a strong 
relationship between social mobility and democracy when he argued that democratic so-
cieties do not determine the social positions of individuals by birth. Open societies allow 
individuals to influence their life chances and outcomes by talent, motivation, and luck 
(Blanden and Machin, 2005: 2). Other scholars stress that the possibility of moving up 
the social ladder is also a requirement for modern industrial societies, a significant indi-
cator of individual freedom and therefore an important political goal itself (Róbert, 2010: 
523). Social mobility can therefore be considered an indicator of social fairness and equal 
opportunities. However, this political goal of equal opportunities does not necessarily 
imply the equality of outcomes. The political goal refers more to the aim of ensuring a 
level playing field (d'Addio, 2007).  
A fairly normative debate revolves about this level playing field and the question of the 
‘right’ degree of intergenerational mobility. No society is perfectly mobile or immobile 
and the question of the ‘right’ degree of mobility is hard to determine since some degree 
of persistence is certainly desirable and accepted. Parents transmit a whole range of ‘as-
sets’ to their children, among them being genes, wealth, material resources, social capital, 
knowledge, aspirations, and preferences. The joint distribution of these assets will most 
likely be unequal across a population, and from a social justice or fairness perspective, 
                                                 
5 Original quote translated by the author: ‘Downwards with the elevator […] the times of upward social 
mobility are long gone‘ (Storost, 2014: 1). 
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there is general consensus on the need to compensate individuals for some kinds of dis-
advantageous positions (Roemer, 2012). Roemer, an expert in the field of social justice 
and equality of opportunity research – argues that the differential transmission of eco-
nomic resources and the lack of knowledge transmission are examples of cases where 
compensation of a disadvantageous starting point is probably undisputed. Here, the state, 
respectively the school system, is in charge of compensation for initial disadvantages. In 
addition to that, Roemer considers it undisputed that schools are in charge of countering 
the parental transmission of falsely pessimistic aspirations or that the state somehow has 
to compensate for a parental lack of social capital. However, he admits that it is highly 
disputable how much the state should interfere in the transmission of genes and prefer-
ences. Compensation for an ‘unlucky genetic draw’ (Roemer, 2012: 483), especially with 
regard to those genes responsible for cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, raises two 
problematic issues. Roemer (2012) argues that first, genes can constitute a comparative 
advantage. From an efficiency perspective, each individual should pursue an occupation 
that corresponds to his or her abilities in order to raise the total output of a society.  
Following this perspective, compensation for ‘bad genetic luck’ seems inefficient. He 
suggests that second, from a self-ownership viewpoint, it could also be argued that each 
person should have the right to benefit from his or her comparative advantage. But this 
would clearly depend on one’s overall understanding of social justice and thus remains a 
normative question. Concerning preferences and values, Roemer argues further, a distinc-
tion between legitimate and non-legitimate preferences and values would be necessary in 
order to decide in favour or against interference into the transmission process. Whereas 
certain preferences like e.g. sexist or racist ones are desirable to be countered, he consid-
ers it a rather a normative question if the transmission of occupational preferences with 
its non-negligible consequences on future income and status is legitimate or not.  
Whereas ‘parents who are teachers may instill in their children a desire to be teachers, 
and bankers may transmit to their children the desire to earn high incomes […] [t]he ex-
tent to which coal miners instill in their children the preference for coal mining […] 
[based on their belief that] no other occupation is available to them should be compen-
sated, because it is really a low and incorrect aspiration, but to the extent that it is because 
they love the coal-mining culture, it is a true preference’ (Roemer, 2012: 486) and would 
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therefore be legitimate. In this vein, Roemer (2012: 487) puts forward a plea for recog-
nizing ‘the legitimacy of parents' transmitting to their children a variety of values, some 
of which will doubtless affect the children's material achievements’. His rather radical 
conclusion in case society does not assent to this view is that otherwise we could just as 
well dissolve families and raise children collectively. Against this background, it becomes 
clear that the ‘right’ degree of intergenerational transmission and mobility is not easy to 
determine while at the same time, a perfectly mobile or immobile society also does not 
seem to be desirable.  
Aside from this political goal of equality of opportunities, there is also a relevant social 
policy perspective of intergenerational mobility and two different angles that underline 
the relevance of the issue. First, some scholars argue that social policy should try to break 
cycles of disadvantages across generations and thus ‘prevent the development of a self-
replicating underclass’ (d'Addio, 2007: 70). Having the possibility to climb the social 
ladder by means of personal effort is a central factor in this context. On the other hand, 
preventing intergenerational downward mobility appears to be equally important, be it in 
terms of preventing the fall itself, or (similarly important) in terms of preventing negative 
consequences of downward mobility. One very important factor in this context is the la-
bour market status in the sense that temporary breaks in an employment history and 
problems in entering the labour market for the first time must not turn out as permanent 
scars (translating in downward mobility) but stay temporary blemishes. Social policy is 
in charge thereof, in order to secure individual and public welfare.  
Lastly, also the economic relevance of social mobility is not negligible. The central argu-
ment in this respect refers to ensuring economic efficiency such that the allocation of 
talents should be optimal. Accordingly, it is argued that only if the matching of employers 
and employees depends on achieved rather than ascribed characteristics, then an individ-
uals’ human capital and talent is fully utilized. Thereby, opportunities of social mobility 
also relate to economic efficiency and economic growth. Besides that, social mobility is 
also related to productivity effects. More specifically, the OECD argues that an inequality 
of opportunities might lead to adverse productivity effects if the missing possibility to 
influence one’s life chances by individual effort impacts people’s motivation, effort, and 
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productivity. This way, a lack of mobility prospects might adversely affect the overall 
efficiency and growth potential of the economy (OECD, 2010: 184).  
In sum, it becomes clear that social mobility in the form of intergenerational mobility is 
a very relevant topic from a political, social and economic perspective. Lasting, respec-
tively growing interest by both social scientists and policymakers demonstrates that there 
is a high awareness of the significance of the topic, but also underlines the necessity to 
contribute to previous research. 
1.3 Research objectives 
Having laid out the relevance of the overall research objective, social mobility, I will now 
give a brief account of the more specific research objectives that will be investigated in 
this thesis. The present thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how the experi-
ence of intergenerational mobility shapes social and political outcomes of individuals. 
More specifically, and in the language of an empirically working social scientist, this 
thesis is centred on the independent variable social mobility. It focuses on the conse-
quences of different dimensions of intergenerational mobility such as educational 
mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobility. These consequences 
can be divided into two dimensions: the social dimension, operationalised as the analysis 
of well-being effects of social mobility, and the political dimension, operationalised as 
the analysis of the association between social mobility and normative welfare state sup-
port.  
In order to arrive at a comprehensive account of this main research objective, several 
minor objectives are pursued. The first research objective is to establish an overview of 
basic debates and the state-of-the art findings of social mobility research in Europe. To 
this end, I will outline central hypotheses of the social mobility literature and summarise 
respective findings of earlier studies. 
The second research objective is to depict the status quo of intergenerational mobility of 
young Europeans today. Using different survey data sources, and mobility indicators (in 
particular, educational mobility, economic mobility, and expected mobility), I will pro-
vide an overview of the distribution of upward mobility, downward mobility and non-
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mobility among young Europeans. These analyses serve as a baseline for the subsequent 
analyses of mobility consequences since it is crucial to have an idea of the distribution of 
movements along the socioeconomic ladder before moving on to the analysis of conse-
quences thereof. Only when the extent of intergenerational movements directed upward 
or downward is assessed is it possible to assess the impact of mobility.  
The third research objective is to introduce the state-of-the art methodology suitable for 
the empirical analysis of mobility consequences. In this context, I will illustrate the meth-
odological challenge of disentangling mobility effects from level effects, such as social 
origin and social destination. Features and findings of conventional regression approaches 
will be contrasted with those of diagonal reference models, thereby emphasising the need 
to rely on a suitable analytical approach when interested in ‘net’ mobility effects, i.e. 
mobility effects over and above the effects that arriving or stemming from a low or high 
status position has.  
The fourth research objective is then to empirically analyse how the experience of social 
mobility shapes young Europeans’ well-being in the form of life satisfaction, self-re-
ported general health, and psychological distress in a country comparative perspective. 
To this end, I depict a newly developed theoretical framework (see Schuck and Steiber, 
2018) for deriving not only individual-level hypotheses, but also macro-level hypotheses 
on context-specific differences in mobility effects. In particular, this theoretical frame-
work relies on typologies of welfare regimes, their institutional setup and other indicators 
of countries’ social and economic statuses, which are arguably influential with respect to 
their effects on social mobility.  
The fifth and last research objective is to empirically investigate how the experiences and 
expectations of social mobility, both upward and downward, impact young people’s atti-
tudes of normative support for the welfare state. As I will argue, it is especially the 
association between mobility and the normative dimension of welfare state support that 
can be expected to differ from other welfare support dimensions, since the experience of 
social mobility might relativise the importance of material self-interest as a determinant 
of normative welfare state attitudes. Drawing from different strands of literature, I inves-
tigate two sets of competing hypotheses based on the assumption that either self-interest 
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or factors beyond self-interest determine the young people’s normative welfare state sup-
port. 
1.4 Research design and outline of chapters 
In order to pursue the five research objectives previously mentioned, this thesis follows 
an integrated research design. It is based on the empirical analysis of survey data, namely 
the European Social Survey Rounds 4 – 8 (ESS ERIC, 2017), and the CUPESSE two-
generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018).  
The analytical approach is based on intergenerational mobility as a central independent 
variable, and relies on different operationalisations of mobility such as intergenerational 
educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility (both indicators of past mobil-
ity experiences), and mobility expectations for the future. Central outcome dimensions of 
this thesis can be differentiated into social and political outcomes. Hereby, the former 
refers to well-being effects of intergenerational mobility in terms of life satisfaction, self-
reported general health, as well as psychological distress. The latter dimension refers to 
the analyses of attitudinal effects of social mobility. In particular, what shall be subsumed 
under the ‘political dimension’ refers to the association between social mobility and nor-
mative attitudes toward the welfare state. As far as the theoretical framework focuses on 
and suggests cross-country differences in mobility effects, I rely on a country-compara-
tive approach (see Chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, this thesis combines both descriptive 
and multivariate analyses of the phenomenon of interest, thus aiming to arrive at a com-
prehensive picture of the overall research objective, social mobility.  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, the second chapter 
draws an overall picture of basic debates and previous findings in social mobility re-
search. More specifically, it first describes the variation of social mobility rates over time 
and between countries and continues with the role of context variables for chances of 
upward mobility and risks of downward mobility. The chapter concludes with a critical 
discussion of the effects of comparing evidence based on different mobility dimensions 
(income mobility vs. class mobility, in particular).  
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The third chapter is then concerned with the description of the survey data and statistical 
methods used in the empirical analysis of the remaining chapters. It presents the different 
survey data used in the analyses and discusses the advantages and limitations thereof. Not 
least, it presents and discusses diagonal reference models, which will be used in Chapters 
5 and 6 for the analysis of mobility effects.  
The fourth chapter turns to the descriptive analysis of the status quo of intergenerational 
mobility of young Europeans. It illustrates the cross-country variation in intergenerational 
educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility, and mobility expectations for 
the future among young Europeans. The description is followed by an excursus on the 
congruence of past mobility experiences and expectations for the future.  
The fifth chapter concentrates on the statistical analysis of the association between inter-
generational educational mobility and individual well-being. After having established the 
theoretical framework, the respective micro- and macro-level hypotheses are conse-
quently tested in statistical analyses of European Social Survey data.  
The sixth chapter then turns to the statistical analysis of the association between intergen-
erational mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Relying on two 
different data sources (European Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2017) and CUPESSE two-
generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018), this chapter integrates the analysis of several di-
mensions of intergenerational mobility and their effects on normative welfare state 
attitudes.  
The seventh and concluding chapter finally summarises the empirical findings, acknowl-
edges the limitations of the here-applied research approach and reflects on the 
implications of the analysis for current debates and future research. 
 16 
2 Social mobility research in Europe: Basic debates and state-of-the art 
Research on social mobility, especially from a cross-country comparative perspective, 
has a long tradition. For decades, social scientists have investigated empirically how so-
cial mobility developed over time and varied between countries. Investigating 
consequences of mobility in a comparative approach naturally has to build on this foun-
dation, even if trends over time and cross-country differences are not per se the focus of 
this thesis. However, this short introduction of basic debates and empirical evidence in 
social mobility research will help the reader in subsequent chapters, when I come back to 
theoretical expectations and evidence of previous research.  
The starting point for this review will be empirical studies on trends in intergenerational 
social mobility in Europe with particular emphasis on variation over time and countries 
in Europe. Subsequently, the role of contextual factors on the macro-level will be de-
scribed. The chapter will then conclude with a brief summary.  
2.1 Variation between countries and over time  
One of the central questions in social mobility research has long been the extent of cross-
country differences in social mobility as well as the development of these patterns over 
time (see, e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989; 
Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Lipset and Bendix, 1959). Among others, two theoretical ap-
proaches that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s gained particular importance in the sense 
that they had a lasting impact on empirical research and the scientific debate: trendless 
approaches and the corresponding ‘Featherman Jones Hauser (FJH) hypothesis’ versus 
the liberal theory of industrialism and the corresponding ‘modernisation hypothesis’.  
Among the proponents of trendless approaches, the first one is known as the Lipset-Zet-
terberg (LZ) theory. It claims that ‘the overall pattern of social mobility appears to be 
much the same in the industrial societies of various Western countries’ (Lipset and Zet-
terberg, 1959: 13; emphasis in original). Based on the comparison of mobility tables of a 
dozen different countries, Lipset and Zetterberg concluded that the degree of intergener-
ational mobility in industrial societies is rather similar and shows little variation over 
time. While their hypothesis basically predicts stable mobility rates for industrialised 
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countries, they acknowledge some kind of threshold effect with higher mobility rates for 
industrialised compared to pre-industrialised countries. Apart from that, they expect little 
variation both across time and across countries. However, their hypothesis is restricted to 
absolute mobility rates, which strongly depend on the occupational structure of a country. 
With later generations of social mobility researchers acknowledging this fact by shifting 
their attention to relative mobility rates, Lipset and Zetterberg’s hypothesis became the 
subject of increasing criticism (see, e.g., Featherman, Jones and Hauser, 1975).  
Featherman, Jones and Hauser called the LZ-thesis into question, suggesting that varia-
tion in total mobility rates might rather result from changes in the occupational structures 
than due to differences in the movements between occupations. Considering the LZ-thesis 
‘falsified’ (1975: 340), they suggested similar patterns concerning relative mobility, i.e. 
invariant mobility chances as long as changes in origin and destination distributions are 
controlled for. In what became known as the FJH-hypothesis,6 they argue that ‘the geno-
typical pattern of mobility (circulation mobility) in industrial societies with a market 
economy and a nuclear family system is basically the same. The phenotypical pattern of 
mobility (observed mobility) differs according to the rate of change in the occupational 
structure, exogenously determined (as far as an individual family is concerned)’ (Feath-
erman, Jones and Hauser, 1975: 340). In other words, the FJH hypothesis shifted attention 
away from absolute towards relative mobility rates and suggested that there are no differ-
ences in relative mobility rates, neither over time nor between countries.  
The liberal theory of industrialism, which is often linked to functionalist sociologists like 
Parsons (1960) and Kerr et al. (1960), and was later advanced by important contributions 
from Blau and Duncan (1967), and Treiman (1970), directly contradicts the previously 
described trendless approaches. It argues that economic development, i.e. above all, the 
transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial society, will lead to increasing relative 
mobility rates, even if structural changes are accounted for. According to the logic of 
industrialism, the transition from pre-industrial to industrial societies will require a pro-
cess of rationalisation and thus lead to a more meritocratic society. In particular, 
industrialisation is argued to lead to high rates of social mobility, with upward mobility 
                                                 
6 The FJH hypothesis is also called ‘common social fluidity’ hypothesis (see, e.g., Ganzeboom, Luijkx and 
Treiman, 1989). 
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predominating downward mobility, equality of mobility opportunities, and increasing 
trends for both mobility and equality of opportunity degrees (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992: 5). The underlying reasoning is based on the assumption that the intensifying com-
petition among employers will lead to greater emphasis on merit in allocating people into 
positions in the labour market. Thereby, achieved rather than ascribed characteristics will 
be decisive for individual recruitment decisions, and thus strengthen the role of educa-
tional attainment for determining one’s class destination (Breen, 2004b: 5). This line of 
argumentation is also known as the ‘increased merit selection hypothesis’ (Jonsson, 
1996).  
The existing evidence is far from straightforward with regard to these contradicting the-
oretical arguments. Yet, one of the few aspects where mobility research has come to a 
consensus is the invalidation of the LZ-hypothesis, which happened repeatedly and rela-
tively soon after its publication (Broom and Jones, 1969; Hazelrigg and Garnier, 1976; 
Hazelrigg, 1974; Miller, S. M., 1960). It turned out to be impossible to find a certain level 
of industrialisation where mobility rates would show no between-country differences. 
Moreover, as demonstrated in the replacement of the LZ-hypothesis by the FJH-hypoth-
esis, the fact that absolute mobility rates depend on the occupational structure of a given 
society was acknowledged in later theoretical predictions. 
Concerning the rivalling FJH and modernisation hypotheses, the few studies that provide 
a large-scale, comparative analysis of industrial societies come to different conclusions. 
The first of these large-scale studies, which is considered pioneer work still today, was 
already conducted in the mid-1980s and titled the ‘Comparative Analysis of Social Mo-
bility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN)’, directed by Müller, Goldthorpe, and Erikson 
(see, Müller and Goldthorpe, 1988). Here, Erikson and Goldthorpe used cross-sectional 
data from nine European countries from the late 1960s and early or mid-1970s (plus sup-
plementary analyses for six more countries with shorter observation periods). Their cross-
country comparative operationalisation of concepts like e.g. the Erikson, Goldthorpe, Por-
tocarero (EGP) class scheme or the CASMIN educational scheme had an ongoing impact 
on social mobility research up to today7 and its main findings have been summarised in 
                                                 
7 For a presentation of the EGP class scheme, see, e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). For a presentation 
of the CASMIN scheme, see, e.g., König, Lüttinger and Müller (1988). 
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Erikson and Goldthorpe’s ‘The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial 
Societies’ (1992). Their main conclusion is one of basic similarity among industrial soci-
eties, thus replacing the FJH thesis of no trend by the assumption of a common, or at least 
a very similar pattern of social mobility. Cross-national differences, which they do find 
are attributed to reflecting ‘effects specific to particular societies at particular times’ 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 388), are therefore not regarded as contradictory to the 
FJH thesis. Based on their findings in favour of FJH, they proposed a slightly amended 
version of the FJH hypothesis which reads as follows: ‘a basic similarity will be found in 
patterns of social fluidity […] across all nations with market economics and nuclear fam-
ily systems where no sustained attempts have been made to use the power of a modern 
state apparatus in order to modify the processes, or the outcomes of the processes, 
through which class inequalities are produced and intergenerationally reproduced’ 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1987: 162; emphasis in original). The possibility of political 
intervention shaping the chances of intergenerational mobility is an important extension 
of the FJH hypothesis with which Erikson and Goldthorpe aimed to fill a major omission. 
Erikson and Goldthorpe’s conclusion of basic similarity in industrial societies was later 
challenged based on the grounds that the analysis of age groups was found unsound for 
the analysis of cohort changes. For example, Breen and Jonsson (1997) particularly crit-
icised the measurement error associated with the measurement of class origin for older 
age groups.  
The basic similarity or FJH hypotheses has, however, been challenged by others who 
found support for the modernisation hypothesis. For example, the comparative analysis 
of 149 intergenerational class mobility tables in 35 countries by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and 
Treiman (1989) found substantively important cross-national variation in the origin-des-
tination association. More specifically, although they found similar mobility patterns, ‘at 
the same time there are substantial cross-national and cross-temporal differences in the 
extent of mobility’ (Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989: 47; emphasis in original). 
Their findings thus contradict the FJH hypothesis of common social fluidity and instead 
support the modernisation hypothesis. More specifically, their finding of an annual re-
duction of approximately one percent in the strength of the association between class 
origin and destination indicates a trend towards increasing social fluidity over time. How-
ever, their results have subsequently been called into question for data quality problems 
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and model choice (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) as well as lacking replicability of the 
general trend towards increasing social fluidity (Wong, 1994).  
More recent evidence from a large-scale comparative study on eleven countries by Breen 
(2004a) indeed finds a common pattern of social fluidity, yet with considerable differ-
ences in their strengths. Based on these findings, they reject the FJH hypothesis as well 
as Erikson and Goldthorpe’s hypothesis of basic similarity. They also find a decline in 
the intergenerational association of origin and destination, yet only for some countries. 
Despite these diverging results regarding theoretical expectations on the development of 
social fluidity over time and between countries, it was never disputed that there are sta-
tistically significant variations in social fluidity (Beller and Hout, 2006b). Rather, the 
dispute revolved around the question of whether these differences were substantial, or 
systematic, and if they were worth discussing after all. After several generations of social 
mobility research, consensus has now been reached that cross-country differences in the 
degree of social fluidity are substantial. While some countries are relatively open, allow-
ing for upward mobility of those from less privileged backgrounds (e.g., countries with 
socialist and social democratic welfare regimes, and countries with better educated labour 
forces (Beller and Hout, 2006b)), others show more closed class structures and/ or hier-
archies with greater barriers for intergenerational mobility (Breen, 2004a; Hout and 
DiPrete, 2006). However, it remains unclear how exactly these cross-national differences 
in the degree of intergenerational mobility can be explained. Some argue in favour of 
differences being idiosyncratic, i.e. stemming from country-specific historical events and 
institutions (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Other scholars argue in favour of country-
level characteristics of the economic and political systems as predictors for cross-national 
differences (see, e.g., Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989). 
2.2 The role of contextual variables 
Previous mobility research offers various hypotheses on the relevance of macro-level fac-
tors for explaining national variation in intergenerational social mobility rates. Whereas 
the importance of economic development was recognised right from the beginning of 
comparative stratification research (Treiman, 1970; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959), it took 
some time until the role of non-economic factors was considered. Grusky and Hauser 
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(1984) were among the first to emphasise the role of noneconomic variables and over the 
four generations of comparative stratification research, many contextual factors that could 
possibly influence rates of social mobility were proposed (see, e.g., Beller and Hout, 
2006b; Pfeffer and Hällsten, 2012; Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Sieben and de Graaf, 
2001). Above all, welfare regime types, equality of educational opportunity, income ine-
quality and the distance between social classes have been proposed to be influential for a 
society’s openness. In the following, these macro variables will be set in context with the 
underlying theoretical mechanisms linking them to cross-national differences in intergen-
erational mobility rates and a summary of the empirical evidence.  
2.2.1 Economic development / industrialization / modernisation 
By far the largest attention was paid to the relationship between economic development 
and social mobility rates which is commonly summarised in the industrialisation or mod-
ernisation hypothesis. Lipset and Zetterberg (1959) were among the first to stress the role 
of industrialisation for intergenerational mobility, arguing that absolute mobility rates are 
influenced by industrialisation and the accompanying change in the occupational struc-
ture. In contrast to Lipset and Zetterberg, Treiman (1970) argued that industrialisation 
was important not only for absolute but also relative intergenerational mobility rates. 
While he agreed with Lipset and Zetterberg on the association between the industrialisa-
tion process and absolute mobility rates, he furthermore suggested an increase in relative 
mobility rates, i.e., social openness. The underlying reasoning rests on the assumption 
that there was a historical shift from a stratification process based on ascription towards 
a stratification system based on achievement occuring along with increasing urbanisation, 
mass communication and industrialisation. In sum, proponents of the industrialisation 
hypothesis argue that the process of industrialisation will translate into a long-term de-
cline in the strength of the association between social origin and destination.  
However, the empirical investigation of these claims, which largely relies on economic 
development as the most important measure of industrialisation, has led to conflicting 
conclusions. The rising meritocracy hypothesis is questioned since ‘findings […] are to a 
significant degree inconsistent with the temporal and cross-national regularities that 
would be expected under the functionalist theory’ (Goldthorpe, 2014: 268). More specif-
ically, the link between educational attainment and social destinations was actually found 
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to weaken instead of strengthen, i.e. educational attainment was becoming less closely 
related to an individual’s social destination (thus contradicting the industrialisation hy-
pothesis) (Breen, 2004a; Breen and Luijkx, 2004: 393). Furthermore, several studies lend 
support to the ‘persisting inequality’ thesis (see, e.g. Barone, 2009 for a review), ques-
tioning a weakening association between social origin and educational attainment. As for 
the overall association between origin and destination, there is evidence for a weakening 
tendency in some societies (Breen, 2004b; Breen and Luijkx, 2004: 385–90) but ‘trend-
less fluctuation’ in others (see, e.g., Falcon, 2012). Some studies find that economic 
development and mobility rates are unrelated (Hazelrigg and Garnier, 1976; Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen and Luijkx, 2004). Others find a positive relationship between 
economic development and intergenerational mobility rates (Grusky and Hauser, 1984; 
Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge, 1979), yet others claim to find a positive, but nonlinear 
relationship (Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Featherman, Jones and Hauser, 1975; Lipset and 
Zetterberg, 1959). All in all, existing evidence can fairly be summarized as being incon-
clusive concerning the relationship between economic development and mobility rates.  
2.2.2 Welfare regime type 
The welfare regime type or state action in general constitute non-economic factors that 
are frequently brought forward in order to explain cross-national differences in social 
mobility rates. However, ‘[t]he link from government action to mobility remains one of 
the major unresolved issues in comparative stratification research’ (Beller and Hout, 
2006b: 353). Despite being ‘natural bedfellows’ (Tranby, 2006: 405), the two prominent 
strands of research – welfare state research on the one hand and social stratification and 
mobility research on the other hand – have long disregarded each other’s findings. Given 
the long research tradition of both literatures, it is quite surprising that first steps towards 
integrating the social stratification and welfare state literature have been taken relatively 
late (see, e.g., Tranby, 2006).  
How can state action and the welfare regime type theoretically influence the path from 
social origin to social destination? According to Beller and Hout (2006b), the state can 
influence the link between origins and destinations if two conditions are met. First, the 
state must successfully reduce the inequality of outcomes (above all, inequality of in-
comes, and inequality of educational opportunity). Second, the inequality of outcomes 
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must also affect mobility. Only if both conditions hold will the state be able to influence 
social mobility. As regards the influence of the state on the inequality of outcomes, the 
welfare state literature has clearly established that this holds true (see, e.g., Fischer et al., 
1996; Korpi, 2003). For example, the state can compensate for market-generated inequal-
ities by either direct redistribution or via institutions that help redistribution indirectly, be 
it in the form of encouraging worker-employer cooperation or constraining hiring, pro-
motion and compensation decisions and thereby creating a greater equality of outcomes 
(Beller and Hout, 2006b). As for the influence of inequality of outcomes and social mo-
bility, this mechanism is far more difficult to establish and therefore disputed. Beller and 
Hout (2006b: 354) argue that institutions ‘can hardly be expected to affect the association 
between parents’ and contemporary workers’ occupations’. The underlying reasoning is 
based on their assessment that wage setting institutions can in fact influence income ine-
quality, but can hardly affect the existing distribution of employment.  
Instead, what the state can do is, according to Beller and Hout, encourage the equality of 
educational opportunity by implementing educational policies. These can affect the de-
gree of social mobility that is mediated by education. The direct link between social origin 
and destination in turn cannot be influenced by educational policies. If the bigger part of 
the association between social origin and destination is mediated through education, state 
action in the form of educational policy can make a major difference in fostering social 
mobility. For example, policies aiming at subsidized tuition fees for disadvantaged youths 
or the expansion of higher education might be possible means. If, on the other hand, the 
direct origin-destination-link plays the major role in the association of social origin and 
destination compared to the indirect origin-education-destination-link, then national dif-
ferences in educational policies could hardly make a difference in cross-country social 
mobility variation.  
Other scholars elaborate in more detail on the possible mechanisms of how state inter-
vention might affect social mobility. Hadjar and Samuel (2015), e.g., refer to the general 
function of welfare states in terms of compensating for individual disadvantages, be it in 
terms of low educational level or low status. Tranby (2006) argues in favour of two dis-
tinct paths toward equality of opportunity: The social democratic strategy with its 
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generous social policies on the one hand, and the liberal strategy targeted at improving 
access to education on the other.  
Esping-Andersen (2015) gets more specific in what government actions exactly influence 
the opportunity structure. He suggests the democratisation of the education system and 
female labour force participation to be the driving sources and draws attention to so-called 
marginal effects of policies. By that, Esping-Andersen stresses that the marginal value of 
a policy measure like child allowances for example might be far greater for low-income 
than for high-income families. Summary measures of intergenerational mobility might 
mask the non-linearity of mobility patterns, i.e. strong mobility effects are seen in the 
middle of a distribution, but hardly any down- or upward mobility forms the very top or 
bottom of distributions. Crettaz and Jacot (2014) argue in favour of a social policy effect 
on intergenerational mobility. According to their social investment perspective, early 
childhood education and care will promote intergenerational educational mobility (see 
also Esping-Andersen, 2002). However, they underline that ‘the question may not so 
much be whether these policies can help, but rather under which conditions they have 
desirable effects’ (Crettaz and Jacot, 2014: 660). In particular, they stress the importance 
of the quality of provided services and the coordination of policies (above all, the combi-
nation with policies reducing economic inequalities).  
The theoretical reasoning depicted above suggests that social reforms play the major role 
in linking welfare states with intergenerational mobility. In 1971, Parkin had already for-
mulated the socialist ideology hypothesis, asserting that countries with left-wing 
governments will have larger educational equality and occupational mobility due to pol-
icies to reduce social inequality (Parkin, 1971). In the same vein, various scholars 
hypothesised that social mobility is higher in societies with social democratic govern-
ments and former Communist societies (Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Sieben and de Graaf, 
2001; Grusky and Hauser, 1984). It is argued that in those societies the state takes over 
important functions of the family. For example, parents might have less influence on their 
children’s decisions if a substantial part of socialisation takes part outside the family 
(Sieben and de Graaf, 2001), (e.g., if children are in state-organized child care institu-
tions). Using fairly similar theoretical reasoning, the role of social policy and political 
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regime is often subsumed under the role of the welfare regime type (see, e.g., Beller and 
Hout, 2006b).  
Finally, another perspective to look at the role of welfare states in intergenerational mo-
bility is associated with the role of insurances and incentives. DiPrete (2002) developped 
the idea of so-called ‘mobility regimes’, which he undermined by a conceptual model of 
different degrees of insurance against social risks. His comparative typology is based on 
institutional structures that promote the stability of household living conditions, including 
the influence of rates at which mobility-generating events occur, insurance against the 
potential results of adverse effects, taxation against the potential gains of positive effects, 
and the promotion of counter-mobility events such as, for example,re-employment. Since 
the provision of public insurance against major life-course risks can be considered a cen-
tral aspect of modern welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), DiPrete (2002) sees a close 
connection between welfare states and mobility regimes. While DiPrete’s model focuses 
on various types of insurance that affect the course of intragenerational mobility, Pfeffer 
and Hällsten (2012) recently introduced a theoretical model for the comparative study of 
intergenerational mobility that also relies on the role of insurance. It is argued that ‘[f]or 
the intergenerational case, the main mobility-inducing events are those structuring edu-
cational careers (entry, graduation, and drop-out) and labour market entry (school-to-
work transitions)’ (Pfeffer and Hällsten, 2012: 3). Thus, the welfare states provide differ-
ent types of insurance that affect not only the course of intragenerational mobility, but 
also the process of intergenerational mobility. 
How about the empirical evidence on the role of welfare regimes in explaining intergen-
erational mobility rates and cross-national differences in the association between social 
origin and destination? Several studies show that mobility rates tend to be highest in social 
democratic and post-Communist regimes, i.e. social democratic and post-Communist re-
gimes foster a weaker origin-destination association (see, e.g., Grusky and Hauser, 1984; 
Sieben and de Graaf, 2001; Yaish and Andersen, 2012; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; 
Breen, 2004a; Esping-Andersen, 2015). Conservative welfare regimes like Italy, Ireland, 
Austria, or Germany in comparison show a strong association between social origin and 
destination i.e. lower mobility rates. The liberal welfare states like the United Kingdom, 
France and the United States, take an intermediate position between the social democratic 
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and conservative welfare regimes (Beller and Hout, 2006b). It is therefore acknowledged 
that redistributive policies play an important role in fostering social mobility, whereas at 
the same time, the finding of high mobility rates in Israel or the Netherlands indicates that 
there must be other drivers, too (Breen and Jonsson, 2005: 233). Another important find-
ing, in addition to this ranking of countries according to their welfare-regime-typical 
mobility rates, is that social and educational policy appear to interact, visible, for exam-
ple, by the fact ‘that the tendency for educational access to lower the origin–destination 
association is most pronounced in the liberal welfare setting where the association would 
otherwise be greatest’ (Beller and Hout, 2006b: 354).  
2.2.3 Education systems 
Education is considered the most important determinant of class position (Breen, 2010a) 
and therefore a central driver of intergenerational mobility, both from a micro- as well as 
a macro-level of explanation. As already described earlier, there are two distinct pathways 
between social origin and destination. One is the direct link between social origin and 
destination. The other, indirect pathway is mediated by education. Previous research has 
identified two mechanisms that are important for the indirect influence of social origin on 
destination, i.e. the indirect pathway of the OED triangle, which is mediated by education. 
The first of those mechanisms is called equalisation and refers to decreasing inequality 
in educational attainment or more equality of educational opportunities (Breen, 2010a). 
Besides this first mechanism, it is increasingly acknowledged that it would be too restric-
tive to only focus on educational equalisation as driver of intergenerational mobility. 
Instead, the role of educational expansion as a distinct mechanism by which intergenera-
tional mobility is influenced is stressed (Breen, 2010a).  
As for the first mechanism of equalisation and its impact on intergenerational mobility, 
the underlying reasoning is that a decreasing influence of social origin on educational 
attainment (the so-called OE link) will translate into a decreasing overall influence of 
social origin on destination (OED link). But how can the link between social origin and 
educational attainment be weakened? It is frequently argued that the institutional structure 
of the educational system, in particular its degree of stratification and standardisation, are 
key drivers of inequality of educational opportunity (see, e.g., van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 
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2010). Stratification refers to the degree to which an education system differentiates ed-
ucational opportunities at various educational levels (Allmendinger, 1989). What is 
commonly referred to as tracking or streaming of students is thought to have conse-
quences on all levels of education. For example, parental guidance in choosing 
educational career paths is argued to have a much stronger impact in highly stratified 
education systems and thus might lead to stronger inequality in educational attainment 
(Pfeffer, 2008). The empirical evidence supports the assumption of highly stratified edu-
cation systems leading to greater educational inequality (van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 
2010; Pfeffer, 2008; Crettaz and Jacot, 2014). In addition to stratification, the standardi-
sation of the education system, i.e. the degree to which the quality of education is defined 
as a nationwide standard (Allmendinger, 1989: 233), is also argued to impact educational 
inequality (van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). Van de Werfhorst and Mijs (2010) recom-
mend analysing the impact of both institutional features jointly, since they are related and 
may also interact. The empirical evidence, however, indicates that standardisation has no 
effect if stratification is taken into account (Pfeffer, 2008).  
In addition to an equalisation of education, the massive increase in formal educational 
attainment during the last century, i.e., educational expansion, is also expected to affect 
the rates of intergenerational mobility. The underlying process is compositional, i.e. it 
holds true only if the educational expansion is combined with a three-way interaction 
between class origin, educational attainment, and class destination (Breen, 2010a). Put 
differently, if successive cohorts achieve higher educational levels and if the origin-des-
tination association is weaker for high than for lower levels of education, then there will 
be a decrease of the gross association between origins and destinations. The logic behind 
this argument is that more and more people reach high levels of education where the 
association between social origin and destination is weaker. Therefore, the average OD 
link for the population as a whole will similarly weaken. Hout (1988) was the first to draw 
attention to the effects of an educational advancement of the labour force on social fluidity 
and Breen (2010a) extended his line of argumentation later. Concerning the empirical 
evidence, the existence of the three-way interaction between class origin, educational at-
tainment, and class destination was found for France (Vallet, 2004), Sweden (Erikson and 
Jonsson, 1998), and Germany (Breen and Luijkx, 2007). The compositional effect was 
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found to positively impact social fluidity in Britain, Sweden, and Germany (Breen, 
2010a).  
2.2.4 Income inequality and the distance between social classes 
Income inequality belongs to those macro-level factors that are much disputed in their 
role with regard to intergenerational mobility. Proponents of its mediating relationship 
between social origin and destination argue that large socioeconomic gaps between the 
lower and upper end of the social ladder may lead to lower rates of intergenerational 
mobility, since elites can and will have a higher motivation to protect the status quo and 
thus prevent intergenerational mobility (see, e.g., Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge, 1979). If 
income inequality is low, elites will see less necessity of ensuring their position by hin-
dering mobility (Yaish and Andersen, 2012). It is therefore hypothesised that the distance 
between social classes will affect intergenerational mobility rates (Grusky and Hauser, 
1984). Other scholars propose an opposing scenario by predicting a negative relationship 
between income inequality and social mobility based on incentive arguments. For exam-
ple, Hout (2004: 971) states that ‘[t]he incentive to pursue mobility (either individually 
or collectively) is proportional to the amount of cross-sectional inequality. As inequality 
approaches zero, the payoff to mobility does too.’ This argumentation is in line with lib-
eral economists’ and structural functional sociologists’ view on the necessity of unequal 
rewards and inequality for the allocation of a society’s best talented members to important 
social positions (see, e.g., Davis and Moore, 1945). Empirical evidence is not straightfor-
ward as to what line of argumentation holds true. There are some studies that find a 
positive relationship between mobility and inequality (Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Breen 
and Luijkx, 2004), whereas others find the opposite (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; An-
drews and Leigh, 2009).  
To conclude, what does the literature tell us on macro-level determinants of social mobil-
ity? Some scholars argue that economic development goes along with a development 
from stratification based on ascription towards stratification based on achievement, yet 
the jury is still out on if this assumption holds true. Furthermore, previous studies argue 
for higher mobility rates being associated with welfare regime types that offer redistribu-
tive policies, equality of (educational) opportunity, a strong role of the state in originally 
familial functions (like e.g., child-care) and the insurance of major life-course risks (such 
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as e.g., unemployment). Equality of opportunity, especially with regard to educational 
attainment (i.e., above all, less stratified systems) seems to enhance mobility prospects. 
And finally, social inequality is argued to be conducive (incentive effects) or preventive 
(status-protection motivation of elites) with the empirical evidence being still inconclu-
sive. Against this background, it appears all the more important and interesting to put not 
only the analyses of intergenerational mobility itself, but also the analyses of mobility 
consequences in a comparative perspective. 
2.3 Different approaches – different results: income vs. class mobility 
Intergenerational mobility is a research topic that attracts and has attracted interest from 
various disciplines in social science. Among others, it is studied by both sociologists and 
economists and as mentioned before, their approaches differ enormously. Whereas soci-
ologists often base their empirical analyses on class mobility, economists are traditionally 
more interested in earnings and income mobility (for an overview on sociological litera-
ture, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004a); for an overview on 
economics literature, see Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Dev-
ereux (2011)). Given these very distinct approaches, it comes as no surprise that results 
with respect to international rankings over time and space vary substantially. As such, 
claims have been raised based on undifferentiated interpretations of declining mobility 
rates by policymakers and media (Bukodi et al., 2014). In the British case, Bukodi et al. 
(2014) argue that the widespread belief of declining mobility rates is solely based on one 
economic study that is analysing intergenerational income mobility rates. However, Bu-
kodi et al. (2014), show that neither absolute nor relative intergenerational class mobility 
rates are declining, thus contradicting findings on intergenerational income mobility. 
Similar attempts to draw attention to divergent findings on intergenerational mobility be-
tween sociology and economics have been made by Torche (2015) and Blanden (2013).  
Conceptually, two perspectives on the divergent findings exist. First, one strand of the 
literature argues that economists and sociologists capture completely different phenom-
ena by analysing intergenerational mobility based on either income or class. Erikson and 
Goldthorpe (2010) for example, argue that divergent findings on intergenerational income 
mobility and intergenerational class mobility result from being different phenomena. 
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Moreover, they raise the question of why social and income mobility should change uni-
formly at all. Second, another possibility to approach the topic is to view income and class 
mobility as two different operationalisations of a common concept, namely the transmis-
sion of advantages and disadvantages from one generation to another with its associated 
impact on future life chances (Breen, Mood and Jonsson, 2015). Recently, Breen, Mood 
and Jonsson (2015) made a first attempt to reveal the formal and empirical relationship 
between income and social mobility by asking ‘how much of the income correlations 
across generations could be accounted for by social mobility’ (Breen, Mood and Jonsson, 
2015: 3). Their analysis reveals a 30 to 50 percent overlap of income and social class 
mobility and illustrates that the two approaches capture distinct aspects, albeit with some 
degree of overlap. 
Economists are primarily interested in the relation between parental permanent income 
and children’s permanent income since Friedman (1957) proposed the permanent income 
expectation to determine consumption and ultimate economic welfare. Whereas theoret-
ically it would be possible to analyse both income and earnings, the economic literature 
is dominated by analysis of the elasticity of sons’ earnings with respect to fathers’ earn-
ings (Blanden, 2013: 40). The earnings indicator normally ranges between 0, indicating 
that earnings of parents and children are completely unrelated, and 1, indicating that earn-
ings of parents are perfectly mirrored in the earnings of their children. Non-labour 
income, people without paid employment, and transmission processes of females are, 
however, mostly neglected.  
The growing interest in the topic of intergenerational mobility becomes visible in the 
increasing amount of cross-national comparative evidence (d'Addio, 2007; Björklund and 
Jäntti, 2009; Black and Devereux, 2011; Blanden, 2013; Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 
Groves, 2005; Causa and Johansson, 2010; Ermisch, Jäntti and Smeeding, 2012; Solon, 
1999). In one of the most recent publications, Blanden (2013) conducts an international 
ranking of intergenerational earnings elasticities based on single-country studies. He 
draws particular attention to the fact that we can observe stark differences between de-
veloped and less developed countries. Besides that, it appears as if Nordic countries have 
high rates of intergenerational mobility compared to the other countries. However, this 
interpretation has to remain cautious, since the indicated standard errors are partly very 
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large, making the ranking very difficult, and Sweden and the USA for example can sta-
tistically not be distinguished.  
Comparing these elasticity figures to the most recent available ranking of social class 
fluidity reveals major differences. For example, according to the findings of Breen 
(2004a), Germany appears to be the least mobile country, a picture that is not supported 
by Blanden’s ranking of intergenerational income elasticity. A similar divergence in 
country rankings was found for the United States, which in terms of earnings or income 
mobility often ranks as one of the less mobile countries among advanced industrial coun-
tries, while intergenerational class mobility analyses find the United States to be relatively 
fluid (Torche, 2015; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Blanden, 2013). Furthermore, Torche 
(2015) points to the fact that correlations of economic inequality and intergenerational 
mobility were found to be strong for income/earnings analyses, but non-existent for class 
analyses. In addition, Torche (2013) found that educational attainment can explain most 
of the association between class origin and destination, but mediates only half of the as-
sociation between parental family income and individual family income.  
These differences clearly illustrate that the measurement approaches of socioeconomic 
standing and its intergenerational transmission come with substantial discrepancies. For 
a differentiated picture of causes and consequences of social mobility, these discrepancies 
should be kept in mind. 
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3 Data and methods used in this study 
This study uses different data sources and statistical methods depending on the suitability 
for the underlying research objective. This chapter will briefly describe the data sources 
that serve as a basis for the empirical analyses conducted in this thesis. Subsequently, the 
statistical methods used in this thesis will be introduced.  
3.1 The European Social Survey 
One of the data sources used for the empirical analyses in this thesis is the European 
Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a scientific multi-country survey with a cross-sectional 
and partly repetitive design. To date, it has been administered in more than 30 countries 
and eight rounds of fieldwork covering different country samples and topics (ESS ERIC, 
2017). The ESS applies strict random probability sampling on respondents aged 15 and 
older from the non-institutionalized population. High comparability of the study is en-
sured by minimum target response rates (70%) and rigorous translation protocols. 
Interviews are conducted face-to-face and include questions on a variety of topics like 
sociopolitical orientations, values, demographics, and socioeconomics. The ESS provides 
the unique opportunity to study cross-national differences in the social and political cor-
relates of intergenerational social mobility, especially with regard to intergenerational 
educational mobility. Cross-national analyses of educational mobility crucially depend 
on the comparability of educational levels. Given the huge heterogeneity of education 
systems across Europe, it was of central importance for the data source to have a compa-
rable measurement of educational degrees in order to avoid drawing the wrong 
conclusions. The ESS makes use of a measurement that was explicitly developed and 
validated for exactly this purpose (Schneider, 2010): the European Social Survey version 
of the International Standard Classification of Education (ES-ISCED). It is an extended 
version of the International Standard Classification of Education 97 (ISCED 97), reflect-
ing ‘different types of education within levels of education by considering ISCED sub-
dimensions, most importantly “programme orientation”’ (Schneider, 2010: 343). One of 
the big advantages of this measurement is that it can be applied for most countries in the 
world by simply deriving the ES-ISCED measurement from ISCED levels and its sub-
dimensions. 
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Given the focus of cross-national comparability in educational levels as one of the central 
explanatory variables of this thesis, subsequent analyses will use only those ESS data that 
implement the ES-ISCED measurement. This is the case for ESS rounds 4 to 8, while 
rounds 1 to 3 were not able to fully harmonise the old education classifications into the 
more refined scheme. Therefore, the subsequent empirical analyses will only use data 
from rounds 4 to 8 collected from 2008-2016 (ESS ERIC, 2017).  
The country sample used in this thesis includes data from 18 European countries (Den-
mark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, 
and Lithuania).8 Since this thesis focusses on young Europeans, it is restricted to respond-
ents aged 25-34, not currently in full-time education. Thereby, only those likely to have 
attained their final level of education are included, which is an important precondition for 
the analysis of intergenerational educational mobility. Depending on the availability of 
the outcome of interest in the respective survey rounds, the analytical sample is further 
reduced. To give an example, psychological distress, one of the central well-being out-
comes in Chapter 5, is only available in ESS rounds 6 and 7, i.e. the sample sizes for these 
analyses deviate much from, among others, the analyses on subjective well-being, which 
are available in ESS rounds 4, 5, 6, and 7.  
3.2 The CUPESSE two-generation survey 
In addition to the ESS, this thesis draws from another European survey explicitly focusing 
on young adults, the Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneur-
ship (CUPESSE) two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018). The CUPESSE two-
generation survey is a multidisciplinary, cross-sectional survey of about 20,000 young 
adults aged 18-35 and their parents from eleven countries. The country sample includes 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey was fielded between February and 
                                                 
8 I only include countries that have participated in at least two rounds. 
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April 2016 and conducted via face-to-face or online interviews based on a common in-
terview guide developed by the CUPESSE project consortium.9 Sampling was based on 
population quotas for age, gender, employment status, educational level and region.10 The 
CUPESSE two-generation survey was originally designed to reflect the intergenerational 
transmission of attitudes and values from parents to children. It covers a wide range of 
topics related to the young adults’ current social, economic and cultural capital, their cur-
rent employment situation, as well as attitudes towards work, politics, and welfare states 
in general. It furthermore includes retrospective information on the young person’s family 
situation at the age of 14. To be more precise, the young adults are asked about their 
family’s social, economic and cultural capital, parental aspirations regarding their educa-
tion and the quality of the relationship between their parents and the children in their 
family. In addition, the young people’s parents (or, in the majority of cases one of the 
parents) were subsequently interviewed online or by Computer-Assisted Telephone In-
terviews (CATI). Similar to their offspring, they answered questions regarding their 
economic, cultural and social capital as well as questions regarding their previous parent-
ing style.  
The CUPESSE two-generation survey data constitute a unique and rich data source for 
the purpose of this study for the following reasons. First and foremost, the survey setup 
allows for the assessment of intergenerational mobility on various dimensions. Unlike 
other surveys, the survey data contain information on both intergenerational economic 
mobility and expected future mobility. It thus opens the possibility to compare social and 
political consequences of intergenerational mobility for both past mobility experiences as 
well as mobility expectations for the future. Second, the CUPESSE data contain rich in-
formation on important social and political outcomes such as political orientation and 
attitudes on welfare state arrangements. These data are furthermore unique in the sense 
that they offer an up-to-date insight into attitudes held by today’s generation.  
                                                 
9 More information on the CUPESSE project objectives and the consortium partners can be found on the 
webpage http://cupesse.eu/. 
10 For regional quotas, the NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) was used. 
Quotas were set to correspond to NUTS 2 levels, the second level of hierarchy dividing the EU territory 
into statistical units (cf., Eurostat, 2018).  
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To sum up, the CUPESSE two-generation survey offers the unique opportunity to assess 
consequences of both past and future intergenerational mobility with up-to-date data of 
high quality.  
3.3 Diagonal reference models 
Analysing mobility effects is not as straightforward as it might appear at first sight. This 
is because of a conceptual and methodological challenge. Conceptually, mobility effects 
(and their estimation) have to be distinguished from pure level effects. More specifically, 
I argue that it is a different question to ask if a downwardly mobile person has a lower 
well-being level because he or she experienced downward social mobility, or because he 
or she ends up in a social status position that is associated with worse well-being out-
comes. Of course, both effects are in some way related, but whereas the former effect 
would be assumed to stem from the downward movement on the social ladder and the 
psychological effects due to comparing the current with the former situation, the latter 
effect would be assumed to be due to low status attainment in general. In other words, I 
argue that it is necessary to account not only for the psychological processes of moving 
up and down the social status ladder compared to one’s parents (net mobility effects), but 
also to account for the resources associated with status attainment (level effects). Only by 
following this conceptual reasoning will it be possible to disentangle mobility effects 
from origin and destination effects, and the mechanisms underlying the effect of inter-
generational mobility on individual outcomes (see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018).  
As van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster (2017: 2) put it, ‘[i]t should be noted that mo-
bility effects refer to the consequences of experiencing social mobility itself, aside from 
the effects of one’s social positions of origin and destination.’ In other words, mobility 
effects do not refer to the fact that socially mobile individuals may adopt a lifestyle (such 
as a certain diet or a certain level of exercise) that is characteristic of their newly acquired 
social position and thus experience a better or worse well-being. Rather, effects like the 
aforementioned ones are due to the fact that an individual adapts to his or her destination 
status (which will subsequently be referred to as level effect). By mobility effects, I in-
stead refer to the psychological effects (e.g. psychological distress) caused by a shift in 
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socioeconomic position, apart from those positive or negative influences that one’s social 
origin and destination status play.  
In addition to this important conceptual differentiation, estimating the consequences of 
social mobility also poses a methodological challenge. The methodological challenge as-
sociated with estimating mobility effects arises when simultaneously estimating the 
effects of social position of origin, social position of destination, and mobility between 
origin and destination across generations (see, e.g., Schuck and Steiber, 2018; van der 
Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017). In a conventional regression approach, only two of 
the three effects of interest can be estimated since mobility is linearly dependent on origin 
and destination (Mobility = Social Destination – Social Origin) (Sobel, 1981). A similar 
methodological challenge concerns the problem of identifying age, period, and cohort 
effects (age-period-cohort models) and has been the subject of scholarly debate for dec-
ades (see, e.g., Reither et al., 2015; Chan and Ermisch, 2015).  
Despite the aforementioned challenges associated with the attempt to identify mobility 
effects within a conventional regression approach, a substantial part of available research 
nevertheless relies on such conventional linear regression techniques, following one of 
three approaches (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018):  
1. estimating mobility effects while controlling for origin (but not for destination),  
2. estimating mobility effects while controlling for destination (but not for origin), or  
3. estimating mobility effects while controlling for origin and destination.  
Any of these three approaches – and conclusions drawn from their respective results – 
fails to tackle the challenge posed by the linear dependency of origin, destination, and 
mobility indicators. They are generally unsatisfactory since omitting one of the three var-
iables of interest (origin, destination, or mobility) leads to uncertainty about what drives 
the observed effects of the remaining two. The estimated mobility effects conflate the 
effects of social mobility with effects of social origin and destination (Schuck and Steiber, 
2018). 
To be more specific, the first approach leads to estimates of mobility effects that are con-
founded by the influence of one’s own status attainment (destination status), i.e. the level 
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effect associated with the resources of one’s own status. Studies using this approach there-
fore tend to find positive effects of upward mobility and the reverse for downward 
mobility (e.g., Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014 in models 
1 and 3 shown in Table 10 that only control for parental status). The second approach 
provides estimates of mobility effects that are confounded by the effect of parental status 
attainment (origin status), i.e. the resources associated with one’s social origin. These 
kinds of models tend to lead to estimates that have been claimed to suggest dissociative 
effects (e.g., Hadjar and Samuel, 2015). The third approach (e.g., Dolan and Lordan, 
2013; Nikolaev and Burns, 2014 models 2 and 4) is not tenable from a methodological 
point of view, because the models are overidentified (Schuck and Steiber, 2018).11  
In contrast to these conventional approaches that are still widely used in studies on mo-
bility effects, diagonal reference models are suitable and allow for identifying the effects 
of mobility, origin, and destination. Calling it a ‘a substantively motivated class of designs 
for the analysis of mobility effects’ suitable to overcome the problems mentioned above, 
Sobel (1981: 893) proposed the use of diagonal reference models already more than 30 
years ago. His so-called diagonal reference models (DRMs) are both parsimonious and 
suited to simultaneously model origin, destination, and mobility effects (Hendrickx et al., 
1993), thus being considered ‘the only acceptable method to model mobility effects’ 
(Houle, 2011: 764). DRMs are based on sociological theory and allow for a simultaneous 
modelling of origin, destination, and mobility effects (Hendrickx et al., 1993) while 
breaking their linear dependency. Following mobility theory, an individual’s characteris-
tics and behaviors are affected by both origin and destination status (Blau, 1956; Blau and 
Duncan, 1967). Furthermore, it has been argued that non-mobiles constitute the core of a 
social position and therefore best reflect its characteristics (Sorokin, 1959: 509f.). Diag-
onal reference models incorporate these assumptions in their model specification by 
modelling the non-mobiles, i.e. those located in the diagonal cells of a mobility table, as 
primary reference group for mobile individuals.  
                                                 
11 Other study designs try to circumvent the problem by estimating interactions between origin and desti-
nation or by dividing the sample into distinct groups that capture all possible combinations of origin and 
destination. Such models do not, however, allow for isolating the effect of mobility (Chan, 2017; Tooth and 
Mishra, 2013). 
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Studies applying this state-of-the-art statistical technique have investigated a large variety 
of mobility outcomes, such as political preferences and behavior (Breen, 2001; Weak-
liem, 1992), attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Tolsma, de Graaf and Quillian, 2009), 
proximity of couples to parents (Chan and Ermisch, 2015), and fertility (Sobel, 1985).12 
The underutilization of DRMs in wide areas of social mobility research presumably goes 
back to the fact that DRMs neither are included in standard statistical software packages 
nor are part of standard university curricula (van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017).  
DRMs model the outcome of interest as the weighted sum of the estimated mean scores 
in the non-mobile origin group (μi) and the non-mobile destination group (μj). The param-
eters q and (1-q) denote the influence of parental and one’s own status, and are bounded 
by the value 1. They can be regarded as weights for the relative importance of origin and 
destination for the outcome of interest (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 982). The functional 
form can then be described as follows:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (1) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏  + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (2) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the value of the dependent variable in cell ij which has k observations. In 
other words, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the outcome of interest of socially mobile individuals whose 
social position of origin is i and of destination is j (Missinne, Daenekindt and Bracke, 
2015). The error term 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 depicts a stochastic term with expectation 0 (Sobel, 1981). (1) 
is the baseline model examining the association between status of origin (O), status of 
destination (D), and outcome of interest and (2) is an extension thereof including covari-
ates represented by the different 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 variables (like e.g. dummy variables that capture 
intergenerational upward and downward mobility) and the associated 𝛽𝛽-parameters (van 
der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017). These covariates are easy to interpret since their 
interpretation is no different from regular regression models. Depending on whether the 
dependent variable Y is dichotomous or metric, logistic or linear versions of the diagonal 
reference models can be applied. For a comparison of nested models (1) and (2), model 
fit statistics like the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC) and the 
                                                 
12 Diagonal reference models have also been used to study the effects of intragenerational mobility 
(Claussen et al., 2005; Houle, 2011). 
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likelihood ratio test (LRT) or wald test can be used. DRMs in this thesis are estimated 
using the Diagonal Reference (DREF) subcommand of the General Nonlinear Models 
(GNM) package in R (Turner and Firth, 2015).13 
To give an example based on the investigation of well-being effects of social mobility, 
let us imagine a socially mobile person k in cell 13 of the mobility table who moves from 
origin status 3 (μi = μ3) to destination status 1 (μj= μ1), i.e. the person is downwardly mobile 
(see Table 3.1.). The well-being of this individual k is then modelled as the weighted sum 
of the estimated mean scores in the non-mobile origin group (𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇33) and the non-mobile 
destination group ((1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗  𝜇𝜇11). The values of 𝑞𝑞 and (1 − 𝑞𝑞) thereby refer to the rela-
tive importance of origin status and destination status for the respondents’ well-being.  
Table 3.1: Visualisation of diagonal reference models 
 
 
Destination 
1 2 3 
O
rig
in
 
1 𝜇𝜇11   
2  𝜇𝜇22  
3 𝑌𝑌31𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇33+ (1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗  𝜇𝜇11 + 𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖  𝜇𝜇33 
     
Source: Own illustration based on van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster (2017) and Missinne, 
Daenekindt and Bracke (2015). 
                                                 
13 Running the models in Stata (diagref command) or SPSS (NLR command) lead to very similar results. 
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4 Intergenerational mobility of young Europeans – the status quo 
Having laid out the research agenda for this thesis, it is then a precondition to first assess 
the phenomenon of study, namely intergenerational mobility in its different dimensions. 
While it is not the focus of this thesis to investigate the different degrees of social fluidity 
per se, it is indispensable to be aware of the distribution of intergenerational mobility 
across European countries when focusing on social and political consequences thereof. I 
will identify countries with comparatively high or low rates of mobility directed down-
wards or upwards on the social ladder. Against this background, this chapter shall serve 
as an empirical baseline for the subsequent analyses of mobility consequences and will 
describe the extent of social mobility in its various dimensions across European countries.  
4.1 Intergenerational educational mobility 
It is well established that educational attainment is closely linked to ‘employment, earn-
ings, overall wealth and the well-being of individuals’ (OECD, 2015: 78). Moreover, it is 
the most important mediator for the origin-destination-association. The degree to which 
educational attainment is independent from parental educational attainment is therefore 
also an indicator of the degree of social justice in a society.  
Before one can assess the degree of educational mobility, an appropriate measure has to 
be chosen. Measuring educational mobility across generations and across countries is a 
challenging endeavor. Specific degrees may vanish over time (e.g. Eastern German de-
grees that no longer exist after the German re-unification) and more importantly, the 
relevance of educational levels in terms of labour market opportunities and life chances 
are changing over time and therefore hard to compare across generations. Apart from that, 
measuring and comparing educational levels across European countries is the second big 
challenge in the analysis of educational mobility, since construct validity of cross-national 
measures of educational attainment is oftentimes problematic (cf., Schneider, 2010). In 
this thesis, I will address these problems by focusing on young Europeans because the 
time span between the parents’ educational attainment and the young person’s educa-
tional attainment is comparably small and the intergenerational comparison thus more 
meaningful than in a comparison with older generations. Second, the subsequent analyses 
of educational mobility rely on an established measurement scheme that was explicitly 
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designed for cross-country comparative analysis in Europe (cf., Schneider, 2010). More 
specifically, I rely on the ES-ISCED classification, which constitutes a reduced form of 
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The ES-ISCED catego-
ries are merged into three educational levels (‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’), whereby ‘low’ 
comprises ES-ISCED levels I and II (below upper secondary education), ‘medium’ com-
prises ES-ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV (upper secondary and post-secondary, and non-
tertiary education) and ‘high’ consists of ES-ISCED levels V1 and V2 (tertiary educa-
tion). Parental educational attainment was assessed by combining information from the 
mother and father at the time when the respondent was 14 years old. The higher of the 
two educational levels is used, and if the educational attainment is missing for one parent, 
the information on the other parent is used. Based on this classification, intergenerational 
educational mobility is then constructed as a categorical variable distinguishing the non-
mobile (i.e., same educational attainment as parents), from the upwardly mobile (i.e., 
more highly educated than parents), and the downwardly mobile (i.e., less highly edu-
cated than parents). 
As we know from previous research, social mobility varies substantially across European 
societies (Breen, 2004a). The descriptive analysis of intergenerational educational mobil-
ity among young Europeans (aged 25 to 34) based on European Social Survey data 
(rounds 4-7) confirms this finding (see Figure 4.1 and Table 9.1 respectively for a detailed 
overview of educational levels and mobility trajectories by country).  
The descriptive analyses show that the vast majority of young people in all European 
countries under study achieve at least the same educational level as their parents. Status 
maintenance, i.e. intergenerational stability or non-mobility in educational attainment, is 
thus the most common mobility status among young Europeans. At the same time, high 
rates of non-mobility for the majority of youths also mean that downward educational 
mobility is not a majority phenomenon.  
Yet, although it might not affect the majority of young Europeans, the shares of down-
wardly mobile individuals are not negligible either. Estonia (23%) and Denmark (21%) 
show the highest shares of downwardly mobile individuals. They are followed by Finland, 
Germany, and Norway which all show absolute shares of downward mobility of 15% and 
more. In turn, downward mobility is lowest in Ireland and Portugal, with 5 % or less of 
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all young people. Finally, concerning those who exceed their parents’ educational attain-
ment, i.e. those who are upwardly mobile, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal are the countries with the highest shares of upwardly mobile individuals (equal 
to or above 43%).  
Figure 4.1: Distribution of intergenerational educational mobility by country 
 
It should be noted that the extent of up- and downward mobility is naturally linked to the 
distribution of parental educational attainment in the sense that the so-called ceiling and 
floor effects take place. If a high share of the parental generation already achieved tertiary 
education, there is naturally little room for their children to surpass this level of educa-
tional attainment. Therefore, lower absolute shares of upward mobility are not necessarily 
bad per se since they may simply result from an already very well educated parental gen-
eration. However, this is not the case for high shares of downward mobility. Of course, 
the risk of downward mobility rises with increasing levels of parental education. Down-
ward mobility should, however, raise concerns, since downward mobility might 
negatively affect individuals. This interdependency is well illustrated in the Southern Eu-
ropean and Nordic countries: Parental educational level is comparatively low in Southern 
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Europe, naturally reducing the risk of downward mobility and increasing the chance of 
upward mobility. The opposite takes place in the Nordic countries. There, parental edu-
cational level is comparatively high, thus leaving almost no room to surpass one’s 
parents’ education and increasing the risk of achieving a lower educational degree com-
pared to one’s parents.  
4.2 Intergenerational economic mobility 
Different measures of mobility can capture different dimensions of life chances and their 
correlates. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on mobility effects by investi-
gating different mobility dimensions and their correlates, one of them being 
intergenerational economic mobility.14  
Intergenerational economic mobility is most commonly based on changes in income, 
earnings, and wealth from one generation to another. The measurement used for the sub-
sequent analyses deviates from this approach for a number of reasons. From the 
perspective of a social scientist, income and earnings constitute a very narrow perspective 
on the economic status of an individual. Reliable information (especially on the often 
retrospectively surveyed situation of one’s family) is very hard to collect in surveys and 
social desirability as well as memory problems are significant sources of measurement 
bias. Furthermore, a measurement of economic status does not necessarily have to rely 
on single numbers like income or earnings mobility. Several studies in the literature have 
established alternative measures of economic status. For example, Svallfors (2006) uses 
a composite index that measures a household’s financial problems in social inequality 
research. The CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018) – mainly focusing 
on the broader concept of young people’s economic self-sufficiency – uses various items 
referring to one’s financial situation which can be used to describe the young adults’ eco-
nomic statuses.  
In the following, I will rely on a specific dimension of the CUPESSE concept of economic 
self-sufficiency, namely the question, ‘Thinking about your personal financial situation 
over the last six months, please indicate whether the following situation applied to you or 
                                                 
14 Throughout this thesis, the terms economic mobility and financial mobility will be used as synonyms.  
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not: We could afford extras for ourselves (such as trips, hobbies, etc.).’ This item taps 
into the degree of one’s perceived financial deprivation and thereby constitutes a proxy 
for the respondent’s economic situation. In order to arrive at a measure for intergenera-
tional economic mobility, the answer to this question is compared to the respondent’s 
family’s situation when he or she was growing up. The family’s situation is covered by a 
similar question which reads as, ‘Thinking about your family’s financial situation when 
you were about 14 years old, which of the following statements applied to your family?: 
We could afford extras for ourselves (such as trips, hobbies, etc.).’ with answers ranging 
from ‘always’ to ‘never’. Differences in the degrees of agreement were coded as inter-
generational upward or downward mobility while similar levels of agreement (indicating 
stable economic statuses across generations) were coded as intergenerational economic 
stability.  
Quite similar to what we observed for intergenerational educational mobility, intergener-
ational economic stability is a reality for the majority group in all countries, with the 
outliers being Greece and Turkey (see Figure 4.2). Yet, in contrast to intergenerational 
educational mobility, the distributions are far more equally distributed. In other words, 
the shares of people that experienced economic upward and downward mobility are much 
more similar in size compared to the non-mobile group. In particular, the very high rates 
of economic downward mobility (especially in comparison to the moderate levels of 
downward educational mobility) are alarming. In nine out of eleven European countries 
under investigation, 30% or more of the young people experienced economic downward 
mobility. In Greece, 63% of the young respondents were not able to maintain the eco-
nomic status of their parents – a situation that is clearly related to the economic crisis and 
the exceptionally high youth unemployment rates in Greece in the crisis aftermath (see, 
e.g., Tosun, 2015) which affected young people from all educational levels. In other 
words, the economic crisis led to a situation where high education and high shares of 
educational upward mobility did not prevent young people from experiencing economic 
downward mobility. Thus, high shares of economic downward mobility go along with 
high shares of educational upward mobility during this particular time period.  
Turning to economic upward mobility, Turkey is again an outlier, but this time in a posi-
tive sense. 43% indicate that they do financially better than their families did while they 
Chapter 4: Intergenerational mobility of young Europeans – the status quo 
45 
were growing up. In all other countries, except Greece, upward mobility shares are about 
equal to the shares of downward mobility. Given the high rates of downward socioeco-
nomic movements in Greece, only 10% achieved a higher economic status than their 
parents.  
Figure 4.2: Distribution of intergenerational economic mobility by country 
 
In sum, intergenerational economic mobility appears to be far less stable, i.e., non-mobile, 
than intergenerational educational mobility. Accordingly, we can observe far more (up- 
and downward) mobility than for educational mobility. Furthermore, it is striking that 
educational mobility, at least on the aggregate level does not at all coincide with economic 
mobility, i.e. countries with high shares of economic downward mobility do not neces-
sarily show high degrees of educational downward mobility. As already mentioned 
earlier, this fact quite clearly relates to the economic crisis and high youth unemployment 
levels across Europe in this specific time period.  
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4.3 Expected intergenerational mobility 
Past mobility experiences, both in terms of educational and economic mobility, can, but 
do not necessarily always shape one’s mobility expectations for the future. The CU-
PESSE two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018) assesses young Europeans’ mobility 
expectations and thus offers the unique opportunity to investigate the effects of both ex-
perienced (past) and expected (future) mobility as well as the congruence or divergence 
of past and expected future social mobility.  
The young people’s expectations of intergenerational mobility for their future are as-
sessed by asking them about their expectations of their future standard of living as 
compared to how their parents are living today. To be more precise, respondents answer 
the question, ‘Thinking about how your standard of living will be like in the future, how 
does it compare to how you are doing today?’ on a 5-point-scale ranging from “Much 
worse than my parents” to ‘Much better than my parents’. Answers are then recoded into 
the three categories ‘expecting intergenerational upward mobility’, ‘expecting intergen-
erational stability’, and ‘expecting intergenerational downward mobility’. Standard of 
living taps into the more economic dimension of social mobility, but next to the mere 
economic status, it is equally referring to a person’s social status position. How a person 
lives, i.e. what a person’s standard of living looks like, and what it is predicted to look 
like in the future, certainly also captures parts of social status. It is thus not directly equiv-
alent to either educational or economic mobility. But it does allow for gaining insight into 
the young people’s overall expectations for their future in comparison to how their parents 
are doing today.  
Against the background of young Europeans’ past and expected intergenerational mobil-
ity experience as illustrated above, in which countries are young people more optimistic 
or pessimistic than in others? Where are expectations congruent to previous experiences 
and where do expectations diverge from past mobility? 
With regard to pessimistic expectations, i.e. those expecting intergenerational downward 
mobility, three countries strongly stand out from the country sample: Greece, Italy and 
Spain. With 34% (Greece), 30% (Italy) and 26% (Spain) young people from those three 
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countries are outliers with an exceptionally high degree of pessimism regarding their fu-
ture standard of living as compared to their parents. Being among the countries that have 
been hit hardest by the global economic crisis and its consequences (Tosun, 2015), young 
Greeks, Italians and Spanish people seem to fear that they will not be able to maintain the 
standard of living they grew up with. Interestingly, Italy and Spain have also been coun-
tries where economic upward mobility has been highest, with 32% and 60% upward 
mobility respectively. It therefore seems that upward economic mobility, at least in Italy 
and Spain, does not give cause for a more optimistic assessment of future mobility ex-
pectations.  
Next to the three Mediterranean countries, young people from the United Kingdom (19%) 
and Germany (15%) also express pessimistic views about their expected standard of liv-
ing in the future to a comparably high extent. Other than that, downward mobility 
expectations are rather low in the remaining countries. This is mirrored by the fact that in 
six out of eleven countries around 90% of the young people expect to be able to at least 
maintain, if not supersede their parents’ current standard of living. In particular, the Turk-
ish youth show comparatively high optimism with more than 60% of respondents 
expecting a better or much better living standard than their parents. Since the young peo-
ple’s expectations are clearly also dependent on their parents’ current situation, one could 
speculate that this high degree of optimism is related to their parents’ standard of living 
being worse in comparison to the other European countries in the sample. Besides that, 
most youths from all countries are optimistic that their future living standard will exceed 
their parents’ current one.  
Unlike past mobility experiences, for future expectations, the non-mobile group does not 
make up the biggest group in the majority of countries anymore. Accordingly, it seems 
as if the biggest share of young people expects changes in their standard of living across 
generations, be it upward or downward.  
All in all, the distributions of educational, economic and expected intergenerational mo-
bility for each country clearly illustrate the interdependencies between one’s parental 
situation and one’s chances or risks of moving up or down the social ladder. It could also 
be observed that experienced mobility does not necessarily coincide with what people 
expect as their future mobility experience.  
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of expected intergenerational mobility by country  
 
4.4 Excursus: Congruence of past mobility and expectations for the future? 
Following up on the previous description of the different mobility dimensions for past 
and expected mobility, the congruence or divergence of mobility experiences and expec-
tations is now central to this chapter. Since expected mobility could only be measured 
with the CUPESSE two-generation survey, but not the European Social Survey, the biva-
riate distribution of mobility groups is only possible for economic and expected mobility. 
It shall provide insights into the following questions:  
1. Which past mobility experiences do individuals who expect upward/ down-
ward mobility in their future have? 
2. Among those who experienced upward/downward economic mobility, how 
many of them are rather pessimistic or optimistic for their future, i.e. ex-
pecting upward/ downward mobility? 
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Among those young people who expect to supersede their parents’ current standard of 
living, most of them have experienced upward financial mobility or maintained their fam-
ily’s economic status. Accordingly, it can be concluded that those who made positive 
mobility experiences in the past apparently have enough reason to look positively into 
their future. Interestingly, 23% of those expecting to surpass their parents’ standard of 
living have experienced financial downward mobility in the past. This might be a group 
of young people who regards their current position as only temporary with much time to 
improve one’s situation both financially and in terms of standard of living.  
Among those who expect not to reach their parents’ standard of living, most of them 
(52%) already experienced downward economic mobility in the past. Yet surprisingly, 
15% of them have been upwardly mobile in the past and nevertheless have pessimistic 
expectations about their future standard of living. Past experiences, subsequently, do not 
seem to determine future mobility expectations in all cases.  
Table 4.1: Congruence of expected mobility and financial mobility 
Expected mobility Financial mobility   
  upward stable downward total 
upward 0.37 0.40 0.23 1.00 
 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.43      
stable 0.21 0.44 0.34 1.00 
 0.32 0.45 0.44 0.41      
downward 0.15 0.33 0.52 1.00 
 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.15      
total 0.27 0.41 0.32 1.00 
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: Own calculations based on weighted CUPESSE two-generation survey data. 
Changing perspectives to those who experienced downward financial mobility, most of 
them (44%) expect to be able to maintain their parents’ current standard of living in the 
long term. Only one quarter of them express negative expectations for their future. Thus, 
despite having experienced financial downward mobility, the majority of young people 
apparently believe in the opportunity to maintain or exceed their parents’ standard of liv-
ing.  
Within the group of financially upwardly mobiles, 59% expect to supersede their parents’ 
standard of living, and 32% expect to at least maintain their parents’ current status. Still, 
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9% of those with experiences of financial upward mobility are rather pessimistic for their 
future by expecting not to be able to maintain their parents’ current standard of living.  
All in all, the bivariate analysis revealed that past mobility experiences do not necessarily 
determine the young people’s expectations for their future. Quite to the contrary, it may 
be speculated that some individuals regard their past inability to maintain their parents’ 
status as only a temporary situation. Given their young age, they may expect to still have 
enough time to eventually achieve or exceed their parents’ status. In many cases, how-
ever, past and future mobility assessments do not deviate substantially.  
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5 Social consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
5.1 Intergenerational educational mobility and well-being15 
It is a well-documented fact that higher education entails numerous positive implications 
like, e.g., longer and healthier lives (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003; Baker et al., 2011), 
greater life-time income, a higher likelihood of being employed, and having a rewarding 
job (Powdthavee, Lekfuangfu and Wooden, 2015; Reynolds and Ross, 1998). Previous 
research further identified ‘a significant positive association between expanding mass ed-
ucation and population health’ (Baker et al., 2011: 307).  
Against the background of these widely known and desirable well-being implications of 
higher education, the fact that about 50% of Europeans have attained a higher level of 
education than their parents (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015), may generally be con-
sidered a good thing. Yet, from a theoretical perspective, educational upward mobility, 
i.e. achieving a higher educational level than one’s parents, may not necessarily imply 
positive well-being effects. According to the seminal study of Pitirim A. Sorokin, moving 
up or down the social hierarchy may just as well be experienced as a stressful and disrup-
tive event. Following Sorokin’s dissociative hypothesis (Sorokin, 1927), social mobility 
– in either direction – means that an individual moves out of his or her familiar environ-
ment of social origin and moves into a less known social position the individual has not 
been socialized into. The disconnection with the individual’s social origin and the men-
tally demanding adjustment to the individual’s new and unfamiliar social destination is 
therefore assumed to go along with a psychological strain.  
Meanwhile, other theoretical assumptions run counter this dissociative perspective and 
rather predict psychological benefits than costs in the context of upward mobility (see, 
e.g., Goldthorpe, 1980). In particular, keeping up with the increasing pressure to maintain 
                                                 
15 Chapter 5 constitutes an extension of the co-authored journal article ‘Does Intergenerational Mobility 
Shape the Well-Being of Young Europeans? Evidence from the European Social Survey’ by Schuck and 
Steiber (2018) to which both authors contributed equally. Within this journal article, the theoretical con-
ceptualization was predominantly Nadia Steiber’s work, whereas the empirical analyses were conducted 
mainly by Bettina Schuck. Both authors contributed substantially to the respective other parts. 
In contrast to the journal article, this chapter uses a multidimensional concept of well-being, i.e. it extends 
the analyses for two more outcome variables. Furthermore, the results and conclusions have been adapted 
to and embedded into the broader context of the present thesis. 
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or even exceed the educational level of one’s parents may imply positive well-being ef-
fects (fulfilled aspirations hypothesis) while one’s failure to do so may lead to frustration, 
i.e. negative well-being implications (frustrated aspirations hypothesis, Schuck and 
Steiber (2018)). Similarly, Newman (1999) predicts negative well-being implications for 
those who fail to maintain their parents’ status position, labelling it the ‘falling-from-
grace hypothesis’. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that high levels of social 
fluidity may involve large shares of ‘failures’ despite stable or increasing levels of aver-
age attainment. According to a recent study, an estimated 3-12% of Europeans are 
downwardly mobile when comparing their educational attainment with that of their fa-
thers (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015). Among young Europeans aged 25-34, this 
number is significantly higher with 4-23% being downwardly mobile (see Chapter 4.1). 
A third theoretical perspective suggests that social mobility per se does not have any well-
being implications aside from the effects of an individual’s social origin and destination 
status (acculturation hypothesis, Blau (1956)). Whereas the previously depicted theories 
rest on the assumption that there remain ‘net’ well-being effects independent from the 
effects that own educational level and parental educational attainment play (see further 
Sobel, 1981), following the acculturation hypothesis well-being implications of social 
mobility stem solely from the influence of an individual’s social origin and destination. 
Accordingly, the well-being of socially mobile individuals would be expected to lie in 
between of the respective non-mobile reference groups, namely the non-mobile groups 
of social origin and destination.  
Due to the methodological challenges involved in estimating the effect of social mobility 
over and above the effects of the two variables defining mobility – one’s own and parental 
status – (see, e.g., Schuck and Steiber, 2018; van der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017) 
the jury on the empirical relevance of the aforementioned hypotheses for contemporane-
ous societies is still out. Against this background, this chapter uses state-of-the-art 
methodology to (1) examine the relative importance of young Europeans’ own level of 
education and their parents’ educational attainment for their well-being, and (2) investi-
gate if intergenerational educational mobility in this regard has an independent effect over 
and above the direct impact of one’s own and parental education. The focus is on young 
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Europeans aged 25-34 and cross-country differences in mobility effects in particular. So-
cial status can be operationalized in multiple ways (e.g. education, occupational class, 
income). In this chapter, I focus on education since it is known to be an important deter-
minant of both occupational class and income (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Card, 1999). 
Given the timeframe of this study (2008-2014), another advantage of focussing on edu-
cation is that this approach – opposed to using a mobility measure based on class or 
income – allows to include all those young Europeans which are currently not employed. 
The well-being implications of educational mobility are examined from a multidimen-
sional perspective. In contrast to previous studies (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018), this 
study uses multiple indicators of individual well-being which have been used in prior 
research on well-being effects of mobility: subjective well-being, self-reported general 
health, and psychological distress. 
5.2 Previous research on well-being effects of intergenerational mobility 
5.2.1 Different approaches – different results 
Looking at previous studies, the jury is still out on how intergenerational social mobility 
shapes well-being outcomes such as happiness, life satisfaction, and (psychological) 
health. Incomprehensible at first sight, the available evidence appears to be rather contra-
dicting, with some studies suggesting positive well-being effects of upward mobility and 
supporting the fulfilled aspirations argument (Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015; Niko-
laev and Burns, 2014), and other studies finding negative well-being effects of upward 
mobility which rather support the dissociative effects hypothesis (Hadjar and Samuel, 
2015; Stacey, 1967). Again other studies find negative well-being implications of down-
ward mobility, supporting the expectations of the frustrated aspirations and falling-from-
grace hypothesis (Hemmingsson, Lundberg and Diderichsen, 1999; Nikolaev and Burns, 
2014). Following the study by Marshall and Firth (1999), social mobility per se has no 
effect at all.  
What appears to be incomprehensible at first sight, namely that previous evidence on 
well-being effects of social mobility is contradicting and incoherent, goes arguably back 
to a methodological cause. To be more precise, it is the methodological challenge of sim-
ultaneously estimating the effects of social origin, social destination and mobility between 
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the two across generations, which is leading to this mixed evidence (for more details on 
this methodological challenge, see Chapter 3.3; see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018, van 
der Waal, Daenekindt and Koster, 2017).  
Yet, only recently has there been a growing awareness of the need to adapt the methodo-
logical approaches for the study of social mobility effects from original fields of interest 
pursued in the 1980s to the study of well-being (see, e.g., van der Waal, Daenekindt and 
Koster, 2017; Schuck and Steiber, 2018). When looking only at studies that apply diago-
nal reference models – ‘the only acceptable method to model mobility effects’ (Houle, 
2011: 764) – the available evidence is far more consistent. In general, i.e. considering 
studies that investigate very different mobility outcomes, findings suggest that net mobil-
ity, over and above social origin and destination effects, does not have a strong influence 
(see, e.g., Breen, 2001; Weakliem, 1992; Tolsma, de Graaf and Quillian, 2009). This sim-
ilarly holds true for studies on well-being effects of mobility. For example, with regard 
to life satisfaction Marshall and Firth (1999) do not find any net effects of mobility. Con-
cerning psychological distress, findings from Houle and Martin (2011) do suggest 
beneficial implications for upwardly mobile sons of farmers. Yet, other types of mobility 
were found to have no effect. 
In sum, it becomes clear that different methodological approaches have led to rather in-
coherent evidence with regard to well-being implications of intergenerational mobility. 
Yet, focussing on studies applying state-of-the-art methodology for the analysis of mo-
bility effects provides a much clearer picture: social mobility, independent from origin 
and destination effects, does not appear to exert strong effects on well-being, neither pos-
itive nor negative. 
5.2.2 Cross-country differences 
Given that there is already rather few evidence on well-being effects of intergenerational 
mobility based on state-of-the-art methodology, still less is known about potential cross-
country differences. One of the few examples is the study by Monden and de Graaf (2013) 
which investigates a potential East-West divide in the importance of father’s educational 
level (social origin) and own educational level (social destination) for self-assessed health 
in adulthood. According to their ‘equality under socialism hypothesis’ (Monden and de 
Graaf, 2013: 979), they expect the relative importance of social origin versus destination 
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to be weaker in post-socialist countries when compared to Western European countries. 
Opposed to that, their ‘family support hypothesis’ (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 980) 
expects the relative importance of social origin versus destination to be stronger in post-
socialist countries when compared to Western European countries. In line with the latter 
hypothesis, the authors find a greater relative importance of father’s education compared 
to own education in Eastern Europe. Their underlying reasoning is that both reliance on 
parental resources was of higher importance and demand for parental support was of 
lower importance for an individual’s well-being in Eastern Europe compared to Western 
Europe. Although Monden and de Graaf (2013) also examine cross-country differences 
in net mobility effects, the neither provide theoretical expectations nor find such differ-
ences.  
The study of Campos-Matos and Kawachi (2015) on social mobility and self-rated health 
also has a comparative perspective, but does not apply Diagonal Reference Models. Using 
conventional multilevel models that control for parental, but not for one’s own education, 
they find beneficial health effects of upward mobility and negative health effects of down-
ward mobility for all welfare regime types. Yet, risk differences between upwardly 
mobile and non-mobile individuals were found to be particularly high in the Southern, 
Post Communist European and former USSR regimes. In Scandinavian countries, risk 
differences were lowest for both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. As ar-
gued before, these findings have to be considered biased, since their methodological 
approach does not allow disentangling genuine mobility effects from destination and 
origin effects.  
Finally, the study by Schuck and Steiber (2018) is the first to provide theoretical assump-
tions and empirical evidence of cross-country differences in well-being effects of 
intergenerational mobility. As previously indicated, the present chapter builds on and ex-
tends their analysis by considering well-being as a multidimensional concept, thus 
investigating not only life satisfaction but also subjective well-being and self-reported 
general health.  
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5.3 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 
The theoretical background and hypotheses can be divided into an individual-level per-
spective (the microlevel perspective) and a cross-national perspective (the macrolevel 
perspective). The individual-level hypotheses on existence and direction of mobility ef-
fects are already well established in the literature, whereas the cross-national perspective 
on mobility effects has only recently been developed (cf., Schuck and Steiber, 2018).  
5.3.1 Individual-level hypotheses 
Generally, the individual-level hypotheses are competing with each other by predicting 
either dissociative, beneficial or null effects of mobility. The dissociative effects hypoth-
esis (Sorokin, 1927) emphasizes the psychological costs of social mobility – regardless 
of the fact if an individual moves upward or downward the social ladder. Accordingly, 
mobility is seen as a process where an individual leaves the social class he or she has been 
socialised into and moves to another social position that is new and less familiar. This 
discruptive social experience is assumed to implicate negative well-being effects such as 
psychological isolation.  
In contrast to that, and in line with Michalos’ multiple discrepancies theory (Michalos, 
1985), fulfilment of one’s own, parental or societal aspirations may be expected to trans-
late into psychological benefits rather than costs (Goldthorpe, 1980), and failure to do so 
may come along with negative well-being implications (falling-from-grace hypothesis by 
Newman (1999)).  
Finally, from an acculturation perspective (Blau, 1956) neither the experience of upward 
nor downward mobility is expected to influence an individual’s well-being over and 
above origin and destination effects. The underlying reasoning is based on the assumption 
that social mobility constitutes a process wherein the influence of an individual’s origin 
status is gradually overridden by the influence of an individual’s destination status. Ac-
cordingly, the well-being of the socially mobile is assumed to lie in-between that of the 
two non-mobile comparison groups. This implies the assumption of net mobility effects, 
independent from level effects of social origin and destination, being zero. Table 5.1 pro-
vides an overview of the aforementioned individual-level hypotheses on the well-being 
implications of upward and downward mobility.  
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Table 5.1: Individual-level hypotheses on well-being implications of social mobility 
 Upward  
Mobility 
Downward 
Mobility 
Ref.: non-mobile individuals   
  Dissociative effects hypothesis - - 
  Fulfilled vs. frustrated aspirations hypothesis + - 
  Falling-from-grace hypothesis n.a. - 
  Acculturation hypothesis no effect no effect 
Note: +/- indicate positive/negative well-being implications of social mobility 
5.3.2 Cross-national differences 
With only very few exceptions (Schuck and Steiber, 2018; Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 
2015; Monden and de Graaf, 2013), the theoretical background on cross-country differ-
ences with regard to the relative strength of mobility effects constitutes a rather neglected 
perspective so far. For the purpose of this study, I follow the stratified approach of Schuck 
and Steiber (2018) who developed theoretical assumptions for European countries along 
six country groups. These country groups are based on widely used typologies of welfare 
regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Fenger, 2007; Ferrera, 1996), their institutional setup 
(in particular their education systems (West and Nikolai, 2013; Green, Preston and 
Janmaat, 2006)) and other indicators of countries’ social and economic statuses, which 
are arguably influential with respect to their effects on social mobility.  
Schuck and Steiber’s (2018) stratified approach distinguishes the social democratic Nor-
dic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway) from the conservative Continental 
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands), the Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Great Britain, Ireland), the Southern European countries (Portugal, Spain), the 
the Visegrád Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), and the Baltic States 
(Estonia, Lithuania).  
The Nordic countries can be characterised by their universal, highly distributive system 
of benefits, their high degrees of decommodification and defamilisation (Esping-Ander-
sen, 1990), and a high degree of both equality of educational opportunity and schooling 
outcomes (West and Nikolai, 2013).  
In contrast, the Continental European countries feature an insurance-based and much less 
distributive welfare system, which aims at the preservation of status differentials. Also, 
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the family’s role for individual welfare is much more important than in the Nordic coun-
tries (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Following West and Nikolai (2013), the education 
systems in Continental Europe are further characterized by high levels of tracking and 
stratification resulting in the production and replication of educational inequalities across 
generations (West and Nikolai, 2013: 482).  
The Anglo-Saxon countries as a third country group can be described as a residual welfare 
system with modest, usually means-tested benefits only and comparatively high levels of 
income inequality (Schuck and Steiber, 2018; Eikemo et al., 2008b). Class consciousness 
has been argued to be rather strong in those countries (Hadjar and Samuel, 2015) and 
equality of educational opportunity and schooling outcomes has been shown to be lower 
than in the Nordic countries (West and Nikolai, 2013).  
Coming to the Southern European countries, this group can be characterized by its dualist 
system of welfare provision that strongly differentiates between insiders and outsiders 
(Eikemo et al., 2008a). Compared to the Continental European country group, individual 
welfare is even more dependent on family support (Saraceno, 2008) and income inequal-
ity is much higher (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). In terms of equality of schooling outcomes 
and educational opportunity, the Mediterranean systems can be placed between the highly 
equal Nordic countries and the hugely unequal Continental European countries (West and 
Nikolai, 2013).  
Although the post-communist countries in the Baltic country group and the Visegrád Four 
both feature a rudimentary welfare provision, socio-economic differences give reason to 
a division into two distinct country groups (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). In particular, so-
cial inequality is lower in the Visegrád Four (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007). Concerning 
educational inequalities, only limited prospects for intergenerational social mobility can 
be expected from both country groups (see, e.g., Kogan, Gebel and Noelke, 2012).  
Based on the differences in the institutional setup of these six country groups (Southern 
European countries, Nordic countries, Continental European countries, Visegrád Four, 
and Baltic countries), the following hypotheses regarding cross-national differences in 
the well-being implications of social mobility can be derived (see further Schuck and 
Steiber, 2018).  
Chapter 5: Social consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
59 
First, education-based well-being gradients are expected to differ between country groups 
based on the level of equality and degree to which welfare states feature redistributive 
and decommodifying elements. In particular, well-being gradients can be expected to be 
weaker in more equal societies and in those country groups where welfare states feature 
strongly redistributive and decommodifying welfare states. The underlying reasoning is 
based on the assumption that social status will be less relevant for individual well-being 
where income inequality is low, since education-based income differentials will also be 
small. Moreover, education-based well-being gradients can be expected to be smaller in 
those country groups where welfare states are universal and aim at mitigating the influ-
ence of social status on individual well-being. In terms of the previously defined country 
groups and their institutional setup, this translates into the expectation of weaker educa-
tion-based well-being gradients in the Nordic countries, the Visegréd Four, and 
Continental Europe, whereas the largest education-based well-being gradients are ex-
pected for the Southern European country group, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the 
Baltic States. 
Second, the relative importance of one’s own and parental education is expected to differ 
between country groups based on their level of equality and degree of decommodifica-
tion. In particular, the relative importance of parental education as opposed to one’s own 
education is expected to be higher in contexts of high inequality. Assuming that an indi-
vidual’s well-being is decisively shaped by parental resources during childhood and 
adolescence, a context of high inequality may enforce a strong link between these im-
portant resources and parental education, thus leading to a greater relative weight of 
parental education in those societies. Moreover, the relative importance of parental as 
opposed to one’s own education is expected to be greater in weakly decommodifying 
welfare states, since individuals are more often forced to rely on the subsidiary function 
of family resources. Examples thereof may be cases like illness or unemployment where 
weakly decommodifying welfare states do not necessarily protect an individual’s well-
being. Considering that this study focusses on young adults, this mechanism may be even 
more relevant when weak decommodification is combined with high levels of youth un-
employment. Applied to the previously defined country groups, a greater relevance of 
parental education as opposed to own education, i.e. a greater relative weight of social 
origin, is expected in the Southern European country group, the Anglo-Saxon countries 
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and the Baltic States. Among these three country groups, the weight of social origin is 
assumed to be particularly high in the Southern European group, where high levels of 
youth unemployment are combined with a comparatively heavy reliance on kinship soli-
darity. On the other end of the spectrum, the relative weight of parental education is 
expected to be least pronounced in the Nordic countries. 
Third, the importance of net mobility effects (i.e., controlling for origin and destination 
effects) is expected to vary across country groups based on the importance attached to 
status and the prevalence of intergenerational mobility. Such net mobility effects may be 
conceptualised as a psychological phenomenon that is not driven by status-based inequal-
ities in well-being enhancing resources. They are effects that go beyond origin and 
destination effects and remain when accounting for them (Sobel, 1985). In other words, 
net mobility effects are those psychological effects on well-being that are found on top of 
the positive or negative well-being effects of originating from and arriving in a higher or 
lower social status position. It can be assumed that such psychological mobility effects 
will be strongest in those country groups that attribute a greater importance to social sta-
tus. In regards to the countries under investigation, such psychological mobility effects 
are expected to be strongest in the conservative welfare states of Continental Europe and 
in the Anglo-Saxon world, where status maintenance and class are of central importance 
for identity. Finally, net mobility effects may be less noticeable in those country groups 
where the prevalence of intergenerational mobility is high (Goldthorpe, 1980; Newman, 
1999), i.e. mobility is rather the normative expectation than the exception (Schuck and 
Steiber, 2018). Applied to the previously defined country groups, this would mean less 
pronounced net mobility effects in the Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Table 5.2 summarises the macro-level hypotheses on the well-being implications of up-
ward and downward social mobility (see also Schuck and Steiber, 2018):  
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Table 5.2: Macro-level hypotheses on well-being implications of social mobility  
Well-being  
implication 
Expectation 
Education-based 
well-being gradients 
Weaker gradients in more equal societies and strongly redis-
tributive and decommodifying welfare states (Nordic 
countries, Visegrád Four, Continental Europe) 
Relative importance 
of one’s own and 
parental education 
Greater relative weight of origin status in unequal societies, 
weakly decommodifying welfare states and where low levels 
of decommodification are combined with high levels of youth 
unemployment (Southern Europe, Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Baltic States) 
Strength of net   
mobility effects 
Stronger net mobility effects where status maintenance and 
class are of central importance for identity (Continental Eu-
rope, Anglo-Saxon countries) – weaker net effects where 
mobility rates are high (Southern Europe, Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries) 
5.4 Research design 
5.4.1 Data and sample 
I use pooled data from the European Social Survey Rounds 4 to 7 collected via face-to-
face interviews from 2008-2014 (ESS ERIC, 2017). Given its comparable design in all 
participating countries, it provides the unique opportunity to study cross-national differ-
ences in the well-being correlates of intergenerational educational mobility. The 
analytical sample includes data from 18 European countries and is restricted to respond-
ents aged 25-34, not currently in full-time education (i.e., those likely to have attained 
their final level of education).16 Since one of the outcomes of interest, psychological dis-
tress, is only available in ESS Rounds 6 and 7, the analytical sample was severely reduced 
by that for all analyses focussing on this item. The final sample comprises all valid cases 
of young Europeans providing information about their own and their parents’ educational 
attainment with no missing information for the respective outcome of interest.17 
                                                 
16 I only include countries that have participated in at least two rounds. 
17 The sample size varies depending on which of the three outcomes is used. For psychological distress, the 
sample is around 8,000 individuals, since this variable was only collected in ESS Rounds 6 and 7. For self-
reported general health, the sample size is around 16,000. For life satisfaction, sample size is around 14,000 
young people.  
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5.4.2 Measures 
The central explanatory variables are one’s own educational attainment, parental educa-
tional attainment, and intergenerational educational mobility as the comparison between 
the two (i.e. distinguishing between non-mobility, downward mobility, and upward mo-
bility). Educational attainment is measured using a reduced form of the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) which was explicitly designed for cross-
country comparative analysis in Europe (ES-ISCED, cf., Schneider, 2010). I distinguish 
three educational levels: below upper secondary education comprising ES-ISCED levels 
I and II (‘low’), upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education comprising 
ES-ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV (‘medium’), and tertiary education consisting of ES-
ISCED levels V1 and V2 (‘high’). Parental educational attainment was assessed by com-
bining information from the mother and father at the time when the respondent was 14 
years old. I use the higher of the two attainment levels. For those with missing information 
on one parent, the information on the other parent is used. Intergenerational mobility is 
captured by a categorical variable distinguishing the non-mobile (i.e., same educational 
attainment as parents), from the upwardly mobile (i.e., more highly educated than par-
ents), and the downwardly mobile (i.e., less highly educated than parents).  
In order to provide a broad picture of well-being implications, I employ three different 
measures that have been frequently used in previous research: subjective well-being, self-
reported general health and psychological distress.  
Subjective well-being (SWB) comprises a broad set of correlated concepts like people's 
emotional and cognitive evaluations of their lives, their happiness, or judgements of life 
satisfaction (Diener et al., 1999). I employ a single-item measure of general life satisfac-
tion as dependent variable. It is based on participants’ responses to the question, ‘All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ where 0 
means ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and 10 ‘extremely satisfied’. Prior research has commonly 
used life satisfaction as a measure of SWB (e.g., Hadjar and Samuel, 2015) thus allowing 
for a comparison with previous estimates.  
Self-reported general health is measured based on the survey participant’s self-assessment 
with regard to the question ‘How is your (physical and mental) health in general?’. Pos-
sible answers were ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘bad’, and ‘very bad’ and have been 
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recoded so that higher scores indicate better health levels (range: 1-5). Due to its use in 
prior research, comparisons with previous findings are possible (see, e.g., Eikemo et al., 
2008b; Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015).  
Psychological distress is measured by the 8-item short version of the Center for Epidemi-
ologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D8) (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D8 scale has been 
frequently used by previous studies as a general measure of psychological distress (see, 
e.g., Houle and Martin, 2011), both in its full and its abbreviated version. It captures var-
ious aspects of mental health such as positive and negative emotions, sleep quality and 
energy levels and has been shown to have reliability and validity when using the items to 
compare mental health differences of men and women across countries (Bracke, Levec-
que and Van de Velde, 2008). For the purpose of this study, the CES-D8 scale is built as 
a non-weighted summary index based on the answers to eight questions (see Table 5.3).18 
Responses were assessed on 4-point Likert scales ranging from 0 to 3, and have been 
reversed for the purpose of a more intuitive interpretation. Accordingly, the CES-D8 
ranges from 0 to 24, with higher scores indicating a higher level of psychological distress. 
Table 5.3: The CES-D8 scale as used in the European Social Survey Rounds 6 and 7 
I will now read out a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved during the past week. 
Using this card, please tell me how much of the time during the past week… 
Answer categories are: almost all of the time (3), most of the time (2), some of the time 
(1), almost none of the time (0). 
…you felt depressed? 
…you felt that everything you did was an effort? 
…your sleep was restless? 
…you were happy? 
…you felt lonely? 
…you enjoyed life? 
…you felt sad? 
…you could not get going? 
                                                 
18 Missing values are dealt with using respondent mean substitution on the condition that respondents had 
answered at least five items of the scale. Individuals with missing values on more than three out of eight 
items have been excluded from the analyses.  
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5.4.3 Analytic strategy 
All empirical analyses use a stratified approach, i.e. the 18 European countries under in-
vestigation are grouped into six country groups (see Chapter 5.3.2 for details on the 
country grouping).19  
As the first step, I replicate previous findings from mobility research using a conventional 
regression framework. This includes models estimating mobility effects while controlling 
for parental attainment (origin status), and models estimating mobility effects while con-
trolling for one’s own attainment (destination status) for all three well-being outcomes. 
All models control for sex, age, country, citizenship, membership in minority ethnic 
group, and ESS round.20 As outlined above, these kinds of models – and conclusions 
drawn from their respective results – fail to tackle the challenge posed by the linear de-
pendency of origin, destination and mobility indicators. Omitting one of the three 
variables of interest (origin, destination, and mobility) leads to uncertainty about what 
drives the observed effects of the remaining two. Results from such standard regression 
models that have been applied in prior studies will serve to show how model selection 
influences estimates of mobility effects and how different specifications lead to radically 
different findings.  
In the second step, I estimate mobility effects using diagonal reference models (see Chap-
ter 3.3). These DRMs are grounded in sociological theory and allow for a simultaneous 
modelling of origin, destination and mobility effects (Hendrickx et al., 1993) while break-
ing their linear dependency. In mobility theory it is argued that an individual’s 
characteristics and behaviours are affected by both origin and destination status (Blau, 
1956; Blau and Duncan, 1967). DRMs take this as a starting point for model specification, 
assuming that the outcome of interest for mobile individuals is shaped by their origin and 
destination status. Non-mobile persons, i.e. those located in the diagonal cells of a mobil-
ity table, are assumed to build the core of a social position and to best reflect the 
                                                 
19 With limited sample sizes for individual countries as well as the limited number of countries available 
for analysis, a multilevel approach is not appropriate here (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013; 
Maas and Hox, 2005). A sample size of 18 countries lies by far below the recommended number of units 
at level 2. Several simulation studies (Stegmueller, 2013; Maas and Hox, 2005) have shown that undercut-
ting this threshold has negative effects on the accuracy of parameter estimates and standard errors.  
20 Since I am interested in the overall effects of intergenerational mobility, I do not control for potential 
mechanisms that might mediate the relationship between mobility and well-being, such as e.g. financial 
satisfaction. 
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characteristics of that position (Sorokin, 1959: 509f.). Therefore, the non-mobiles are 
modelled as the primary reference group for mobile individuals. 
Applied to the research question of this chapter, DRMs model respondents’ well-being as 
the weighted sum of the estimated mean well-being scores in the non-mobile origin group 
(μii) and the non-mobile destination group (μjj). The parameters q and (1-q) denote the 
influence of parental and one’s own education, and are bounded by the value 1. They can 
be regarded as weights for the relative importance of origin and destination for the re-
spondents’ well-being 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (Monden and de Graaf, 2013: 982). The functional form looks 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (1) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞) ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
(1) is the baseline model examining the association between parental education (origin 
status), one’s own education (destination status), and the respondent’s well-being and (2) 
is an extension thereof including the dummy variables UP and DOWN that capture inter-
generational mobility. For each country group, two nested models are estimated. All 
models include the same control variables used in the conventional regression framework 
earlier. The Akaike Information Criterion and the likelihood ratio test are used to assess 
model fit.  
5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Descriptives 
Table 5.4 shows the distribution of intergenerational educational mobility and the three 
outcomes of interest for each country group. Similar to what is known from previous 
studies on broader age groups (Böhnke, 2008), average life satisfaction is highest in the 
Nordic countries and lowest in the Baltic States. With regard to psychological distress, 
the estimates are in line with earlier studies that found highest risks for depressive symp-
toms in Continental, Eastern and Southern Europe, and lowest risks in the Nordic 
countries (Eikemo et al., 2016). Self-reported general health is highest in the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries and lowest in Continental Europe and the Baltic States. These  
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Group name Nordic    Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
Countries DK, FI, SE, NO  BE, FR, DE, NL ES, PT   GB, IE   CZ, HI, PL, SK EE, LT   
  Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) 
Life satisfaction (range: 0-10)                         
  7.99 (0.03) 7.08 (0.05) 7.09 (0.05) 7.21 (0.08) 7.09 (0.05) 6.59 (0.10) 
Self-reported general health (range:1-5) 
 4.25 (0.02) 4.02 (0.02) 4.12 (0.02) 4.29 (0.03) 4.14 (0.01) 4.01 (0.03) 
Psychological distress (range: 0-24)             
 4.45 (0.08) 5.02 (0.09) 5.58 (0.15) 4.70 (0.13) 5.32 (0.11) 5.36 (0.11) 
Parents' educational attainment (O)                         
Low 0.16  0.24  0.69  0.40  0.28  0.10  
Medium 0.46  0.57  0.16  0.36  0.56  0.59  
High 0.38  0.19  0.15  0.24  0.15  0.31  
One’s own educational attainment (D)                         
Low 0.07  0.13  0.39  0.22  0.14  0.12  
Medium 0.50  0.61  0.26  0.38  0.54  0.47  
High 0.44  0.26  0.35  0.41  0.33  0.41  
Mobility (M)                         
Upward 0.29  0.29  0.42  0.38  0.35  0.25  
Downward 0.16  0.13  0.08  0.12  0.07  0.18  
Non-mobile 0.54  0.57  0.50  0.50  0.57  0.57  
Notes: Abbreviations: O-origin, D-destination, M-mobility.  
Source: ESS4-7 (ESS6-7 for outcome psychological distress), weighted results based on own calculations. 
Table 5.4: Composition of country groups    
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findings also correspond to previous studies for the general population that found the 
highest levels of self-rated health in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries, and compa-
rably low levels in the Southern and Eastern European countries (Eikemo et al., 2008a). 
Coming to the explanatory variables of interest, I find that in all country groups, inter-
generational stability is the most common mobility status – a fact that is in line with the 
assumption of DRMs that the group of non-mobiles forms the core of a class. Moreover, 
it underlines the well-established fact that education has a strong tendency to be repro-
duced across generations (OECD, 2014: 87ff.). Upward mobility is most common in 
Southern Europe (42%) and least common in the Baltic States (25%). Downward mobil-
ity, in turn, is most prevalent in the Baltic States (18%) and the Nordic countries (16%). 
Upward mobility is thus found to be far more common than downward mobility in all 
country groups – a finding that corresponds with earlier findings for the broader set of 
OECD countries (OECD, 2014: 87).  
5.5.2 Conventional regression models 
In the following, I estimate mobility effects while either controlling for parental attain-
ment (origin status, see Panels 1, Table 5.5 – Table 5.7) or one’s own educational 
attainment (destination status, see Panels 2, Table 5.5 – Table 5.7) for all three well-being 
outcomes and using a conventional regression framework. This replication of previous 
findings will serve to show how model selection (in particular, whether it is controlled 
for origin or destination status) influences the effects of intergenerational educational mo-
bility.  
Panel 1 in Table 5.5 presents the results of conventional regression models regressing life 
satisfaction on intergenerational educational mobility while controlling for parental edu-
cation (omitting one’s own education). Concerning origin effects, I find parental 
education to have a substantial impact on an offspring’s well-being in all but the Nordic 
countries. In line with previous studies (e.g., Campos-Matos and Kawachi, 2015) I find 
positive well-being effects of upward mobility and the reverse for downward mobility in 
all country groups. Yet, as outlined earlier, these estimates of mobility effects are con-
founded by the influence of one’s own status attainment on well-being (which has not 
been controlled for in the model).  
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Panel 2 in Table 5.5 presents the results of conventional regression models regressing life 
satisfaction on mobility while controlling for one’s own education (omitting parental ed-
ucation). Concerning destination effects, I find one’s own education to have the lowest 
explanatory power in the Nordic countries. Results concerning estimates of mobility ef-
fects are radically different compared to the first approach (Panel 1 in Table 5.5). I find 
negative effects of upward mobility in the Baltic States and counterintuitively, positive 
well-being effects of downward mobility in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Visegrád Four 
and the Baltic States. This owes to the fact that parental education (i.e. the origin effect) 
is not controlled for in these models, rendering strongly biased estimates of mobility ef-
fects.  
Moving on to psychological distress, Panels 1 and 2 in Table 5.6 illustrate a similar di-
vergence of mobility effects, depending on whether the linear regression models control 
for origin or destination status. Regressing psychological distress on intergenerational 
educational mobility while controlling for parental education (Panel 1 in Table 5.6) re-
sults in negative effects for the upwardly mobile, and positive effects for the downwardly 
mobiles. In other words, the estimates suggest that upwardly mobiles have lower levels 
of psychological distress, and downwardly mobiles have higher levels of psychological 
distress when compared to non-mobiles. 
In contrast, regressing psychological distress on intergenerational educational mobility 
while controlling for one’s own education (Panel 2 in Table 5.6) results in completely 
different mobility effects. While in Panel 1 mobility effects were almost all statistically 
significant, in Panel 2 all except one mobility effect lost their statistical significance. Even 
more important, I now find positive effects for upwardly mobile individuals, i.e. higher 
levels of psychological distress, in four out of six country groups. Similarly, the estimates 
now suggest downwardly mobiles to have lower levels of psychological distress than non-
mobiles in four out of six country groups. Thus, mobility effects in Panel 1 and 2 (Table 
5.6) are again radically differing from each other.  
A similar picture is finally found with the linear regression models for self-reported gen-
eral health. As visible in Panels 1 and 2 in Table 5.7, mobility effects differ radically 
depending on whether the models control for either parental education (omitting one’s 
own education) or one’s own education (omitting parental education). In the former case, 
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I find positive effects for upwardly mobiles and negative effects for downwardly mobile 
individuals across all six country groups. Accordingly, those who succeeded to exceed 
their parents’ educational level report a better health than individuals who only main-
tained their parents’ educational level. And people who arrived at a lower educational 
level than their parents report a lower level of health compared to non-mobile individuals.  
These findings for mobility effects again change substantially when models control for 
one’s own educational attainment (Panel 2 in Table 5.7). Here, only mobility effects in 
the Baltic States remain statistically significant. Apart from that, the signs of mobility 
effects again change their direction in five out of six country groups, so that upward mo-
bility is suddenly associated with lower levels of health, and downward mobility with 
higher levels of health. 
As outlined above, the kinds of models that have been presented here as a replication of 
approaches in earlier studies are not able to disentangle the effects of social mobility, 
social origin and social destination. Therefore, conclusions drawn from their respective 
results have to be considered biased. I refrain from replicating a third regression approach 
that was applied in previous mobility effects research. Such studies model both origin and 
destination effects, and mobility effects, thus leading to over-identified models. Instead, 
I finally turn to DRMs, ‘the only acceptable method to model mobility effects’ (Houle, 
2011: 764).  
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Table 5.5: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: life satisfaction) 
Panel 1: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for parental education (omitting one’s own education)       
  Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile) 
Upward 0.14 0.08 0.53 0.08 0.45 0.09 0.67 0.11 0.63 0.09 0.86 0.14 
Downward -0.21 0.09 -0.63 0.10 -0.38 0.20 -0.35 0.18 -0.39 0.14 -0.59 0.15 
Parents' educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium 0.10 0.09 0.49 0.08 0.24 0.13 0.76 0.11 0.53 0.10 1.03 0.20 
High 0.25 0.12 1.10 0.11 0.63 0.16 1.25 0.16 1.32 0.14 2.04 0.22 
Intercept 7.23 0.36 7.70 0.35 6.09 0.53 4.80 0.55 5.72 0.41 4.28 0.61 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 2,699  4,032  2,102  1,813  3,931  1,473  
Adj. R-sq 0.02  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.10  
                          
Panel 2: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for one’s own education (omitting parental education) 
  Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile)  
Upward -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.09 -0.22 0.14 
Downward -0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.36 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.50 0.17 
One’s own educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium 0.23 0.13 0.55 0.10 0.37 0.14 0.66 0.14 0.48 0.13 0.98 0.20 
High 0.35 0.14 1.07 0.11 0.59 0.14 1.33 0.16 1.27 0.15 2.02 0.22 
Intercept 7.13 0.37 7.68 0.36 6.06 0.53 4.92 0.55 5.78 0.41 4.28 0.61 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 2,699  4,032  2,102  1,813  3,931  1,473  
Adj. R-sq 0.03   0.09   0.07   0.07   0.09   0.10   
Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold 
indicate significant effects (p<0.05). ‘Mobility’ refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one’s own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attainment 
(Panel 2). Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
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Table 5.6: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: psychological distress) 
Panel 1: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for parental education (omitting one’s own education)       
 Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile) 
Upward -0.48 0.23 -0.92 0.21 -0.74 0.30 -0.87 0.27 -0.74 0.25 -0.67 0.26 
Downward 0.48 0.25 0.96 0.26 1.06 0.56 0.47 0.45 1.24 0.42 0.40 0.31 
Parents' educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium -0.76 0.27 -1.04 0.23 -0.46 0.40 -1.11 0.27 -0.59 0.29 -1.84 0.40 
High -1.19 0.33 -1.95 0.29 -0.70 0.49 -1.15 0.39 -1.48 0.39 -2.55 0.45 
Intercept 6.13 0.99 7.17 0.94 7.47 1.63 6.41 1.36 8.64 1.23 7.56 1.20 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 1,580  2,009  878  1,163  1,651  1,101  
Adj. R-sq 0.03  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.04  
                         
Panel 2: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for one’s own education (omitting parental education) 
 Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile)  
Upward 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.19 -0.29 0.41 -0.05 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.27 
Downward -0.18 0.25 -0.16 0.27 0.64 0.50 -0.21 0.44 0.43 0.41 -0.71 0.33 
One’s own educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium -1.30 0.39 -1.63 0.28 -0.36 0.43 -0.77 0.35 -0.78 0.37 -1.37 0.41 
High -1.86 0.41 -2.36 0.31 -0.71 0.44 -1.47 0.39 -1.53 0.42 -2.30 0.46 
Intercept 6.60 1.02 7.60 0.95 7.49 1.62 6.06 1.36 8.69 1.24 7.20 1.20 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 1,580  2,009  878  1,163  1,651  1,101  
Adj. R-sq 0.03  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.03  
Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in 
bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05). ‘Mobility’ refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one’s own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attain-
ment (Panel 2). Source: ESS6-7, own calculations. 
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Table 5.7: Estimates from linear regression models (outcome: self-reported general health) 
Panel 1: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for parental education (omitting one’s own education)       
 Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile) 
Upward 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.05 
Downward -0.29 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.11 0.07 -0.17 0.07 -0.25 0.05 -0.15 0.05 
Parents' educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.28 0.07 
High 0.46 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.49 0.08 
Intercept 3.97 0.18 4.22 0.14 4.49 0.19 4.40 0.20 4.47 0.14 3.84 0.21 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 2,699  4,034  2,113  1,822  3,944  1,477  
Adj. R-sq 0.04  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.05  
                         
Panel 2: ‘Mobility effects’, controlling for one’s own education (omitting parental education) 
 Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
‘Mobility’ (Ref.: Non-mobile)  
Upward -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.05 
Downward 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.13 0.06 
One’s own educational attainment (Ref.: Low) 
Medium 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.04 0.34 0.07 
High 0.47 0.07 0.38 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.42 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.56 0.08 
Intercept 3.92 0.18 4.22 0.14 4.48 0.19 4.42 0.20 4.46 0.14 3.76 0.21 
ESS round  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 2,699  4,034  2,113  1,822  3,944  1,477  
Adj. R-sq 0.04  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.06  
Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, all models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in 
bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05). ‘Mobility’ refers to effects of mobility that are confounded by one’s own attainment (Panel 1) or parental attain-
ment (Panel 2). Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
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5.5.3 Diagonal reference models 
Two nested DRMs were fitted for each country group and all three well-being outcomes 
(subjective well-being, psychological distress, and self-reported general health) consecu-
tively. Concerning the education-based gradient of well-being in the group of non-
mobiles (diagonal effects in Table 5.8) the baseline models (Models 1) show rising life 
satisfaction scores with educational attainment. Comparing country groups, the gradient 
is found to be most pronounced in the Baltic States and least pronounced in the Nordic 
countries. The weight parameters from Models 1 indicate whether young Europeans’ life 
satisfaction is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the destination or origin group. 
Across all country groups, I find respondents’ destination to be more important for their 
life satisfaction than their origin. The relative weight of the origin status (parental educa-
tion) is greatest in the Baltic States (q=0.33), followed by the Visegrád Four (q=0.26), 
and the Anglo-Saxon countries (q=0.25), whereas the influence of parental education is 
estimated to lie close to zero in the Nordic and the Southern European countries. How-
ever, it is important to note that even in the Baltic States, the influence of the destination 
status trumps the origin status (1-q=0.67).  
Model 2 tests for the effects of intergenerational mobility over and above the effects of 
educational origin and destination, finally allowing mobility effects to be separated from 
mere level effects. For all but the Continental European countries, model fit statistics 
indicate that adding mobility indicators to the baseline model (comparing Model 2 with 
Model 1) does not provide a significantly better fit to the data. Accordingly, upward mo-
bility and downward mobility effects (net of parental and one’s own educational level, 
and controls) are shown to be non-significant, supporting the acculturation hypothesis. 
The exception is Continental Europe, where I find significant net mobility effects: down-
ward mobility significantly reduces life satisfaction whereas upward mobility 
significantly increases it. Both upward and downward mobility effects are sizable in mag-
nitude and supportive of the hypothesis of stronger psychological mobility effects in 
societies where status maintenance is important for social identity.21 
                                                 
21 Given that the vast majority of intergenerational mobility trajectories happen between adjacent educa-
tional categories (see Table 5.14), differences in effects between shorter and longer range mobility 
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Estimates of the two nested DRMs for the outcome psychological distress are summarized 
in Table 5.9. Similar to the results for life satisfaction, the baseline models show decreas-
ing psychological distress with higher educational attainment across all country groups 
(diagonal effects in baseline Models 1). This educational gradient of psychological dis-
tress in the group of non-mobiles is most pronounced in the Baltic States, and least 
pronounced in the Southern European countries. Weight parameters in Models 1 further-
more indicate that the young Europeans’ level of psychological distress is closer to their 
non-mobile counterparts in the destination group since the relative weight of origin status 
(parental education) is estimated to lie close to zero in all country groups except the Baltic 
States. The Baltic States constitute the exception since they are the only country group 
where the relative weight of origin status (parental education) is higher than the relative 
weight of destination status (own education). Accordingly, the level of psychological dis-
tress among young people from the Baltic States is closer to their non-mobile counterparts 
in the origin group than in the destination group.  
Subsequently, Model 2 tests for the effects of intergenerational mobility on psychological 
distress over and above the effects of educational origin and destination. With respect to 
model fit statistics, I find that adding mobility indicators to the baseline models does not 
lead to a statistically significant improvement in model fit in any of the six country 
groups. Mobility effects thus do not seem to shape the young Europeans’ levels of psy-
chological distress over and above parental and one’s own educational level. In the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, however, model fit improvement is at least marginally significant 
(i.e., on a 10 % level) and the estimates furthermore show statistically significant negative 
effects for upward mobility. In other words, the young Anglo-Saxons’ psychological ex-
perience of exceeding their parents’ educational level is associated with a statistically 
significant lower level of psychological distress. Since model fit improvement is only 
marginally significant, I take this as weak support of the previously proposed H3 where I 
expected stronger psychological effects in societies where status maintenance is crucial 
                                                 
trajectories (e.g., mobility from high to medium versus mobility from high to low levels of education) could 
– although theoretically interesting – not be investigated further. 
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for social identity. In all other country groups, I do not find statistically significant mo-
bility effects, which is in line with the lack of model fit improvement by adding mobility 
indicators to the baseline models.  
Moving on to the third outcome, self-reported general health, results from the two nested 
DRMs for each country group are presented in Table 5.10. With respect to the education-
based gradient of self-reported general health in the group of non-mobiles (diagonal ef-
fects), the baseline models (Models 1) show rising general health levels with educational 
attainment. Comparing country groups, I find the gradient to be most pronounced in the 
Baltic States, and least pronounced in Southern European countries. Concerning the rel-
ative importance of parental or one’s own education for general health, the weight 
estimates from Model 1 give a very clear picture. In all country groups, the respondent’s 
destination status (their own education) is more important for his or her self-reported gen-
eral health level than their origin (parental education). Although destination status plays 
the dominant role in all country groups, it is noticeable that the relative weight of parental 
education (origin status) is greatest in the Baltic States (q=0.38), and lowest in the Vise-
gréd Four (q=0.11).  
But how does intergenerational educational mobility shape self-reported levels of general 
health, over and above the level-effects of social origin and social destination? Models 2 
can shed light on this question. Looking at the model fit statistics, it becomes clear that 
for all but the Nordic countries, model fit does not improve significantly by adding mo-
bility indicators to the baseline models (Models 1). Thus, the effects of experiencing 
upward or downward mobility are shown to be non-significant when controlling for pa-
rental and one’s own educational level. The Nordic countries represent the exception, 
since I find both a significant model improvement and significant net mobility effects 
there: downward mobility significantly reduces the general health level whereas upward 
mobility significantly decreases them. This finding is admittedly surprising since it is not 
in line with the previously depicted hypothesis of stronger psychological mobility effects 
in societies where status maintenance is crucial for social identity and weaker psycholog-
ical mobility effects in societies with higher social fluidity. 
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Table 5.8: Estimates from DRM (outcome: life satisfaction) 
  Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Weights 1                                                 
O (q) 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.75 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.48 0.25 0.09 0.42 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.59 0.29 
D (1-q) 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.86 0.08 0.25 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.45 0.48 0.75 0.09 0.58 0.26 0.74 0.09 0.72 0.25 0.67 0.08 0.41 0.29 
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)                     
Upward   -0.01 0.07   0.37 0.17   0.26 0.23   0.23 0.23   0.08 0.20   0.43 0.34 
Downward   -0.05 0.09   -0.48 0.17   -0.23 0.24   0.04 0.26   0.09 0.22   -0.14 0.37 
Diagonal 2 (Ref.: Low education level)                     
Medium  0.24 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.58 0.11 0.50 0.10 0.38 0.10 0.28 0.19 0.74 0.15 0.77 0.15 0.41 0.14 0.43 0.14 1.01 0.23 1.11 0.24 
High 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.14 1.13 0.11 1.11 0.11 0.61 0.11 0.63 0.15 1.39 0.16 1.38 0.16 1.28 0.15 1.28 0.15 2.06 0.23 2.12 0.24 
                         
Intercept 7.57 0.38 7.60 0.38 7.00 0.36 7.07 0.36 7.39 0.52 7.41 0.52 5.57 0.54 5.47 0.54 6.02 0.42 5.98 0.42 4.78 0.61 4.63 0.62 
AIC 9,912 9,914 16,550 16,547 8,833 8,838 7,653 7,655 16,941 16,944 6,241 6,243 
Pr(>Chi)3 0.57 0.03 0.87 0.43 0.57 0.27 
N 2,699     4,032     2,102      1,813     3,931       1,473       
Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.  
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05).  
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment.  
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero. 
3P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1. 
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
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Table 5.9: Estimates from DRM (outcome: psychological distress) 
   Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
  β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Weights 1                                                 
O (q)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.33 0.08 0.22 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.77 0.56 0.13 0.71 0.24 
D (1-q)  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.86 0.10 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 1.33 0.92 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.57 0.77 0.44 0.13 0.29 0.24 
 Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)                     
Upward    0.20 0.19 
  
0.20 0.19 
  
-0.49 0.79 
  -
0.87 0.27 
  
-0.26 0.69 
  
-0.41 0.33 
Downward    -0.18 0.25   -0.16 0.27   0.86 0.74   0.47 0.45   0.77 0.74   0.04 0.43 
 Diagonal 2 (Ref.: Low education 
level) 
                    
Medium   -1.20 0.38 -1.30 0.39 -1.69 0.30 -1.63 0.28 
-
0.53 0.32 -0.41 0.56 -0.84 0.36 
-
1.11 0.27 -0.84 0.35 -0.68 0.40 -2.08 0.49 -2.12 0.50 
High  -1.67 0.38 -1.86 0.41 -2.37 0.31 -2.36 0.31 
-
0.98 0.35 -0.77 0.48 -1.53 0.39 
-
1.15 0.39 -1.58 0.36 -1.51 0.41 -2.71 0.48 -2.75 0.49 
                          
Intercept  6.03 1.01 6.21 1.02 8.66 0.96 8.62 0.96 7.01 1.62 6.82 1.64 6.91 1.35 7.21 1.35 9.66 1.23 9.51 1.24 7.24 1.19 7.40 1.21 
AIC  8,203 8,205 10,856 10,858 4,927 4,930  6,506 6,505 9,317 9,321 5,814 5,816 
Pr(>Chi)3  0.39 -0.39 0.40 0.09 0.73 0.40 
N  1,580 1,580 2,009 2,009 878 878 1,163   1,163 1,651 1,651 1,101 1,101 
 Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.  
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05).  
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment.  
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero. 
3P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1. 
Source: ESS6-7, own calculations. 
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Table 5.10: Estimates from DRM (outcome: self-reported general health) 
  Nordic  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Weights 1                                                
O (q) 0.18 0.08 0.81 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.52 0.25 0.18 0.10 0.52 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.63 0.46 0.38 0.11 0.02 0.33 
D (1-q) 0.82 0.08 0.19 0.22 0.82 0.09 0.76 0.27 0.78 0.22 0.48 0.25 0.82 0.10 0.48 0.20 0.89 0.12 0.37 0.46 0.62 0.11 0.98 0.33 
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)                     
Upward   0.17 0.08   0.03 0.06   0.06 0.05   0.10 0.06   0.06 0.09   -0.09 0.10 
Downward   -0.23 0.08   0.01 0.07   -0.03 0.07   -0.09 0.07   -0.18 0.09   0.13 0.10 
Diagonal 2 (Ref.: Low education level)                     
Medium  0.20 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.37 0.08 0.35 0.08 
High 0.48 0.07 0.45 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.43 0.05 0.40 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.56 0.08 0.56 0.08 
                         
Intercept 3.91 0.18 3.99 0.18 4.37 0.14 4.36 0.14 4.71 0.19 4.71 0.19 4.20 0.19 4.20 0.19 4.49 0.14 4.54 0.14 3.59 0.21 3.59 0.21 
AIC 6,036 6,033 8,988 8,991 4,570 4,572  3,980 3,982 8,526 8,525 3,121 3,124 
Pr(>Chi)3 0.02 0.77  0.38 0.36 0.10 0.45 
N 2,699 4,034 2,113 1,822 3,944 1,477 
Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.  
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05).  
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment.  
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero. 
3P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1. 
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
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5.6 Robustness tests 
In addition to the previously shown analyses, several exemplary robustness tests have 
been conducted for the outcome life satisfaction. In particular, I estimated two nested 
DRM with a pooled sample of all 18 countries in order to assess the relative importance 
of one’s own versus parental education (see Table 5.11). They can be seen as baseline 
models for the stratified analyses previously shown.  
In line with the findings from the stratified analyses, the pooled model suggests that one’s 
own education is relatively more important than parental education for young Europeans’ 
life satisfaction. The education-based well-being gradient is substantial, with the highly 
educated having on average a 1.07 point higher life satisfaction score than their counter-
parts with low levels of education. With regard to net mobility effects, model fit statistics 
indicate a better fit of Model 2 as compared to Model 1. I find statistically significant 
positive upward mobility effects and statistically significant downward mobility effects, 
over and above origin and destination effects.  
As shown in Table 5.8, DRM predict origin weights that lie on the boundaries of the 
theoretically possible interval of 0.00 to 1.00 for the Nordic and Southern European coun-
tries. In other words, the estimates indicate that parental education has no well-being 
effect in these two country groups. To test the robustness of this finding, I ran conven-
tional linear models regressing life satisfaction on one’s own and parental education. 
These models corroborate the finding from DRMs of very small and non-significant well-
being effects of parental education for both country groups (see Table 5.12). 
For a formal test of significance of differences in effects across country groups, I pooled 
all data from the 18 countries under investigation and tested interaction effects of the 
estimates for weights and diagonal effects with the country groups. I compared the fit of 
a series of nested models using likelihood ratio tests (see Table 5.13). Model A, the base-
line model, includes only the basic control variables (age, sex, ESS round, citizenship, 
and minority group). Model B additionally includes dummy variables for the country 
groups and shows a significantly better model fit. Model C allows control variables to 
vary across country groups, again significantly improving the model fit. Model D tests 
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for significant differences between origin/destination weights across country groups. The 
significant improvement in model fit compared to model C suggests that the differences 
between country groups presented in this study are statistically significant. Model E ad-
ditionally includes interaction effects between diagonal effects and country groups. The 
significant increase in model fit suggests significant differences in education-based well-
being gradients across country groups. Given that model fit statistics suggest that Model 
2, shown in Table 5.8 (i.e., the model including mobility dummies), shows a significantly 
poorer fit to the data than Model 1 in five out of six country groups, I refrain from carrying 
out a similar test of cross-country differences in net mobility effects.  
Furthermore, I conducted sensitivity analyses using a 4-category education variable in-
stead of the 3-category version used in the main analyses (see Table 5.15). I distinguish 
between basic education (less than lower secondary education comprising ES-ISCED 
level I), lower secondary education (ES-ISCED level II), higher secondary education (ES-
ISCED levels IIIa, IIIb, and IV) and tertiary education (ES-ISCED levels V1 and V2). 
For the Nordic countries, the Visegrád Four, and the Baltic States, cell sizes for the lowest 
attainment level are, however, too small to allow for meaningful analysis (i.e., the number 
of respondents with only basic education is smaller than 25 in these country groups). 
Results for the three remaining country groups are found to be robust against this change 
in measurement.  
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 Model 1 Model 2 
 β SE β SE 
Weights1         
O (q) 0.17 0.04 0.53 0.13 
D (1-q) 0.83 0.04 0.47 0.13 
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)     
Upward   0.26 0.09 
Downward   -0.20 0.09 
Diagonal 2 (Ref.: Low education level)     
Medium  0.50 0.05 0.48 0.06 
High 1.07 0.06 1.07 0.06      
Intercept 6.60 0.19 6.60 0.19 
AIC 66,530 66,525 
Pr(>Chi)3 0.01 
N 16,050   16,050   
Notes: controls for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.  
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05).  
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment.  
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero. 
3P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1. 
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
  
Table 5.11: DRM using pooled data from all 18 countries (outcome: life satisfaction) 
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  Southern   Nordic    
     
  β SE β SE 
One’s own educational attainment (Ref.: Low)         
Medium 0.39 0.11 0.25 0.13 
High 0.61 0.12 0.38 0.14 
Parents' educational attainment (Ref.: Low)    
Medium -0.03 0.13 -0.02 0.09 
High 0.00 0.15 -0.03 0.09 
Intercept 6.06 0.53 7.12 0.37 
ESS round  yes  yes  
Country yes  yes  
N 2,102  2,699  
Adj. R-sq 0.07   0.02   
Notes: In addition to ESS round and country, models control for age, sex, citizenship, and membership of minority ethnic group. Numbers (effects) in bold indicate 
significant effects (p<0.05). Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
 
Table 5.13: Overview of model fit – interaction effects (outcome: life satisfaction) 
 
Model  
  Resid. Df Resid. Dev Df Deviance Pr (>Chi) 
A Baseline model including only basic controls 1  16037 63723    
B A + country group 16032 61407 5 2316.20 0.0000 
C B + interaction basic controls * country group 15993 60988 39 418.50 0.0000 
D C + interaction weights * country group 15989 60949 4 39.07 0.0364 
E D + interaction diagonal effects * country group 15978 60615 11 334.26 0.0000 
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. N=16,050.  
1 Basic controls include age, sex, ESS round, citizenship, and minority group 
Notes: Model comparisons are based on likelihood ratio tests. 
  
Table 5.12: Effects of one’s own and parental education (using linear regression; outcome: life satisfaction) 
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Group name Nordic    Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon Visegrád 4 Baltic States 
Countries DK, FI, SE, NO  BE, FR, DE, NL ES, PT   GB, IE   CZ, HI, PL, SK EE, LT   
  Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n 
Parents' educational attainment (O)                         
Low 0.16 437 0.24 1,030 0.69 1,448 0.40 723 0.28 1,116 0.10 141 
Medium 0.46 1,241 0.57 2,444 0.16 337 0.36 661 0.56 2,215 0.59 874 
High 0.38 1,021 0.19 828 0.15 317 0.24 430 0.15 600 0.31 458 
One’s own educational attainment (D)                         
Low 0.07 181 0.13 539 0.39 825 0.22 393 0.14 535 0.12 173 
Medium 0.50 1,337 0.61 2,626 0.26 545 0.38 684 0.54 2,104 0.47 693 
High 0.44 1,181 0.26 1,137 0.35 732 0.41 737 0.33 1,292 0.41 607 
Mobility (M)                         
Upward 0.29 794 0.29 1,262 0.42 892 0.38 687 0.35 1,391 0.25 370 
Downward 0.16 441 0.13 568 0.08 160 0.12 212 0.07 284 0.18 266 
Non-mobile 0.54 1,463 0.57 2,473 0.50 1,050 0.50 915 0.57 2,255 0.57 837 
Detailed mobility trajectories (M)                         
Upward (low -> high) 0.04 95 0.03 134 0.16 331 0.10 188 0.04 174 0.02 34 
Upward (low -> medium) 0.09 255 0.14 606 0.18 381 0.13 242 0.14 539 0.05 67 
Upward (medium -> high) 0.16 444 0.12 521 0.09 179 0.14 257 0.17 678 0.18 269 
Downward (high -> low) 0.01 32 0.01 28 0.01 25 0.02 28 0.00 9 0.01 21 
Downward (high -> medium) 0.13 347 0.07 318 0.03 71 0.06 111 0.04 152 0.09 133 
Downward (medium -> low) 0.02 63 0.05 221 0.03 65 0.04 73 0.03 123 0.08 112 
Non-mobile 0.54 1,463 0.57 2,473 0.50 1,050 0.50 915 0.57 2,255 0.57 837 
N 2,699   4,032   2,102   1,813   3,931   1,473   
Source: ESS4-7, weighted results based on own calculations. Abbreviations: O-origin, D-destination, M-mobility. Sample refers to the analyses for the outcome ‘life 
satisfaction’. 
  
Table 5.14: Sample composition by country group – detailed   
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  Continental Southern Anglo-Saxon 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Weights1                         
O (q) 0.14 0.08 0.78 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.09 0.44 0.19 
D (1-q) 0.86 0.08 0.22 0.20 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.09 0.56 0.19 
Net Mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)             
Upward   0.43 0.15   0.03 0.11   0.25 0.18 
Downward   -0.47 0.15   0.07 0.18   0.03 0.22 
Diagonal 2 (Ref.: Basic education)             
Lower secondary 0.00 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.27 0.10 0.25 
Higher secondary 0.58 0.21 0.69 0.14 0.42 0.15 0.39 0.17 0.77 0.23 0.90 0.21 
Tertiary 1.13 0.21 1.30 0.15 0.64 0.15 0.63 0.17 1.42 0.23 1.50 0.21 
             
Intercept 7.00 0.39 6.85 0.37 7.35 0.54 7.34 0.54 5.53 0.57 5.35 0.56 
AIC 16,552 16,547 8,835 8,839 7,655 7,657 
Pr(>Chi)3 0.01      0.92  0.35    
N 4,032 2,102 1,813 
Notes: All models control for age, sex, country, citizenship, membership of minority ethnic group, and ESS round.  
Numbers (effects) in bold indicate significant effects (p<0.05).  
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment.  
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low education level) are fixed at zero. 
3P-value of likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 and Model 1. 
Source: ESS4-7, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 5.15: Main DRM analyses using a 4-category education variable (outcome: life satisfaction) 
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5.7 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter applied state-of-the-art methodology to investigate the well-being implica-
tions of intergenerational educational mobility for young Europeans. Using diagonal 
reference models allowed to estimate genuine ‘net’ mobility effects, independent from 
the well-being effects of social origin (parental educational attainment) and social desti-
nation (own educational attainment). For three different well-being dimensions – life 
satisfaction, psychological distress, and self-reported general health – and six country 
groups formed of the 18 countries under investigation, this chapter investigated well-be-
ing implications of social mobility in a cross-country comparative perspective. In line 
with previous studies, there are considerable cross-country differences in intergenera-
tional educational mobility. For example, Southern Europe stood out as the country group 
where rates of upward mobility are highest (42%) whereas downward mobility rates were 
found to be most prevalent in the Baltic States (18%). 
Well-being was assumed to increase with levels of educational attainment all across Eu-
rope, but smaller education-based well-being gradients were expected in countries 
featuring high income equality and strongly redistributive and decommodifying welfare 
states. In line with these expectations, for the first out of three well-being measures, life 
satisfaction, the smallest gradient was found in the Nordic countries, where neither one’s 
own nor parental education matter much for shaping young adults’ subjective well-being. 
Also in line with such expectations, the strongest gradients regarding life satisfaction 
were found for the hugely unequal Baltic States. With regard to psychological distress, 
the second well-being measure under investigation, the educational gradient in the group 
of non-mobiles was found to be most pronounced in the Baltic States, again supporting 
the previously described expectations on cross-country variation. The weakest gradient 
for psychological distress was found in Southern Europe, which is, however, contrary to 
what was expected. Moving on to self-reported general health, I found rising general 
health levels with educational attainment. And in line with my expectations, the most 
pronounced gradients in health levels were again found for the Baltic States. Contrary to 
my expectations, for self-reported general health, too, the education-based gradient was 
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found to be least pronounced in Southern Europe. In sum, this evidence is rather support-
ive of the theoretical expectations with regard to education-based well-being gradients 
and cross-national differences.  
It was further assumed that the relative importance of parental educational attainment as 
opposed to own educational attainment would be greater in unequal and weakly decom-
modifying welfare states where family resources play an important role for individual 
well-being. For subjective well-being, the findings suggest that young adults’ own edu-
cation is more important for their current life satisfaction than their parents’ in all 
countries. Yet, in line with expectations, parental status was found to be least important 
for life satisfaction in the Nordic countries and most important in the Baltic States com-
pared to the other country groups. Contrary to the expectation of greater relative weight 
of parental education in country groups that feature both low levels of decommodification 
and high levels of youth unemployment, the estimates from DRMs show no support of 
this claim. A potential explanation for this finding may be that education might not be a 
very good indicator of family resources for Southern European countries, since a majority 
of parents only have low levels of education (see Table 5.4) (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). 
Concerning psychological distress, I found that the young Europeans’ level of psycho-
logical distress is closer to their non-mobile counterparts in the destination group, with 
the relative weights of origin status (parental education) estimated to lie close to zero in 
all country groups except the Baltic States. The findings suggest that in the Baltic States, 
the level of psychological distress among young people is closer to their non-mobile coun-
terparts in the origin group than in the destination group. In line with the theoretical 
expectations, parental status is thus found to be most important in the Baltic States com-
pared to the other five country groups.  
With regard to self-reported general health, the findings suggest that the respondents’ 
destination status (their own education) is more important for their self-reported general 
health level than their origin (parental education). In line with expectations, the influence 
of parental education is again most important in the Baltic States.  
Turning to the net mobility effects, over and above (i.e. controlling for) origin and desti-
nation effects, the empirical results – for all three well-being outcomes under 
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investigation – suggest that in most countries mobile individuals do not exhibit signifi-
cantly higher or lower levels of well-being. These results are in line with the individual-
level acculturation hypothesis which assumed mobility per se to have no independent 
effect. In contrast, individual well-being is chiefly determined by the destination status 
(one’s own education).  
Yet, there are a few exceptions to this more general non-finding with regard to net mo-
bility effects. A first exception is Continental Europe, where status loss/gain across 
generations was found to affect young adults’ life satisfaction in addition to the level 
effect of ending up in a lower/higher status position compared to their parents. These 
results are in line with the expectation that psychological mobility effects are more likely 
to occur in status-based societies. Another exception is the Anglo-Saxon country group, 
where I found statistically significantly lower levels of psychological distress for individ-
uals who have experienced upward mobility. In line with the fulfilled aspirations 
hypothesis, upward mobility is thus associated with psychological benefits. Furthermore, 
these findings are in line with the macro-level assumption of mobility effects to be 
stronger in societies that place more importance on social status. As final exception, and 
completely contrary to the theoretical expectations, the findings suggest that the experi-
ence of upward or downward mobility in the Nordic countries shapes the respondents’ 
level of self-reported general health over and above the influence of social origin and 
destination. Accordingly, upward mobility is associated with higher general health levels 
and downward mobility with lower general health levels, thus supporting the fulfilled 
versus frustrated aspirations hypothesis, and the falling-from-grace hypothesis, respec-
tively.  
By different means, the study presented in this chapter has made inroads into further dis-
entangling the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and well-
being. Focusing on young people instead of the general population ensured that an inter-
generational comparison of educational attainment is still meaningful. Considering well-
being as a multidimensional concept furthermore allowed for a more comprehensive eval-
uation of results in light of previous studies. Another strength of the study is the use of 
state-of-the-art modelling techniques for the study of intergenerational mobility that allow 
isolating the psychological (‘net’) mobility effects from the level effects of one’s own and 
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parental education. Moreover, this study constitutes a further step in the investigation of 
cross-national differences in mobility effects by applying an only recently developed the-
oretical framework (see Schuck and Steiber, 2018) to broader set of well-being outcomes.  
Yet, is has to be mentioned that the findings are not without caveats and limitations. The 
use of a stratified approach, that was required due to restricted options (a limited number 
of countries) for cross-national comparative analysis, did not allow formally testing the 
macro-level hypotheses on moderating contextual factors. Future research could therefore 
build on this chapter and contribute to the knowledge on the relevant moderating contex-
tual factors by using a larger set of countries that provide larger sample sizes. Apart from 
that, it has to be acknowledged that the present study is based on a very specific time 
period (2008-2014), which was mainly shaped by the economic crisis. It remains a task 
for future research to investigate if and to what degree the economic crisis plays a medi-
ating role for mobility effects on well-being.  
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6 Political consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
Political opinions and preferences are shaped by a multitude of factors. Hereby, the cen-
tral role of both current socioeconomic position (social destination) and family 
background (social origin) has long been documented in the literature (Moene and Wal-
lerstein, 2001; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Piketty, 1995). An individual’s socialisation, 
and especially their socialisation at a young age, is known to play an important role for 
their political attitudes. Against this background, there is reason to assume that intergen-
erational mobility, next to current economic position and social origin, may be influential 
for young people’s political opinions and preferences (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019).  
In contrast to the experience of older generations, upward social mobility is no longer a 
given for young people today. Recent evidence suggests ‘that the balance of upward and 
downward mobility in the experience of successive birth cohorts is moving in an unfa-
vourable direction’ (Bukodi et al., 2014: 13). Although referring to the UK, this 
development is only one example of a bigger picture that depicts the potential end of an 
era of widespread upward mobility and increasing risks of downward mobility. Due to 
this change, as well as the perception of constantly new upcoming social crises (like, e.g., 
the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and its aftermath), fears of intergenerational downward 
mobility are no longer a phenomenon that only occurs among those at the lower end of 
the social ladder. Quite to the contrary, fears of downward mobility have diffused into 
society as a whole (Mitrea, Mühlböck and Warmuth, 2017), and the middle class in par-
ticular (Lengfeld and Ordemann, 2016).  
Against this background of a newly emerging fear of downward mobility, this chapter 
sets out to examine how upward and downward mobility, both experienced and expected, 
shape young people’s attitudes toward the welfare state over and above current and pa-
rental socioeconomic status (see Schuck and Shore (2019) for a different analytical 
approach of this theoretical question). More specifically, this chapter addresses the ques-
tion of whether social mobility impacts attitudes of normative support for the welfare 
state. In the following, I will argue that in particular this normative dimension is relevant 
for the investigation of mobility effects. Socially mobile individuals may – from a theo-
retical perspective – be especially influenced by factors other than material self-interest, 
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which is often considered one of the strongest predictors for welfare state attitudes in 
general (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019).  
The investigation of political correlates of social mobility draws upon several literatures 
and the research objective pulls from various themes that have attracted scholarly interest 
for quite some time. Without a doubt, social mobility counts as one of these research 
topics that has been investigated in terms of causes, consequences, cross-country varia-
tion, and time trends for decades now. The same holds true for what I call here ‘political 
consequences’, i.e. the normative dimension of welfare state attitudes, which arguably 
are different among the socially mobile than for the non-mobile. The study of welfare 
state attitudes taps into the literatures on political socialisation, determinants of political 
behaviour, and comparative welfare state research.  
The role of an individual’s social position and their expectations regarding future move-
ments up or down the socioeconomic ladder is well examined by previous research. Much 
less is, however, known about the role of social mobility for welfare attitudes beyond that, 
in particular for what shall be called ‘moral aspects of welfare states’ (Schuck and Shore, 
2019). The ‘moral aspects of the welfare state’ refer to the moral or normative dimensions 
of welfare state attitudes which go beyond pure redistributive preferences by tapping into 
beliefs about distributive justice and deservingness (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot 
et al., 2017; Mau, 2003). Welfare state support is known to be multidimensional. In taking 
the multidimensionality of welfare state support into consideration, it is possible to look 
beyond material self-interest as source of welfare state support and focus on normative 
concerns and preferences (Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot, 2013; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 
1995; Oorschot, 2010). Among the socially mobile, such factors may arguably lead to 
different attitudes than would otherwise be predicted by material self-interest (given that 
the focus is on the moral or normative dimensions of welfare state attitudes). This multi-
dimensional conceptualization of welfare state support also takes into account that 
individuals my hold different views over different dimensions of welfare state support 
(Schuck and Shore, 2019). Multidimensionality, moreover, ‘implies that is it likely that 
the welfare state’s social legitimacy cannot be captured by a single indicator that only 
reflects people’s preferences for the role of the government’ (Oorschot, 2010: 20; see also 
Häusermann, Kurer and Schwander, 2015). This chapter therefore addresses a gap in the 
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literature by investigating the effects of intergenerational mobility (over and above cur-
rent and parental socioeconomic status) beyond preferences for redistribution. In 
examining young adults’ support of statements regarding the effects of receiving public 
assistance and benefit recipients, this study is able to explore a further dimension of the 
formation of welfare support attitudes.  
By adopting a differentiated approach to the study of social mobility, i.e. studying differ-
ent indicators of social mobility and their association with normative welfare state 
support, this study furthermore complements previous research on mobility effects. Pre-
vious studies in the field of political mobility effects largely relied on class mobility 
approaches, whereas this study will make use of alternative mobility indicators such as 
intergenerational educational mobility, intergenerational economic mobility and expected 
intergenerational mobility. In class mobility research, unemployed people, and above all, 
those who never had a job, are hard to classify and therefore often excluded from the 
analyses. Considering the turbulent economic timeframe of this study, I feel that the in-
clusion of unemployed young people is crucial for the analyses. Moreover, by focusing 
on educational, economic, and expected mobility, I am able to compare implications of 
both experienced and expected mobility. This seems especially relevant since earlier stud-
ies (see, e.g., Lengfeld and Ordemann, 2016; Lengfeld and Hirschle, 2009) have already 
shown that fears of downward mobility are not restricted to the less well-off, but affect 
equally (or even more) those whose current position is not bad at all.  
Finally, the relationship between social mobility and welfare state attitudes is also rele-
vant from the perspective of policymakers. Intergenerational upward mobility constitutes 
one of the bedrock beliefs of democratic societies. It ‘mirrors the societal expectation that 
generational reproduction is accompanied by economic prosperity and that the pie that 
can be distributed is constantly growing’ (Mitrea, Mühlböck and Warmuth, 2017: 4). In 
that sense, the stability of a democracy is directly related to the perception of realistic 
chances of upward mobility (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and policymakers should be aware 
of citizens’ (perceived) chances and risks of socioeconomic movements in order to be 
ready to influence these by the right social policy instruments.  
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With respect to welfare state attitudes and the experience of mobility, it is rather the aspect 
of welfare state legitimacy that makes the topic relevant for policymakers. Only if bene-
ficiaries of welfare provision are deemed deserving, individual’s will support such 
programs and policies (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Jensen and Petersen (2017), for exam-
ple, recently demonstrated the functioning of this deservingness heuristic across levels of 
self-interest, media frames, ideological divides, and national cultures for the example of 
politics of health care, yet emphasised the fact that it does not apply equally for all social 
benefits (unemployment benefits, in particular). Policymakers are affected by this deserv-
ingness heuristic since they are under pressure ‘to provide beneficial policy to powerful, 
positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive, punishment-oriented pol-
icy for negatively constructed groups’ (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 334).  
Elections, redistributive policies and even democratic legitimacy may be affected by so-
cial solidarity and beliefs about whom is deserving of social assistance and collective 
resources (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). The experience 
and the expectation of intergenerational mobility, which – as we have seen in previous 
chapters – affect a substantial share of today’s young Europeans, should be seen in direct 
connection to electoral outcomes, support for redistributive policies, and democratic le-
gitimacy, and thus raise awareness among policymakers. If retrenchment is inevitable, 
policymakers might avoid electoral punishment by a strategy of ‘expansionary disman-
tling’ (Jensen et al., 2014).  
Moreover, as the empirical analyses will show and is known from the literature (Roosma 
and Oorschot, 2017), welfare state attitudes are differing across Europe to a substantial 
degree. Asked about the role and outcomes of the welfare state, Northern and Western 
welfare states show more approval whereas Southern and Eastern European welfare states 
are more critical. This geographical gap in welfare state support should raise concerns 
especially among those policymakers who envision taking the European integration to 
the next level by establishing a social pillar (Roosma and Oorschot, 2017). The non-neg-
ligible differences in social legitimacy of welfare states across Europe therefore 
constitutes a huge challenge for policymakers and the present study can inform about the 
role of social mobility in this association.  
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This study makes use of two datasets, the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 
2018) and the latest round of the European Social Survey (ESS Round 8, 2017). It adopts 
a cross-national comparative perspective and applies state-of-the art methodology suita-
ble for parsimoniously estimating the effect of social mobility over and above social 
origin and destination effects.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I will give an account of the 
association between social mobility and (normative) welfare state attitudes. Based on this 
review I will then formulate two sets of competing hypotheses. Subsequently, I will out-
line the research design including the introduction of the data used to examine my 
research questions. After the presentation of empirical results, the paper concludes with 
a discussion and an outline for future research.  
6.1 Intergenerational mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state 
Despite the huge literature on attitudes toward the welfare state, relatively little is known 
about the role of experienced and expected social mobility in shaping opinions regarding 
normative aspects of the welfare state. Drawing on two strands of literature which have 
previously been depicted – the first examining effects of social mobility on redistributive 
preferences and the second focusing more specifically at welfare attitudes – two sets of 
competing hypotheses can be derived (see also Schuck and Shore, 2019). In contrast to 
the more general literature on determinants of welfare state attitudes, this chapter’s per-
spective is on experienced and expected mobility and normative attitudes toward the 
welfare state in particular. To this end, the focus of the following section will be on how 
self-interest and especially factors beyond self-interest may shape the relationship be-
tween social mobility and welfare attitudes.  
6.1.1 The self-interest perspective 
Within the extant literature on determinants of welfare state attitudes and distributional 
preferences (see, e.g., Kevins et al., 2018; Guillaud, 2013; Rehm, 2009; Jæger, 2005), 
economic self-interest is often considered the basis (Schuck and Shore, 2019). In other 
words, it is expected that those who potentially benefit from redistributive measures, i.e., 
the lower 50% of the income distribution, are in favour of redistribution, whereas those 
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who potentially contribute to redistributive measures, i.e., the upper 50% of the income 
distribution, will oppose redistribution (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Meltzer and Rich-
ard, 1981). It can be expected that this association between material self-interest and 
redistributional preferences holds not only for current income, but also for alternative 
indicators of social status, such as social class or educational level (Schuck and Shore, 
2019; Armingeon, 2006).  
In contrast to the well-established influence of an individual’s current socioeconomic po-
sition, the role of an individual’s past so socioeconomic position – which may be equally 
influential in shaping redistributive preferences and welfare attitudes – is much less ex-
plored (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Piketty (1995), for example, underlines the influential 
position of family background (and economic mobility) for an individual’s attitudes to-
ward redistribution. Accordingly, an individual’s social origin acts as a primary 
socialisation agent that forms initial preferences and beliefs. Yet, as the young people’s 
lives progress and their socioeconomic status improves or deteriorates, these initial pref-
erences and beliefs will be updated. In other words, upward and downward mobility go 
along with processes of re-socialisation so that socially mobile people eventually hold 
attitudes and beliefs that lie in between their points of origin and destination. A re-social-
isation thus means that as children grow up and are confronted with different economic 
circumstances, they might adapt their attitudes to their new socioeconomic status, despite 
their family background exerting an important influence for the formation of political 
opinions and values (Piketty, 1995; Abramson and Books, 1971; Lown, 2015). 
Next to the influence of current socioeconomic status and social origin, the experience of 
upward or downward mobility might add another influence with respect to individuals’ 
welfare state attitudes. Following Gugushvili (2016b), the so-called mechanism of inter-
nal vs. external attribution of success might affect how socially mobile individuals 
perceive the role of ascribed and attained factors in determining their success (upward 
mobility) or failure (downward mobility), as well as their perceptions of existing inequal-
ities and the role of the state (Gugushvili, 2016a; Piketty, 1995). According to this ‘self-
serving bias in causal attribution’, upwardly mobile individuals are anticipated to attribute 
their success to their own efforts while being less likely to favour a strong welfare state 
(Gaviria, Graham and Braido, 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). In turn, downwardly 
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mobile individuals are anticipated to attribute their failure to external sources, going along 
with a higher likelihood to favour a strong welfare state. I will come back to this mecha-
nism in the context of factors beyond material self-interest. For now, based on the 
aforementioned assumptions, the following hypothesis can be derived:  
H1: Intergenerational upward (downward) mobility decreases (increases) the likelihood 
of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.  
The self-interest argument is not confined to past and current socioeconomic position. 
Following previous studies, it can be expected to play a decisive role for the association 
of expectations about the future and welfare state support, too (Schuck and Shore, 2019). 
Following the ‘prospect of upward mobility’ (POUM) hypothesis of Benabou and Ok 
(2001), rational actors who expect upward mobility for their future may oppose redistri-
bution, even if their current socioeconomic position would predict otherwise (Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2009). Accordingly, not only one’s current socioeconomic position, but an in-
dividual’s pursuit of insurance against future losses may shape current welfare attitudes 
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Recent studies (Buscha, 2012; Lee, 2016) suggest that 
especially the sensitivity to losses may have a positive impact on welfare support, since 
expectations of downward mobility have been found to strengthen support for redistribu-
tive measures. Based on the assumption that this social insurance motive is not limited to 
redistributive measures, but welfare state support in general, a second hypothesis can be 
formulated: 
H2: Expected upward (downward) mobility decreases (increases) the likelihood of hold-
ing positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.  
6.1.2 Influences beyond self-interest 
Despite the well-documented and decisive role of self-interest in shaping welfare atti-
tudes, influences beyond self-interest may arguably be also important. In particular, the 
concept of deservingness, i.e., whom one considers to be deserving of welfare state sup-
port, holds many clues (Schuck and Shore, 2019). When groups are perceived as 
deserving of public resources, this is often reflected in support for benefits targeted at 
those groups, especially if these groups are considered to be victims of circumstance. 
Elderly and the sick constitute typical examples of such deserving groups, as both old age 
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and poor health are commonly perceived as circumstances beyond one’s own control 
(Jensen and Petersen, 2017; Petersen, 2012; Oorschot, 2006; Oorschot, 2000). Other 
groups, namely the unemployed, face a fare more negative image and are often perceived 
as largely responsible for their situation. Unlike the previously mentioned groups, it is 
assumed that unemployed could have prevented their situation, thus being less deserving 
of welfare support than the elderly or the sick (Schuck and Shore, 2019). When compared 
to other groups of welfare recipients, ‘the unemployed are seen as having less “character”, 
less self-responsibility, less perseverance, and less trustworthiness’ (Oorschot, 2006: 25-
26). 
If our perception of deservingness shapes our attitudes toward welfare support, how do 
we actually determine whom is considered deserving or not? Van Oorschot (2000) out-
lines a fivefold set of criteria people use when assessing whether a group is seen to deserve 
the social benefits they receive. First, there is the issue of control, that is, are recipients 
responsible for their own situation? Second, need matters; the more in need of benefits 
the group is, the more deserving they are seen to be. The third criterion has to do with 
identity. If individuals identify rather than take an ‘us vs. them’ perspective with benefi-
ciaries of welfare support, they are more likely to perceive them to be deserving of 
support. Fourth, the attitudes of recipients toward support matter. Are they grateful for 
the assistance they receive? Finally, the notion of reciprocity can shape deservingness: 
When recipients are seen to have earned the benefits they receive or will do something to 
pay them back, they are more likely to be viewed as deserving. Among those five criteria, 
control and identity have been found to be most influential in shaping deservingness atti-
tudes (Oorschot, 2000). In line with that, Rueda (2018) suggests altruism as an 
explanation of support for redistributive measures by individuals with higher socioeco-
nomic status. Accordingly, altruism is particularly relevant when individuals can identify 
themselves with the recipients of benefits. 
So why might someone with a high socioeconomic status hold favourable attitudes toward 
welfare support and their recipients when their rational view, based on their experience 
or expectation of upward social mobility, would predict otherwise? The answer lies argu-
ably in the formative experience of growing up less well-off and its effects on the 
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evaluation of deservingness (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Lown (2015: 6) posits that ‘per-
sonal experiences with the frustrations of economic hardship or poverty […] provide a 
first-hand understanding of the challenges of being poor and shape beliefs regarding per-
sonal responsibility for circumstance’. Accordingly, the experience of upward social 
mobility, which by definition includes the experience of growing up less well-off, may 
positively influence the perception of deservingness of welfare recipients. Despite their 
movement up the social ladder, individuals may still identify with the less well-off, based 
on their experience of growing up in an economically deprived environment. Similarly, 
they may be less likely to view benefit recipients, and even the unemployed, as responsi-
ble for their own fate (Schuck and Shore, 2019). The fact that socialisation experiences 
from childhood and adolescent are important for one’s political attitudes well into adult-
hood has been widely documented in previous studies (Campbell et al., 1960; Niemi, 
Craig and Mattei, 1991; Sears, 1975) and further supports this argument. In line with that, 
growing up poor might ‘serve as counterweight to the conservative effects of upward 
mobility’ (Lown, 2015: 9) and upwardly mobiles may continue to identify with their so-
cial origin group, i.e., the social milieu they grew up in. Based on the aforementioned 
assumptions, a competing hypothesis on the effects of social mobility on normative wel-
fare attitudes can be derived: 
H3: Upward mobility (both experienced and expected) increases the likelihood of holding 
positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support.  
The present chapter has shown that the self-interest perspective leads to different conclu-
sions than the deservingness perspective, when it comes to predicting the direction of the 
association between social mobility and normative attitudes toward the welfare state. Be-
fore moving on to the research design, the empirical predictions of the competing 
hypotheses according to the self-interest or deservingness perspective are summarized in 
Table 6.1.   
Chapter 6: Political consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
98 
Table 6.1: Overview of hypotheses on the relationship between social mobility and nor-
mative attitudes toward the welfare state 
 Self-interest  
perspective 
Deservingness  
perspective 
  (Experienced) upward mobility Hypothesis 1: - Hypothesis 3: + 
  (Experienced) downward mobility Hypothesis 1: + n.a. 
  Expected upward mobility Hypothesis 2: - Hypothesis 3: + 
  Expected downward mobility Hypothesis 2: + n.a. 
Note: +/- indicate higher/lower likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and 
receiving social support. 
6.2 Research design 
6.2.1 Data 
The empirical analyses that will be presented in Chapter 6.3 and Chapter 6.4 make use of 
the two cross-national survey datasets that have already been described at length in Chap-
ter 3. The CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018) as well as the European 
Social Survey (ESS ERIC, 2017) offer different opportunities to investigate the political 
consequences of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, and in order to arrive at the most 
comprehensive picture of how intergenerational mobility shapes normative welfare state 
attitudes, the empirical insights of both datasets will be combined in this chapter. More 
specifically, the CUPESSE two-generation survey will be used to investigate economic 
mobility and expected mobility, whereas the European Social Survey will be used to in-
vestigate educational mobility. Both surveys contain items that refer to the normative 
attitudes toward the welfare state. Although these items are not identical (and a direct 
comparison of mobility effects across the two data sources is therefore not possible), the 
combination of two empirical databases allows for a comprehensive insight into mobility 
effects, independent from the mobility dimension and measurement of welfare state atti-
tudes. Furthermore, the usage of European Social Survey data from round 8 (ESS Round 
8, 2017) which include an extra question module with a wide range of welfare state atti-
tudes and were only recently published, allows for the integration of highly topical data 
that have not been used for mobility analyses before.  
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6.2.2 Measures 
The outcome of interest for this study is normative attitudes toward the welfare state. 
Previous studies have shown that attitudes toward the welfare state are multidimensional 
and that attitudes toward a welfare state’s goals and scope can differ significantly from 
attitudes toward the welfare state’s efficiency, effectiveness, and policy outcomes 
(Roosma, 2016). For the purpose of this study, I focus on the moral aspects of the welfare 
state, i.e. the analyses focus on perceptions of the unemployed (Oorschot and Meulemann, 
2014), perceptions of benefit underuse and overuse (Roosma, Gelissen and Oorschot, 
2013), and perceived consequences of the welfare state on individual morality (Oorschot, 
Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012)22 as dependent variables. In sum, I use seven different 
attitudes to measure normative attitudes toward the welfare state, two stemming from the 
CUPESSE two-generation survey and five from the ESS. Table 9.3 in the Appendix gives 
a detailed overview of the exact wording of the items, the respective data source, and the 
respective sub-dimension of normative welfare state attitudes as referred to in previous 
research. All welfare attitude items are recoded into binary outcome measures, differen-
tiating agreement from disagreement. Correlation among the items concerning the moral 
dimension of welfare state attitudes amounts to 0.25; for attitudes towards and beliefs on 
benefit recipients, correlation is 0.42 (between outcomes 3 and 4), 0.12 (between out-
comes 4 and 5), and 0.06 (between outcomes 3 and 5), and correlation for the items 
concerning perceived consequences of the welfare state (the moral dimension) is 0.60.  
The central independent variable of interest is intergenerational mobility. The ESS and 
the CUPESSE two-generation survey capture intergenerational mobility in three distinct 
dimensions: whereas the CUPESSE two-generation survey allows assessing the degree 
of economic and expected mobility, the ESS contains the well-tested base for assessing 
intergenerational educational mobility.23 For economic mobility, the respondent’s finan-
cial situation is compared to the respondent’s family’s situation when he or she was about 
14 years old. For expected mobility, the respondent gives an assessment of whether he or 
                                                 
22 It has been shown that there are three dimensions of perceived consequences of the welfare state, includ-
ing the economy, individual morality, and social life (Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012). 
23 Although the CUPESSE survey also contains measures of educational attainment, it will not be used for 
further analyses of educational mobility. The CUPESSE data collection could not be ensured to be compa-
rable to a degree that is needed for the analysis of cross-national educational mobility. Therefore, I continue 
to rely on the well-established measure of educational attainment in the ESS, which was explicitly designed 
for cross-country comparisons of educational levels (cf., Schneider, 2010).  
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she will have a similar, better or worse standard of living in the future compared to how 
his or her parents are doing today. And for educational mobility, parental educational 
attainment is compared to the respondent’s educational attainment. Based on the afore-
mentioned comparisons, dummy variables are created differentiating intergenerational 
upward from intergenerational downward movements as well as intergenerational status 
stability. A detailed description of the respective measures has already been given in 
Chapter 4, and will therefore not be repeated at this point.  
6.2.3 Analytic strategy 
The empirical analyses start with a detailed overview of the phenomenon of study, namely 
the average level of support for normative welfare state attitudes among young Europeans 
in general, and across different mobility groups in particular. Accordingly, the descriptive 
analyses highlight both the cross-country variation in levels of public welfare state sup-
port among young Europeans in general and the within-country variation of public 
support between individuals with different social mobility experiences and mobility ex-
pectations. Subsequently, the multivariate analyses estimate the effect of 
intergenerational mobility on normative welfare state attitudes by means of diagonal ref-
erence models. The use of diagonal reference models allows for disentangling the effect 
of an upward or downward mobility experience from the effects of having arrived at a 
high or low (educational/economic) status level and originating from a high or low (edu-
cational/economic) status level. It is the statistical model of choice for the purpose of this 
study since the main focus lies on investigating the association between social mobility 
and normative welfare attitudes, over and above current and parental socioeconomic sta-
tus (for a detailed description of diagonal reference models see Chapter 3.3).24   
All models use pooled country data and control for socio-demographic attributes like 
gender, migration history (both one’s own and parental migration status), main economic 
activity, and one’s own and parental educational attainment, as well as left-right political 
attitudes (Roosma, Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014), level of religiosity (scaled 0 to 10) 
(Kahl, 2005), previous unemployment experience, and whether the respondent is depend-
ent on income from unemployment or other social benefits (Oorschot, 2010: 22). 
                                                 
24 See Schuck and Shore (2019) for a different analytical approach. 
Chapter 6: Political consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
101 
Educational attainment is measured using a reduced form of the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED), which was explicitly designed for cross-country 
comparative analysis of educational attainment in Europe (Schneider, 2010). In particu-
lar, three educational levels are distinguished: below upper secondary education 
comprising ISCED levels 0, 1, and 2 (‘low’), upper secondary and post-secondary, non-
tertiary education comprising ISCED levels 3a, 3b, and 4 (‘medium’), and tertiary edu-
cation consisting of ISCED levels 5a, 5b, and 6 (‘high’). All models furthermore control 
for the respondents’ main activity, differentiating those employed from those self-em-
ployed, not working, and unemployed. The analytical sample based on the CUPESSE 
two-generation survey (Tosun et al., 2018) comprises around 11,000 young adults from 
11 European countries.25 The analytical sample based on ESS Round 8 (ESS Round 8, 
2017) consists of around 3,000 young adults from 14 European countries.26 In order to 
account for variation that goes back to systematic differences between countries, all mul-
tivariate models include country-fixed effects.27  
6.3 Empirical results I: Findings from the CUPESSE two-generation survey 
Following the previously described research design, this chapter will illustrate the de-
scriptive findings on the average levels of public support for normative welfare state 
attitudes across countries and across different mobility groups, before finally moving on 
to the estimation results. In order to increment the reading flow, only figures regarding 
within-country differences among different mobility groups will be shown in this chapter, 
                                                 
25 The CUPESSE country sample includes Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, It-
aly, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
26 The country sample based on ESS Round 8 comprises Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.  
27 Although it would admittedly be very informative to study contextual effects such as regime type by 
using a multilevel approach, there are two reasons why I refrain from a multilevel approach in this study. 
First, and most importantly, the central research question clearly focusses on a micro-level mechanism for 
which no cross-country differences are hypothesized. Second, multilevel models are commonly based on 
maximum likelihood estimation methods that require sufficiently large sample sizes. Several simulation 
studies (see, e.g., Maas and Hox, 2005; Stegmueller, 2013) have investigated the effect of simulated de-
sign characteristics (sample sizes, in particular) on the accuracy of parameter estimates and respective 
standard errors. All of these studies conclude that a sample size of 11 (and 14, respectively) countries falls 
by far below the minimum number of units at level 2 (in the present case, countries). If I were interested 
in country-fixed effects (which I am not, since it is not the focus of this study), a minimum number of 25 
countries would be tenable for linear models, and an even greater number of countries would be necessary 
for non-linear models like the DRMs here applied (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). 
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while figures depicting between-country differences can be found in the Appendix (see 
Chapter 9).  
6.3.1 Descriptives 
In a first step, I investigate cross-country differences in the average level of agreement to 
the statement ‘If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work’ among 
young Europeans aged 18 to 35 (see Figure 9.1, Appendix). The item is phrased in such 
a way that agreement indicates less welfare state support and disagreement indicates more 
welfare state support. In all countries but Greece, the majority of young people apparently 
rather agree with that statement, indicating a certain degree of scepticism of welfare ben-
efits and the deservingness of benefit recipients. The highest scepticism is demonstrated 
in the Czech Republic, with around 90% of agreement. Following with some distance are 
Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Lowest levels of agreement 
can be found in Spain, Denmark, and Greece, with Greece being the only country showing 
higher disagreement than agreement. Interestingly, it is Denmark and Greece that show 
the lowest average levels of agreement, despite facing completely different economic cir-
cumstances and representing totally different welfare state regimes.  
Since the central interest of this study is to investigate differences in welfare state attitudes 
across groups of young people with different social mobility experiences, the subsequent 
descriptions are meant to illustrate those differences for the different groups of economic 
and expected mobility. Before I move on to the description of these differences, a short 
note on the logic of illustration that will be used for all subsequent figures on agreement 
to certain welfare state attitudes across mobility groups: Average levels of agreement for 
those who have experienced financial upward mobility are depicted by a triangle, and for 
those who experienced financial downward mobility average agreement levels are indi-
cated by a cross. The financially stable group is illustrated by a small circle. 
Figure 6.1 depicts differences in the average level of agreement to the statement ‘If wel-
fare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work’ across European countries 
and individuals with different social mobility experiences. Although overall levels of 
agreement vary significantly across countries, a general pattern becomes visible. In all 
countries, agreement levels for the group who experienced intergenerational financial up-
ward mobility are higher compared to those who experienced intergenerational downward 
Chapter 6: Political consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
103 
mobility. In line with the self-interest perspective (H1), potential contributors to the sys-
tem accordingly show lower welfare state support and higher scepticism of welfare 
recipients than those who might be potential beneficiaries of the welfare state. The com-
peting deservingness perspective (H3), assuming those who have experienced upward 
mobility to be more sympathetic with welfare recipients, seems not to be supported. An-
other interesting finding is the distance between average levels of support between the 
different mobility groups. Welfare state support among upwardly mobiles and down-
wardly mobiles is substantially different in Austria and Greece, with average levels of 
support differing about 20%, whereas they are less substantial in the remaining countries.  
Figure 6.1: ‘If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work’; mean 
values per country and financial mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
Moving on to expected intergenerational mobility, Figure 6.2 illustrates that the descrip-
tive findings do not deviate much from intergenerational financial mobility. Similar to 
what was found for financial mobility, the group of young people expecting upward mo-
bility (with the exception of the Czech Republic) on average shows higher level of 
agreement to the item ‘If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work’ 
than the group who expects not to be able to maintain their parents’ current standard of 
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living. Only in the Czech Republic, the country with the highest average level of agree-
ment, those expecting downward mobility show even higher agreement levels than those 
expecting upward mobility. Since the overall welfare state support, measured as the afore-
mentioned item, seems to be rather low and the difference between upwardly and 
downwardly mobile individuals not being very high, this deviation from the general pat-
tern seems not too strong. Normative welfare state support is accordingly higher among 
the group expecting downward mobility than the group expecting upward mobility. Not 
surprisingly, potential future beneficiaries show higher tendencies of supporting the pro-
vision of welfare benefits than potential future contributors. In other words, in line with 
H1, the logic of material self-interest driving one’s preferences seems to be at work here, 
while there is no support for the deservingness argumentation (H3), which should lead 
the expectedly upwardly mobiles to hold more positive views of receiving social support.  
Figure 6.2: ‘If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work’; mean 
values per country and expected mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
Having looked at the distributions across countries and mobility groups for the first meas-
ure of normative welfare state support, the focus is now on the second measure of 
normative welfare state support, which reads as ‘It’s humiliating to receive money without 
having to work’. Again, the item is phrased in such a way that agreement indicates less 
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welfare state support and disagreement indicates more welfare state support. As illus-
trated in Figure 9.2 (Appendix), average levels of agreement to this item show much less 
variance than the attitude looked at previously. In most countries, around half of the 
young people agree, while around half of the young people disagree with this statement. 
Turkey constitutes quite an outlier with almost 80% of young Turks agreeing to the state-
ment and thereby showing comparably low welfare state support. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Hungary and Spain are the only countries that show average levels of agree-
ment that lie below 50%. In sum, the variance across countries is relatively low. 
Figure 6.3: ‘It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work’; mean values per 
country and financial mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
How do groups with different mobility experiences differ in their attitudes towards the 
welfare state? Figure 6.3 gives a first insight into this question, showing average levels 
of agreement to the statement ‘It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work’ 
and distinguishing all three groups of financial mobility. The graph illustrates quite ex-
plicitly that in most countries, the attitudes of those who experienced financial upward 
mobility do not differ substantially from those who experienced financial downward mo-
bility. Only in Italy and Switzerland are slight differences found, with upwardly mobiles 
showing less support of the welfare state than downwardly mobiles. Here again, the self-
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interest logic (H1) appears to underlie this difference, and not a potential empathy with 
one’s social origin group. 
Figure 6.4: ‘It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work’; mean values per 
country and expected mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
Far different from that, mobility expectations do seem to shape the respondents’ welfare 
state support. In contrast to what we have seen previously, young Europeans who expect 
to exceed their parents’ current standard of living do show deviating attitudes from those 
expecting not to be able to maintain their parents’ living standard. In seven out of 11 
countries, expectedly upwardly mobiles show higher levels of agreement, i.e. less welfare 
state support, than the expectedly downwardly mobiles. But unlike the previous descrip-
tive analyses across mobility groups, this does not apply for all countries. In Denmark 
and Switzerland, it is the expectedly downwardly mobiles that show higher levels of 
agreement than the expectedly upwardly mobiles, i.e. less welfare state support. In the 
Czech Republic and Spain, both groups do not differ substantially in their level of agree-
ment. In terms of differences between mobility groups, the Hungarian case is most 
striking. Young Hungarians expecting downward mobility show comparably high levels 
of welfare state support, and thereby deviate around 30 percentage points from the group 
expecting intergenerational upward mobility.  
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In sum, the descriptive analyses so far support the self-interest perspective and are in line 
with hypotheses 1 and 2 which assume (expected) upward mobility to decrease the like-
lihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support and 
(expected) downward mobility to increase the likelihood of holding positive views of 
benefit recipients and receiving social support. At the same time, the results do not sup-
port the competing hypothesis 3, which assumed upwardly mobile individuals to be 
sympathetic with the less well-off and consequently show higher support for normative 
welfare state attitudes.  
6.3.2 Diagonal reference models 
Turning to the multivariate estimation results, I will first describe the estimates from di-
agonal reference models for the outcome ‘If welfare benefits are too high, there is no 
incentive to work’ and then move on to results for the second outcome ‘It’s humiliating 
to receive work without having to work’. For both outcomes, agreement can be interpreted 
as less welfare state support while disagreement is regarded as more welfare state support. 
Accordingly, positive coefficients in the following multivariate models represent less nor-
mative welfare state support and negative coefficients represent greater normative welfare 
state support.  
Model 1 estimates net effects of intergenerational financial mobility, i.e. mobility effects 
over and above current and parental financial status, on welfare state support using out-
come 1: ‘If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to work’. While financial 
mobility apparently does not have a statistically significant effect on normative welfare 
state support, the financial status itself is found to influence it. As indicated by the positive 
and statistically significant coefficients for the diagonal, the better one’s financial status, 
the less likely one is to exhibit welfare state support. The diagonal estimates correspond 
to the financial gradient for non-mobile individuals, i.e. the reference group ‘non-mobiles 
facing a bad financial situation’ is compared to non-mobile individuals from groups with 
a better economic situation. In line with the material self-interest argumentation, a better 
financial situation corresponds to less welfare state support. Besides this level effect, the 
findings do not, however, support the assumption that the psychological experience of 
financial mobility shapes one’s welfare state preferences over and above current financial 
status (i.e., no support for H1 or H3). Weight estimates furthermore indicate the relative 
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importance of an individual’s own and parental financial situation. For Model 1, the sta-
tistically significant destination weight of .92 indicates that it is one’s current financial 
situation, and not one’s family’s situation while growing up, that is driving normative 
welfare state support. This finding once again underlines the importance of an individ-
ual’s current economic situation in shaping welfare state support.  
Model 1 (as well as the remaining Models 2-4) includes well-known determinants of wel-
fare state support like educational level, employment status, political ideology, religiosity, 
or dependence on welfare benefits as control variables. In line with previous findings 
from the literature, those not working and those who are unemployed show more welfare 
state support than employed individuals. The more right a respondent places himself on 
the left-right scale, the more likely it is that he or she exhibits less support for the welfare 
state. Religious individuals are found to exhibit less support for normative welfare atti-
tudes (Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012). Individuals with unemployment 
experience over 6 months, those with income from unemployment benefits or other social 
benefits, as well as individuals with a migration background all show statistically signif-
icantly more welfare state support.  
Model 2 represents an extension of Model 1 in that it adds expected mobility to the pre-
viously described model parameters. The addition of mobility expectation leads to a better 
model fit, based on the reduction of AIC values across models. As before, net financial 
mobility does not have a statistically significant effect on welfare state support, while 
financial status continues to shape welfare state attitudes. More importantly, Model 2 re-
veals that it is rather the expectation of intergenerational upward mobility that goes along 
with a higher likelihood of showing less support for the welfare state, whereas the expec-
tation of intergenerational downward mobility is associated with more welfare state 
support. Accordingly, it is not the experience of intergenerational mobility that is associ-
ated with welfare state support, but the expectation of intergenerational mobility. These 
findings are in line with the self-interest argument underlying H2, showing that fears of 
downward mobility, i.e., being a potential future beneficiary of welfare benefits, make 
people more inclined to support the welfare state. Likewise, expecting to become a po-
tential contributor in the future apparently makes people less supportive of the welfare 
state. The fact that the net effects of mobility remain stable when included simultaneously 
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with expected mobility also speaks in favour of distinct mechanisms that influence the 
young people’s attitudes. Besides that, weight estimates as well as the direction of further 
control variables do not change substantially from Model 1 to 2. In sum, the findings from 
Model 1 and Model 2 speak strongly in favour of H2 while they do not support H1 or H3.  
Models 3 and 4 are similar to Models 1 and 2, but focus on the second outcome measure 
‘It’s humiliating to receive work without having to work.’ Model 3, which includes finan-
cial mobility, but not expected mobility, shows that the net effects of financial mobility, 
i.e. over and above financial status per se, are not statistically significant. Estimates for 
the diagonal furthermore indicate that there is no financial gradient in welfare support 
with respect to this second outcome measure. In other words, for outcome 2, there are no 
statistically significant differences in welfare support between groups of non-mobiles 
with different financial situations. With regard to other determinants of welfare state sup-
port, I find a higher likelihood of supporting the welfare state among females, those not 
working or unemployed, and individuals with unemployment experience above 6 months, 
income from unemployment, or other social benefits. Similar to what can be observed for 
Models 1 and 2, a more to the right oriented placement on the left-right scale and more 
religious individuals show less welfare state support.  
In Model 4, Model 3 is extended by adding dummy variables for expected mobility. 
Model fit, based on the comparison of AIC estimates, increases thereby. Comparing the 
estimates of Model 3 and 4 reveals no substantial changes. I do, however, find statistically 
significant effects for upward mobility expectations in Model 4, suggesting again, that 
self-interest (H1 and H2) and not identification with one’s social origin (H3) is determin-
ing welfare support attitudes.  
Overall, I draw two basic conclusions from these results. First, the previously discussed 
models suggest that expectations for the future clearly outweigh past mobility experience 
in its importance for shaping welfare state support. Although the current financial status 
does seem to play a crucial role for welfare state attitudes, the isolated effect of experi-
encing upward or downward financial mobility over and above the mere level-effect of 
one’s current status does not seem to play a significant role. Second, these results support 
the assumption of self-interest being a decisive driver of welfare state support, both in 
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terms of current financial status (not mobility) and future mobility expectations.28 In that 
regard, intergenerational mobility apparently does not differ from the well-established 
social status effects per se. The empathy or identification with one’s former social origin 
group is thus less influential than hypothesised earlier.  
  
                                                 
28 These results also hold if I implement a metric operationalisation of outcomes 1 and 2 instead of using 
binary versions. Detailed results are available as robustness checks in Chapter 6.5.  
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Table 6.2: Estimates from DRM (logit) (outcome: normative welfare state attitudes) 
  
If welfare benefits are too high there 
is no incentive to find work. 
It’s humiliating to receive money 
without having to work. 
  (1=agree) (1=agree) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
 β SE  β SE  β SE  β SE  
Weights 1             
    O (q) 0.08 0.27  0.15 0.29  0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 
    D (1-q) 0.92 0.27 *** 0.85 0.29 ** 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 ***              
Net financial mobility  
(Ref.: non-mobile)             
     upward -0.01 0.08  -0.01 0.08  -0.07 0.05  -0.08 0.05  
     downward -0.06 0.08  -0.04 0.08  0.00 0.05  0.02 0.05               
Mobility expectation  
(Ref.: non-mobile)             
     upward    0.11 0.05 *    0.10 0.05 * 
     downward    -0.29 0.06 ***    -0.12 0.06               
Diagonal  
(Ref.: Financial situa-
tion: bad) 2             
     rather bad 0.12 0.07  0.11 0.08  -0.10 0.07  -0.11 0.07  
     rather good 0.36 0.09 *** 0.33 0.09 *** -0.01 0.08  -0.03 0.08  
     good 0.42 0.10 *** 0.39 0.10 *** -0.10 0.09  -0.12 0.09               
Education (Ref.: low)             
     medium 0.04 0.07  0.03 0.07  0.11 0.07  0.11 0.07  
     high -0.07 0.08  -0.09 0.08  -0.10 0.07  -0.11 0.07  
Parental education  
(Ref.: low)             
     medium 0.01 0.06  0.02 0.06  0.03 0.06  0.04 0.06  
     high -0.15 0.07 * -0.10 0.07  0.00 0.07  0.03 0.07  
Female -0.07 0.05  -0.07 0.05  -0.10 0.04 * -0.10 0.04 * 
Main activity  
(Ref.: employed)             
     self-employed -0.03 0.09  -0.03 0.09  0.03 0.08  0.03 0.08  
     not working -0.23 0.08 ** -0.22 0.08 ** -0.27 0.07 *** -0.27 0.07 *** 
     unemployed -0.25 0.08 ** -0.23 0.08 ** -0.17 0.08 * -0.16 0.08 * 
Left-right scale  
(scale: 0-10) 0.18 0.01 *** 0.18 0.01 *** 0.08 0.01 *** 0.08 0.01 *** 
Religiosity (scale: 0-
10) 0.02 0.01 * 0.02 0.01 * 0.03 0.01 *** 0.03 0.01 *** 
Unemp. experience  
> 6 months -0.34 0.05 *** -0.33 0.05 *** -0.17 0.05 *** -0.16 0.05 *** 
Income from unemp. 
benefits -0.32 0.10 ** -0.33 0.10 *** -0.17 0.10  -0.18 0.10  
Income from other so-
cial benefits -0.19 0.09 * -0.19 0.09 * -0.26 0.08 ** -0.26 0.08 ** 
Migration background -0.20 0.10 * -0.21 0.10 * 0.12 0.09  0.11 0.09  
Parental migration 
background -0.04 0.07  -0.06 0.07  0.03 0.06  0.02 0.06  
Country dummies yes   yes   yes   yes   
Constant 0.00 0.14   0.01 0.14   -0.30 0.13 * -0.31 0.13 * 
AIC 12,582   12,551   14,236   14,228   
N 10,987   10,987   10,965   10,965   
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Table 6.2 (continued): 
Notes:  
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean less welfare state sup-
port. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; 
1O pertains to parental financial situation, D to one’s own financial situation. 
 2Financial gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (financial situa-
tion: bad) are fixed at zero. 
Source: CUPESSE data, own calculations. 
6.4 Empirical results II: Findings from the ESS 
Findings from the CUPESSE two-generation survey will now be complemented by addi-
tional analyses based on the latest European Social Survey data. Although the analyses 
will be restricted to intergenerational educational mobility (and do not include intergen-
erational financial mobility or mobility expectations), these additional analyses offer a 
great opportunity to complement the investigation of mobility effects for normative wel-
fare attitudes with different outcome measures. Moreover, these latest ESS data allow a 
very up-to-date look into the current opinions of young Europeans today since the data 
were just released in October 2017.  
6.4.1 Descriptives 
Similar to the empirical section on CUPESSE data, the descriptive findings shall illustrate 
average levels of support for normative welfare state attitudes among young Europeans 
across countries and across different mobility groups before finally moving on to the mul-
tivariate analyses. In sum, there are five different outcomes under investigation, of which 
the first three focus on attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients, whereas the last 
two outcomes refer to the moral dimension of perceived consequences of the welfare 
state. All items are phrased in such a way that agreement indicates less welfare state sup-
port and disagreement indicates more welfare state support. For the purpose of 
readability, all outcomes were recoded into binary variables so that positive coefficients 
in the multivariate analyses indicate more welfare state support, whereas negative coeffi-
cients indicate less welfare state support. Furthermore, in order to increment the reading 
flow, only figures regarding within-country differences among different mobility groups 
will be shown in this chapter, while figures depicting between-country differences can be 
found in the Appendix (see Chapter 9).  
Chapter 6: Political consequences of young Europeans’ intergenerational mobility 
113 
Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients  
Figure 9.3 (Appendix) illustrates the average level of support for the statement ‘Most 
unemployed people do not really try to find a job’ among young Europeans aged 25 to 
34. It constitutes one out of three attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients that 
serve as a measure for normative welfare support. The graph reveals that only in the Scan-
dinavian countries Norway and Sweden, a majority of young people disagree with the 
statement, thereby expressing rather high welfare state support. Poland constitutes the 
outlier of the country sample, with less than 20% of young people disagreeing, i.e. almost 
80% agreeing with the statement. The remaining countries vary around 40% disagree-
ment, with the Czech Republic being closest to Poland, and Iceland closest to the strong 
supporters, Norway and Sweden.  
Figure 6.5: ‘Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job’; mean values per 
country and educational mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
In a second step, these country-level averages are broken down by intergenerational edu-
cational mobility groups (see Figure 6.5). Two aspects of this illustration are of particular 
interest. First, the distance between upward and downward movers with regard to their 
average level of support allows for insight into attitudinal differences between individuals 
with different mobility experiences. And second, the order of upward and downward 
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movers, i.e. which of these groups exhibit more or less support for the statement, indicates 
more or less support for the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 6.1.  
With regard to the distance between mobility groups, I find that the attitudes of upwardly 
and downwardly mobile individuals differ substantially in most countries, with the ex-
ception of Poland (where all mobility groups express comparatively low support for the 
outcome statement). Thus, upwardly mobile individuals do differ from downwardly mo-
biles, with differences being greatest in Germany, Iceland, and Finland. With respect to 
the question of which of these groups expresses more or less welfare support, the descrip-
tive evidence is rather mixed. In six out of 14 countries, the upwardly mobiles express 
more welfare support than the downwardly mobiles. Yet, in six other countries, the rela-
tionship is the other way round. Thus, the findings do not indicate a definitive conclusion 
for the overall mechanism at work here (self-interest vs. deservingness perspective).  
The second of three outcomes measuring attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipi-
ents reads, ‘Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to’. Figure 9.4 
(Appendix) reveals that average support for this statement is rather high across all coun-
tries (average disagreement to the statement is lower than 40% in all countries). Again, 
the strongest support, i.e. scepticism against benefit recipients, is found in Poland, and 
the least support in Finland, Norway, Estonia, and Sweden. Broken down by groups with 
different mobility experiences, it becomes visible that attitudes are different for upwardly 
and downwardly mobile individuals in most countries, but to a comparatively low degree. 
In Belgium, Finland, France, and Norway, experiences of intergenerational mobility do 
not seem to make a difference between upward and downward movers at all.  
Regarding the differences between downward and upward movers that exist at all (see 
Figure 6.6), welfare state support is higher among the downwardly mobiles than among 
the upwardly mobiles in most countries. Keeping in mind that the attitudinal differences 
concerning this outcome measure are comparatively low, this evidence speaks rather in 
favour of the self-interest hypothesis (H1). 
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Figure 6.6: ‘Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to’; mean values per 
country and educational mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
The third outcome measuring attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients reads, 
‘Many with very low incomes get less than they are legally entitled to.’ With respect to 
cross-country differences in levels of support for this item, I find that the variance be-
tween countries is comparatively high (see Figure 9.5, Appendix). In all 14 countries, 
average levels of agreement to this item is around 50% or less, indicating that a majority 
of young people consider benefit recipients with very low incomes to get more than or 
equal to what they are entitled to. The strongest disagreement with the statement is found 
among young people from Norway and Sweden, where the welfare state is strongest and 
young individuals apparently feel that benefit recipients get the benefits they deserve. 
With respect to differences between individuals with different mobility backgrounds, I 
find that differences appear to be quite substantial (visible by the distance between crosses 
and triangles in Figure 6.7). Differences between upwardly and downwardly mobiles are 
biggest in Ireland, Austria, France, and Sweden. And in ten out of fourteen countries, 
downwardly mobiles express higher agreement to the outcome statement than their up-
wardly mobile peers. In terms of the theoretical hypothesis, this finding supports the self-
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interest argumentation proposed in H1, and provides only weak evidence (in four coun-
tries, where differences between the two groups are not very big anyway) for the 
deservingness perspective proposed in H3.  
Figure 6.7: ‘Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to’; mean 
values per country and educational mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
Perceived consequences of the welfare state (moral dimension) 
The two remaining outcome measures refer to the perceived consequences of welfare 
state in their moral dimension. As visible in Figure 9.6 (Appendix), there is substantial 
variation in average levels of support for the statement ‘Social benefits and services make 
people lazy’. Again, Poland stands out with the highest agreement, i.e. highest scepticism 
with regard to potential consequences of receiving social benefits. In contrast, the most 
positive assessment of welfare state consequences is expressed by young Estonians, fol-
lowed by young people from Austria and Iceland. Coming to within-country differences 
across individuals different mobility experiences, Figure 6.8 reveals that upwardly mobile 
individuals apparently do express different attitudes than downwardly mobiles (with the 
exception of Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Belgium). The distance between upwardly 
and downwardly mobiles is quite substantial for Germany and the Czech Republic, with 
average levels of support differing around 25% or more. Interestingly, and despite their 
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similar distance between the two groups, upwardly mobiles in Germany are less support-
ive, while upwardly mobiles in the Czech Republic are more supportive of the outcome 
statement. More generally, there is no clear pattern of whether upwardly or downwardly 
mobiles are more supportive of the outcome statement and no definitive conclusion with 
respect to the competing hypotheses H1 and H3 can be drawn.  
Figure 6.8: ‘Social benefits and services make people lazy’; mean values per country and 
educational mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
Finally, Figure 9.7 (Appendix) illustrates average levels of agreement to the statement 
‘Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another’ and thereby 
indicates perceived consequences of the welfare state. I find that most countries express 
a rather negative view of welfare state consequences, with 50 or more percent agreeing 
to the statement. The least negative views exist in Estonia, the only country where more 
than 50% disagree with the statement. Moving on to differences between individuals with 
different mobility experiences, the graphical illustration shows that upwardly and down-
wardly mobiles differ comparably little in their attitudes, with the exception of Germany, 
the Czech Republic, Iceland, and Sweden. And again, there is no clear picture of whether 
it is the downwardly mobile individuals or the upwardly mobile individuals who tend to 
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disagree with the statement or not. In some countries, like Germany, Finland, Great Brit-
ain, Iceland, and Sweden for example, upwardly mobiles disagree to a larger extent than 
downwardly mobiles. In other countries, like the Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway, and 
France, it is the group of downwardly mobiles who disagree to a greater extent. Thus, the 
descriptive analyses do not allow for a definitive conclusion with regard to which hypoth-
esis is supported by the empirical evidence.  
Figure 6.9: ‘Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one an-
other’; mean values per country and educational mobility group 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
In sum, the descriptive analyses show that there is substantial variation in support for the 
five attitudinal statements, which serve as outcome measures for normative welfare state 
support. Both on a country level, but above all between groups with different mobility 
experiences, attitudes vary. The most central question with regard to the hypotheses for-
mulated in Chapter 6.1 is if and how upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals differ 
in their normative welfare state attitudes from non-mobile individuals. Based on the pre-
vious descriptives, I conclude that the evidence rather supports the self-interest 
perspective proposed in H1, and that there is only weak evidence for the deservingness 
argumentation summed up in H3. Admittedly, these analyses can only present a first step 
since the attitudinal differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals 
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may well be biased by the fact that the descriptive analyses naturally cannot control for 
other characteristics of these groups. Yet, it was possible to assess the extent of how dif-
ferent the attitudes of downwardly mobile persons are from upwardly mobiles, and how 
these differences are distributed throughout the countries in the sample population.  
6.4.2 Diagonal reference models 
Turning to the multivariate estimation results, I will first describe the estimates from the 
diagonal reference models for the attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients 
(Models 1-3, Table 6.3) and then move on to results for the moral dimension of perceived 
consequences of the welfare state (Models 4-5, Table 6.4). To improve readability of the 
models, the binary outcomes have been recoded so that positive coefficients represent 
more normative welfare state support and negative coefficients represent less normative 
welfare state support.29  
Model 1 (featuring outcome 1, ‘Most people do not really try to find a job’) estimates net 
effects of intergenerational educational mobility, i.e. mobility effects over and above cur-
rent and parental educational attainment, on normative welfare state support. While 
educational mobility apparently does not have a statistically significant effect, the re-
spondent’s educational attainment (=diagonal) is found to influence it. As indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the diagonal, a high educational 
level increases the likelihood of having a positive attitude towards benefit recipients com-
pared to individuals with a low educational level. The diagonal estimates correspond to 
the educational gradient for non-mobile individuals, i.e. the reference group ‘non-mobiles 
with low educational level’ is compared to non-mobile individuals with higher educa-
tional levels. Besides this level effect, the findings do not, however, support the 
assumption that the psychological experience of educational mobility shapes one’s atti-
tudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients over and above their own educational 
attainment (i.e., no support for H1 nor H3). Weight estimates furthermore indicate the 
relative importance of an individuals’ own (destination status) and parental educational 
status (origin status). For Model 1, the statistically significant destination weight of .77 
                                                 
29 In other words, the binary outcome variables do not always take 1 for ‘agree’ versus 0 for ‘not agree’ 
but are partly also coded the other way around so that positive coefficients in the multivariate models always 
indicate more normative welfare state support and negative coefficients always indicate less normative 
welfare state support.  
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indicates that it is one’s own educational level, and not the parental educational attain-
ment, that is driving welfare state support.  
Model 1 furthermore includes socio-demographic characteristics and well-known deter-
minants of welfare state support like employment status, political ideology, religiosity, or 
dependence on welfare benefits as control variables. With respect to these controls, I find 
that those who are unemployed show more welfare state support than employed individ-
uals. The more right a respondent places himself on the left-right scale, the more likely it 
is that he or she exhibits less support for the welfare state. Finally, individuals with un-
employment experience over 3 months, and those with income other social benefits show 
statistically significant more welfare state support.  
Model 2 replicates Model 1, but uses another outcome measure that reads, ‘Many manage 
to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to’. With respect to the net effects of ex-
periencing educational mobility, I find statistically significant negative effects for upward 
mobility and statistically significant positive effects for downwardly mobiles. In other 
words, upwardly mobile individuals express less normative welfare state support and 
downwardly mobile individuals express more normative welfare state support than non-
mobile individuals. In line with H1, potential contributors thus are more sceptical of ben-
efit recipients, and potential beneficiaries express more positive attitudes for benefit 
recipients. In contrast, the competing hypothesis H3 is not supported.  
As indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the diagonal, a 
high educational level again increases the likelihood to have a positive attitude towards 
benefit recipients compared to individuals with a low educational level. An educational 
gradient is thus found for Model 2, too. Concerning the relative importance of one’s own 
and parental educational attainment for normative welfare state attitudes, the estimates 
indicate that it is clearly one’s own educational status (destination weight: 1.00) that is 
important for the respondent’s attitudes. In contrast, the influence of parental educational 
level appears not to be significant. With respect to the included control variables, only 
two are statistically significant. Accordingly, the more right a person places him- or her-
self on the left-right scale, the lower his or her likelihood to express positive views for 
benefit recipients. Furthermore, those who receive unemployment benefits express more 
normative welfare state support.  
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Model 3 (featuring outcome 3, ‘Many with very low incomes get less benefit than they 
are legally entitled to’) uses the third outcome measure of attitudes towards and beliefs 
on benefit recipients, otherwise being identical to Models 1 and 2. In Model 3, net effects 
of educational upward mobility are negative, whereas net effects of educational down-
ward mobility are positive. In contrast to Model 2, effects are not statistically significant. 
Accordingly, individuals who have exceeded their parents’ educational level express 
lower normative welfare state support, and individuals who do possess a lower educa-
tional level than their parents express more normative welfare state support than non-
mobile individuals. Interestingly, the educational gradient (the diagonal) is different from 
the previous two models. In Model 3, the highly educated show less agreement to the 
outcome statement compared to those with low levels of education. In other words, highly 
educated individuals agree less with the statement that many with very low incomes get 
less benefit than they are legally entitled to. Moreover, the relative importance of parental 
and one’s own education diverges from the previous models. For the third model, both 
influences appear to be similarly strong, whereas the previous models showed a dominant 
influence of one’s own educational status.  
With respect to control variables, I find similar effects to Model 1 and 2. Placement on 
the left-right scale has a statistically significant negative effect, i.e. the more right, the 
lower the likelihood of agreeing with the outcome statement/showing more normative 
welfare state support. Both unemployment experience and receiving income from other 
social benefits increase likelihood of agreeing with the outcome statement/showing more 
normative welfare state support.  
Models 4 and 5 represent DRM estimates for the moral dimension of perceived conse-
quences of the welfare state. For outcome 4, ‘Social benefits/services make people lazy’, 
I find neither statistically significant effects of educational mobility, nor an educational 
gradient. In other words, neither the mobility experience per se, nor educational attain-
ment appears to have a statistically significant influence on the likelihood to disagree with 
outcome 4. Yet, the weight estimates indicate that one’s own education is predominantly 
influential for the respondent’s attitudes towards welfare state consequences. Other than 
that, I find negative effects for placement on the left-right scale, similar to Models 1 to 3. 
Individuals that receive income from unemployment benefits or other social benefits have 
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a higher likelihood of disagreeing with outcome 4, thus exerting more normative welfare 
state support.  
Finally, Model 5 replicates Models 1-4 and uses the outcome statement ‘Social benefits 
make people less willing to care for one another’. The results show statistically significant 
negative effects for upward mobility, indicating a lower likelihood for them to disagree 
with the outcome statement. Put differently, upwardly mobile persons are more sceptical 
than non-mobile persons when it comes to potential moral consequences of the welfare 
state. Contrary to the assumptions formulated in H3, the upwardly mobiles do not show 
greater empathy for benefit recipients, but suspect potential negative consequences of 
welfare state support. With respect to the diagonal, I find positive effects for the highly 
educated, i.e. a higher likelihood for them to disagree with the outcome statement com-
pared to those with low levels of education. Again, weight estimates indicate the dominant 
influence of one’s own educational status for the respondent’s perceptions of moral con-
sequences of the welfare state. Apart from that, the control variables point to the expected 
directions, similar to Models 1-4. Positive effects, i.e. a higher likelihood to disagree with 
the outcome statement, are found for individuals with more than 3 months of unemploy-
ment experience, and individuals with income from unemployment benefits or other 
social benefits. Negative effects, i.e. a lower likelihood to disagree with the outcome 
statement, are found for individuals that place themselves more to the right on the left-
right scale, for more religious individuals, and for those with a migration history.  
Overall, and in line with H1, the multivariate results do support the assumption that up-
wardly mobile individuals are more sceptical towards benefit recipients, i.e. show less 
normative welfare state support, than non-mobile individuals. Although this effect for 
educational upward mobility is only statistically significant in two out of the five models, 
coefficients in Model 1-5 point in the same direction and thereby suggest that the mech-
anism at play here is self-interest, and not empathy and identification with one’s social 
origin. For the isolated effect of educational downward mobility the evidence is less 
strong, although Model 2 estimates a statistically significant positive effect, i.e. more nor-
mative welfare support among downwardly mobiles. Since the remaining Models are 
unanimous in their direction of the coefficient for downward mobility, I take this as only 
slight support for H1, which assumed potential beneficiaries to have a higher likelihood 
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of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support. Apart from 
that, the results further suggest that there is an educational gradient with respect to nor-
mative welfare state attitudes, with higher educated individuals showing more normative 
welfare state support than lower educated people. Finally, it is important to notice that 
there is strong evidence for the dominant influence of the respondent’s own educational 
attainment as compared to parental educational attainment in shaping normative welfare 
state attitudes. 
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Table 6.3: DRM (logit) (outcome: attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients) 
 
  
Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients 
 
Most unemployed 
people do not re-
ally try to find a 
job  
 
Many manage to 
obtain benefits/ser-
vices not entitled 
to  
 
Many with very 
low incomes get 
less benefit than 
legally entitled to 
  
 (1= disagree) (1= disagree) (1= agree) 
  M1 M2 M3 
 β SE  β SE  β SE  
Weights 1          
    O (q) 0.23 0.21  0.00 0.00 *** 0.58 0.21 ** 
    D (1-q) 0.77 0.21 *** 1.00 0.00 *** 0.42 0.21 * 
          
Net Mobility  
(Ref.: non-mobile)          
    upward -0.16 0.19  -0.39 0.12 ** -0.11 0.16  
    downward -0.09 0.20  0.42 0.15 ** 0.28 0.17  
          
Diagonal  
(Ref.: Low educated) 2          
    medium  0.28 0.19  -0.02 0.19  -0.15 0.17  
    high 1.21 0.19 *** 0.97 0.21 *** -0.90 0.17 *** 
          
Male  0.13 0.08  -0.06 0.10  -0.05 0.09  
Employment status (Ref.: employed)          
    unemployed 0.62 0.19 ** 0.18 0.22  -0.07 0.20  
    inactive -0.36 0.14 * 0.18 0.16  0.06 0.14  
Left-right scale (scale: 0-10) -0.16 0.02 *** -0.11 0.02 *** -0.07 0.02 ** 
Religiosity (scale: 0-10) -0.01 0.01  -0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01  
Unemployment experience > 3 months 0.17 0.09  0.12 0.11  0.38 0.09 *** 
Income from unemployment benefits 0.45 0.29  0.73 0.31 * 0.38 0.30  
Income from other social benefits  0.40 0.23  0.42 0.25  0.57 0.23 * 
Migration background -0.25 0.17  0.12 0.20  -0.13 0.18  
Parents with migration background -0.09 0.13  -0.05 0.16  0.14 0.13  
Country dummies yes yes yes 
Intercept -0.36 0.26   -1.28 0.29 *** 0.35 0.24   
AIC 3,841   2,946   3,675   
N 3,114   3,044   2.915   
Notes:  
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean more welfare state sup-
port. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; 
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment. 
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low educated) 
are fixed at zero. 
Source: ESS Round 8, own calculations. 
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Table 6.4: DRM (logit) (outcome: perceived consequences of the welfare state - moral 
dimension) 
  
Perceived consequences of the welfare state  
(moral dimension) 
 
Social benefits/services 
make people lazy 
Social benefits make peo-
ple less willing to care for 
one another 
 
 (1= disagree) (1= disagree) 
  M4 M5 
 β SE  β SE  
Weights 1       
    O (q) 0.27 0.18  0.00 0.00 *** 
    D (1-q) 0.73 0.18 *** 1.00 0.00 *** 
       
Net Mobility  
(Ref.: non-mobile)       
    upward -0.18 0.12  -0.29 0.10 ** 
    downward -0.24 0.15  0.01 0.13  
       
Diagonal  
(Ref.: Low educated) 2       
    medium  -0.23 0.19  0.22 0.15  
    high 0.42 0.19  0.76 0.17 *** 
       
Male  0.09 0.09  -0.09 0.08  
Employment status (Ref.: employed)       
    unemployed 0.17 0.20  0.21 0.19  
    inactive -0.04 0.14  -0.16 0.13  
Left-right scale (scale: 0-10) -0.18 0.02 *** -0.09 0.02 *** 
Religiosity (scale: 0-10) -0.01 0.01  -0.04 0.01 * 
Unemployment experience > 3 months 0.13 0.09  0.20 0.09 * 
Income from unemployment benefits 0.98 0.29 *** 0.81 0.28 ** 
Income from other social benefits  0.44 0.23  0.67 0.22 ** 
Migration background -0.29 0.18  -0.31 0.17  
Parents with migration background 0.11 0.13  0.09 0.13  
Country dummies yes yes 
Intercept 0.91 0.26 *** 0.15 0.23   
AIC 3,643 4,035 
N 3,136 3,107 
Notes:  
All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean more welfare state sup-
port. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; 
1O pertains to parental educational attainment; D to one’s own educational attainment. 
2Educational gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (low educated) 
are fixed at zero. 
Source: ESS Round 8, own calculations. 
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6.5 Robustness tests 
Several robustness checks have been conducted in order to support the assumption that 
the previously described results are not driven by a specific model specification. In par-
ticular, two options have been investigated further. First, the variance inflation factor was 
investigated to be sure that there is no multicollinearity problem in the models. For that 
purpose, variance inflation measures were calculated (see Table 6.5). Furthermore, Mod-
els 1 to 4 from Table 6.2 have been re-run with a metric operationalisation of outcomes 
instead of binary outcomes (see Table 6.6).  
With respect to collinearity diagnostics, it was investigated if variance inflation factors 
exceeded a critical value of 5 (cf., O’Brien, 2007). The estimation of variance inflation 
factors did not however reveal a mulitcollinearity problem. In particular, one could be 
worried about a high correlation of placement on the left-right scale and welfare state 
support. Based on the VIF calculation (see Table 6.5), I conclude that including both 
parameters in the diagonal reference models does not lead to multicollinearity problems.  
Concerning the alternative model specification as metric outcomes, the previously dis-
cussed results do not change substantially. However, one important difference is 
noticeable. The experience of upward financial mobility now exhibits a statistically sig-
nificant negative effect. Having improved one’s financial situation over the generations 
is thus leading to more welfare state support. Although in the original models (see Table 
6.2) the effects of upward financial mobility have not been statistically significant, the 
signs of the mobility coefficients suggested a mechanism beyond self-interest, as captured 
by H3. In sum, these findings may be interpreted as somewhat supportive of the empathy 
argumentation put forward in H3, assuming that there is more than self-interest driving 
welfare state attitudes.  
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Table 6.5: Collinearity diagnostics 
 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Financial mobility (Ref.: non-mobile)         
     upward mobility 1.25 1.12 0.80 0.20 
     downward mobility 1.27 1.13 0.79 0.21 
Mobility expectation (Ref.: non-mobile)     
     upward mobility 1.23 1.11 0.82 0.18 
     downward mobility 1.22 1.11 0.82 0.18 
Education, Ref.: low     
     medium 2.86 1.69 0.35 0.65 
     high 3.04 1.74 0.33 0.67 
Parental education, Ref.: low     
     medium 1.69 1.30 0.59 0.41 
     high 1.80 1.34 0.56 0.44 
Main activity, Ref.: employed     
     self-employed 1.05 1.02 0.95 0.05 
     not working 1.29 1.13 0.78 0.22 
     unemployed 1.41 1.19 0.71 0.29 
Left-right-assessment 1.10 1.05 0.91 0.09 
Religiosity 1.14 1.07 0.88 0.12 
Unemp. experience > 6 months 1.21 1.10 0.82 0.18 
Income from unemp. benefits 1.20 1.09 0.84 0.16 
Income from other social benefits 1.11 1.05 0.90 0.10 
Migration background 1.35 1.16 0.74 0.26 
Parental migration background 1.35 1.16 0.74 0.26 
Female 1.09 1.04 0.92 0.08 
     
Mean VIF 1.46       
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Table 6.6: Alternative model specification (metric outcomes): Estimates from DRM 
(outcome: normative welfare state attitudes) 
 
If welfare benefits are too high there 
is no incentive to find work. 
It’s humiliating to receive money 
without having to work. 
 M1  M2 M3 M4 
 β SE  β SE  β SE  β SE  
Weights 1             
    O (q) 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 
    D (1-q) 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 *** 
             
Net financial mobility (Ref.: non-mobile) 
     upward -0.03 0.02  -0.04 0.02  -0.04 0.02  -0.05 0.02 * 
     downward -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02               
Mobility expectation (Ref.: non-mobile) 
     upward    0.05 0.02 *    0.05 0.02 ** 
     downward    -0.11 0.03 ***    -0.04 0.03  
             
Diagonal (Ref.: Financial situation: bad)2 
     rather bad 0.05 0.03  0.04 0.03  -0.10 0.03 ** -0.10 0.03 *** 
     rather good 0.15 0.03 *** 0.13 0.03 *** -0.04 0.03  -0.05 0.03  
     good 0.19 0.04 *** 0.18 0.04 *** -0.06 0.04  -0.07 0.04  
             
Education (Ref.: low)             
     medium 0.01 0.03  0.00 0.03  0.03 0.03  0.03 0.03  
     high -0.06 0.03  -0.06 0.03 * -0.03 0.03  -0.04 0.03  
Parental education  
(Ref.: low)             
     medium -0.03 0.03  -0.03 0.03  0.01 0.03  0.01 0.03  
     high -0.08 0.03 ** -0.06 0.03 * -0.02 0.03  -0.01 0.03  
             
Female -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.03 0.02  -0.03 0.02  
Main activity  
(Ref.: employed)             
     self-employed -0.01 0.03  -0.01 0.03  -0.01 0.03  -0.01 0.03  
     not working -0.12 0.03 *** -0.12 0.03 *** -0.14 0.03 *** -0.14 0.03 *** 
     unemployed -0.14 0.03 *** -0.13 0.03 *** -0.12 0.03 *** -0.12 0.03 *** 
Left-right scale  
(scale: 1-10) 0.09 0.00 *** 0.09 0.00 *** 0.04 0.00 *** 0.04 0.00 *** 
Religiosity (scale: 1-10) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 *** 
Unemp. experience > 6 
months -0.17 0.02 *** -0.16 0.02 *** -0.09 0.02 *** -0.09 0.02 *** 
Income from unemp. 
benefits -0.20 0.04 *** -0.20 0.04 *** -0.04 0.04  -0.04 0.04  
Income from other social 
benefits -0.10 0.04 ** -0.10 0.04 ** -0.08 0.04 * -0.08 0.04 * 
Migration background -0.07 0.04  -0.08 0.04  0.05 0.04  0.04 0.04  
Parental migration back-
ground -0.02 0.03  -0.03 0.03  0.02 0.03  0.02 0.03  
Country dummies yes   yes   yes   yes   
constant 2.58 0.06 *** 2.59 0.06 *** 2.41 0.06 *** 2.41 0.06   
AIC 29,348   29,320   29,180   29,172   
N 10,987   10,987   10,965   10,965   
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Table 6.6 (continued) 
Notes: All dependent variables are coded in such a way that positive coefficients mean less welfare state 
support. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;  
1O pertains to parental financial situation; D to one’s own financial situation. 
2Financial gradient estimated for non-mobile individuals; effects for reference group (financial situation: 
bad) are fixed at zero. 
Source: CUPESSE data, own calculations. 
 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate the political consequences of different dimensions of 
intergenerational mobility. The study was based on the assumption that not only current 
social status and social origin, but also intergenerational mobility play a role in shaping 
political opinions and preferences. More specifically, in light of a situation characterised 
by both real and threatened downward mobility, this study aimed to investigate how the 
experiences and expectations of intergenerational social mobility impact young Europe-
ans’ attitudes of normative support toward the welfare state over and above current and 
parental socioeconomic status.  
Normative support toward the welfare state refers to the ‘moral aspects of welfare state’, 
i.e. welfare state attitudes which comprise not only redistributive preferences but also 
beliefs about distributive justice and deservingness (Oorschot et al., 2017; Mau, 2003). 
Despite the fact that there are huge literatures covering both how social position and the 
prospect of moving up or down the socioeconomic ladder shape preferences for redistri-
bution, it is much less clear how intergenerational mobility influences welfare attitudes 
beyond that (Schuck and Shore, 2019). Against this background, this study aimed to com-
plement previous research by acknowledging the multidimensionality of welfare state 
support (Oorschot, 2010) and investigating the effects of intergenerational mobility be-
yond preferences for redistribution. Further contributions lie in the use of state-of-the-art 
methodology that allowed to disentangle mobility effects from the effects of social origin 
and destination, and the differentiated approach to the study of social mobility, i.e. stud-
ying different indicators of social mobility and their association with normative welfare 
state support. The use of two datasets, the CUPESSE two-generation survey (Tosun et 
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al., 2018) and the latest round of the ESS (ESS Round 8, 2017) allowed for the imple-
mentation of both previous experiences of intergenerational mobility (in particular, 
economic and educational mobility) and expectations of intergenerational mobility. 
With respect to the association between intergenerational mobility and normative welfare 
attitudes, two sets of competing hypothesis were investigated. I hereby followed the ap-
proach by Schuck and Shore (2019) who drew from two strands of literature – one 
examining the effects of mobility on redistributive preferences and the other looking more 
specifically at welfare attitudes.  
Following the first perspective, it is mainly self-interest that shapes normative welfare 
state attitudes and intergenerational upward (downward) mobility is accordingly expected 
to decrease (increase) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and 
receiving social support (Hypothesis 1). Similarly, and based also on the self-interest ar-
gumentation, expectations of upward (downward) mobility are assumed to decrease 
(increase) the likelihood of holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving so-
cial support (Hypothesis 2). Taking into account factors beyond material self-interest like 
empathy, identification, and deservingness perceptions, a second set of hypotheses ex-
pects upward mobility (both experienced and expected) to increase the likelihood of 
holding positive views of benefit recipients and receiving social support (Hypothesis 3).  
The descriptive analyses mostly supported the self-interest perspective (H1 + H2) and 
there was only weak evidence for the competing hypothesis which was based on factors 
beyond material self-interest (H3). The descriptive analyses did not, however, take into 
account that upwardly and downwardly mobiles differ in other important characteristics 
that may influence a respondent’s normative welfare state attitudes. Therefore, these de-
scriptive analyses were subsequently complemented by multivariate analyses. 
The multivariate analyses aimed at disentangling the effect of experiencing intergenera-
tional mobility from arriving at a low or high status position or stemming from a low or 
high (parental) status position. With respect to financial mobility, no statistically signifi-
cant effect was found, i.e. neither of the previously depicted hypotheses was supported. 
The financial status, however, did exhibit the expected effect. Accordingly and in line 
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with the dominant self-interest argumentation, the better-off, i.e. potential contributors, 
show less normative welfare state support than less well-off individuals.  
In contrast to the non-findings for economic mobility, expectations for future intergener-
ational mobility apparently do play a major role in shaping normative welfare state 
attitudes. Expectations for the future clearly outweigh past mobility experiences in their 
importance for shaping welfare support. In line with H2, individuals expecting to arrive 
at a better standard of living than what they are having today express less normative wel-
fare state support than those expecting to maintain their parents’ standard of living. In 
turn, individuals expecting not to be able to maintain their parents’ current standard of 
living express more normative welfare state support.  
For educational mobility, the multivariate results do support the assumption that upwardly 
mobile individuals are more sceptical towards benefit recipients. In line with H1, they 
express less normative welfare state support than non-mobiles. For educational down-
ward mobility, the evidence is less strong since estimates point to different directions 
across the different models.  
What implications does this evidence have for society and policymakers? Knowledge on 
whether and why people support different welfare state dimensions is of a broad societal 
interest since it can inform public debates (Roosma, 2016). It is, however, equally or even 
more relevant for policymakers and politicians, as it is their duty to take into consideration 
the dynamics of popular support for the welfare state when they have to decide about 
welfare rights, entitlements, and obligations (Roosma, 2016; Brooks and Manza, 2007). 
In a similar vein, the present study constitutes a basis for the assessment of the social 
legitimacy of the welfare state. As Oorschot et al. (2017: xvii) assert, ‘the basic welfare 
deservingness question of “who should get what, and why”, dominating discussions in 
the early times of welfare state formation is back to the forefront again, and will possibly 
stay there for some time to come.’ Elections, redistributive policies and even democratic 
legitimacy may be affected by social solidarity and beliefs about whom is deserving of 
social assistance and collective resources (Schuck and Shore, 2019; Oorschot, 2013; 
Rothstein, 1998). The experience and the expectation of intergenerational mobility, which 
– as we have seen in previous chapters – affect a substantial share of today’s young Eu-
ropeans, should be seen in direct connection to electoral outcomes, support for 
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redistributive policies, and democratic legitimacy, and thus raise awareness among poli-
cymakers. Furthermore, the geographical variation in welfare state support constitutes a 
huge challenge for those policymakers who envision taking European integration to the 
next level by establishing a social pillar (Roosma and Oorschot, 2017). 
Though the present study has made inroads into further disentangling the relationships 
between intergenerational social mobility and welfare attitudes, the findings are not with-
out caveats. The present analytical approach does not allow for the exploration of 
certainly existing cross-country differences (e.g. different economic circumstances like 
the especially difficult situation in the Southern European countries, and different welfare 
regime types, especially with regard to how benefits are allotted and administered, which 
in turn shapes the perception of welfare beneficiaries). Furthermore, and although the 
models do include country fixed effects, the study does not explicitly take into account 
that risks of downward mobility and chances of upward mobility are not equally distrib-
uted across countries. Future research could further explore these cross-country 
differences (e.g. the well-known regime hypothesis (see, e.g. Jæger, 2005)) by using a 
larger country sample that allows for a multilevel approach which was not tenable here. 
Moreover, the present analytical approach constitutes a snapshot of a very specific 
timeframe that is shaped by the aftermath of the economic crisis. Future research could 
take this study as a starting point for adding a time dimension to the topic, e.g. by com-
paring different points of time with each other.  
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7 Overall discussion and conclusion 
This thesis set out to investigate social and political consequences of young Europeans’ 
experiences of intergenerational mobility. It does so against a rather pessimistic back-
ground: For the first time in decades, concerns have been raised of the current young 
generation ending worse off than their parents’ generation (Eurofound, 2017). These fears 
go back to two main developments: first, the economic recession that started in 2008 and 
imprinted a whole generation’s labour market experiences, and second, the increasingly 
widespread completion of higher education and the accompanying concerns of diminish-
ing returns for education.30  
In light of these developments, this thesis aims at improving our understanding of how 
achieving a higher or lower socioeconomic status than one’s parents shapes young Euro-
peans’ well-being and welfare state attitudes as examples of social and political 
consequences. By doing so, it complements the predominantly labour-market-oriented 
research on young Europeans that was stimulated by the economic crisis.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will give a brief summary of the empirical results, 
before turning to the implications of this study. Finally, I will outline the limitations of 
this study and point to potential avenues for future research.  
7.1 Summary of empirical results 
The empirical analyses started with an exploration of the status quo, i.e., the investigation 
among intergenerational mobility of young Europeans in its different dimensions (educa-
tional mobility, economic mobility, and expectations of future mobility, in particular). 
The descriptive analyses (Chapter 4) show that the vast majority of young people in all 
European countries under study (except for Greece and Turkey) are able to maintain their 
parents’ status position, both in terms of educational level and level of economic well-
being. In general, the findings suggest that intergenerational economic mobility is far 
more fluid than intergenerational educational mobility, i.e. we can observe far more 
changes in socioeconomic statuses across generations than for educational mobility. Fur-
thermore, it is striking that intergenerational educational mobility, at least on the 
                                                 
30 See Voßemer and Schuck (2016) for a comparison of overeducation versus prolonged job search. 
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aggregate level, does not necessarily coincide with economic mobility. Arguably due to 
the specific timeframe of the study (2008-2016), in some countries high shares of educa-
tional upward mobility go along with high shares of economic downward mobility. For 
example, 44% of Spanish youth exceed their parents’ educational level, but only 30% of 
Spanish youth exceed their parents’ level of economic well-being. On the other hand, 
only 8% of Spanish youth do not succeed to achieve their parents’ level of education, 
whereas 30% state that their economic situation is worse than their parents’.  
Turning to mobility expectations for the future, the descriptive findings furthermore sug-
gest that past experiences of intergenerational mobility do not necessarily coincide with 
what people expect as their future mobility experience. Despite the non-mobiles being 
the largest group when looking at the distributions of educational and economic mobility, 
the descriptive findings suggest that the largest share of young people across Europe ex-
pects movements in their standard of living across generations for their future, be it 
upward or downward. Next to rather optimistic expectations for their future in most coun-
tries, the Mediterranean countries Greece, Italy, and Spain stand out with an exceptionally 
high degree of pessimism regarding their future standard of living as compared to their 
parents. Interestingly, Italy and Spain are countries where economic upward mobility 
among young people has been quite high, with 32% and 60% respectively. It therefore 
seems that upward economic mobility, at least in Italy and Spain, does not give cause for 
a more optimistic assessment of future mobility expectations. 
Further bivariate analyses then revealed that past mobility experiences do not necessarily 
determine young Europeans’ expectations for their future. Although in many cases the 
young individuals’ past and future mobility assessments do not deviate substantially, 
some obviously consider their past inability to maintain their parents’ status level as only 
temporary. Given their relatively young age, which leaves a lot of time to eventually 
achieve or exceed their parents’ socioeconomic level, this may be an expression of an 
optimistic view into their future.  
Having established the status quo of today’s intergenerational mobility among young Eu-
ropeans, the analyses went on to well-being effects of intergenerational educational 
mobility (Chapter 5). In line with theoretical expectations that assumed well-being to in-
crease with levels of educational attainment all across Europe, and being more 
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pronounced in countries with high income inequality and less universal welfare states, 
strongest well-being gradients were found in the hugely unequal Baltic States for all three 
outcomes under investigation (life satisfaction, psychological distress, and self-reported 
general health). Smallest well-being gradients were found in the Nordic countries (for life 
satisfaction) and in Southern Europe (for psychological distress and self-reported general 
health). Yet only the former finding was in line with theoretical expectations.  
With respect to the relative importance of parental and one’s own education for young 
Europeans’ well-being, it was hypothesised that the relative weight of parental status 
would be greater in societies with high income inequality and weakly decommodifying 
welfare states. The empirical findings suggest that one’s own level of education is more 
important for one’s current well-being in all countries. Yet, in line with the theoretical 
expectations, the influence of one’s parents’ educational level on all three outcomes under 
investigation was found to be most important in the Baltic States in comparison to other 
country groups. However, the assumption of parental education being relatively important 
in the unemployment-ridden Southern European countries was not supported.  
Turning to net mobility effects, i.e. mobility effects that remain after controlling for origin 
and destination effects, the empirical results for all three well-being outcomes under in-
vestigation suggest that mobile individuals do not exhibit statistically significantly higher 
or lower levels of well-being. This finding is in line with the individual-level acculturation 
hypothesis that assumed mobility per se to have no independent effect. Yet, the findings 
for two country groups support the macro-level hypothesis assuming psychological mo-
bility effects to be more likely in status-based societies. In particular, this refers to the net 
mobility effects that have been found in Continental Europe, where status loss/gain across 
generations was found to affect the young individuals’ life satisfaction, and the Anglo-
Saxon country group, where I found statistically significantly lower levels of psycholog-
ical distress among individuals who have experienced upward mobility. Yet, the finding 
of upward/downward mobility affecting the respondents’ level of self-reported general 
health over and above the influence of social origin and destination in the Nordic coun-
tries runs counter to my macro-level hypothesis. In contrast, it rather supports the 
individual-level fulfilled versus frustrated aspirations hypothesis, which assumes upward 
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mobility to be associated with higher well-being levels and downward mobility with 
lower well-being levels.  
The empirical analyses then turned to the investigation of how the experiences and ex-
pectations of intergenerational social mobility impact young Europeans’ attitudes of 
normative support toward the welfare state (Chapter 6). More specifically, the analyses 
aimed at disentangling the effect of experiencing intergenerational mobility from arriving 
at a low or high status position or stemming from a low or high (parental) status position 
(net mobility effects). To this end, not only were several outcome dimensions used in the 
analyses, but also three distinct mobility dimensions – intergenerational educational mo-
bility, intergenerational economic mobility and mobility expectations for the future.  
With respect to educational mobility, the findings suggest that net mobility effects are 
present, i.e. the analyses suggested mobility effects that remained after controlling for 
parental and one’s own education. Accordingly, the empirical findings suggest that edu-
cational upward mobility compared to non-mobility is associated with more sceptical 
attitudes towards benefit recipients. This is in line with the assumption that self-interest 
is decisive for an individual’s normative welfare state support. At the same time, the 
counter-hypothesis of factors beyond self-interest being more influential than material 
self-interest found no support. For educational downward mobility, the findings are less 
clear since estimates of net mobility effects point to different directions across models.  
For the second mobility dimension, economic mobility, no net mobility effects have been 
found. The findings rather suggest that mobile individuals do not exhibit significantly 
different attitudes towards normative welfare state support in comparison to non-mobile 
individuals. Yet, the financial status itself, i.e., the respondents’ destination status, did 
exhibit the expected effect. In line with the self-interest argumentation, the better-off, i.e. 
potential contributors, show less normative welfare state support than less well-off indi-
viduals. 
Turning from past mobility experiences to expectations for future mobility, the empirical 
findings suggest that, in line with the theoretical assumptions of the deservingness per-
spective, individuals expecting to arrive at a better standard of living than what they 
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currently have, express less normative welfare state support than those expecting to main-
tain their parents’ standard of living. In turn, individuals expecting not to be able to 
maintain their parents’ current standard of living express more normative welfare state 
support. Consequently, expectations for future mobility seem to play a more influential 
role in determining the young respondents’ normative welfare attitudes than the psycho-
logical experience of economic mobility.  
7.2 Implications of this study 
As a recent report from European Union Agency Eurofound (2017: 71) asserts, despite 
the aim of fostering social cohesion by improving chances of social mobility (OECD, 
2011; Council of Europe, 2010), ‘[i]n most instances, “social mobility” as a term is rarely 
mentioned explicitly in policy debates (with the exception of a handful of countries, in-
cluding Greece and the UK)’. Yet, the results of this thesis can inform the current policy 
agenda and debate, as I will briefly describe in the following.  
It is well-established that education is the essential lever to foster social mobility (Breen, 
2010a). Yet, the comparison of distributions of intergenerational educational and eco-
nomic mobility among young Europeans has shown that educational upward mobility, 
i.e., achieving a higher social status than one’s parents, is no guarantee for economic up-
ward mobility in all European countries. In light of this, the question arises as to what 
policymakers can do to change this. Especially in times of economic downturn, it is the 
transition from school to work that constitutes a crucial stage for the young individuals’ 
employment careers and economic well-being (Eurofound, 2017). Policymakers may 
therefore be well-advised to implement not only measures to eliminate barriers to educa-
tional success (such as, e.g., the lasting impact of socioeconomic background for school 
attainment), but also to implement policies that address the labour market and the critical 
stage of entering it. The recently introduced Youth Guarantee (see, e.g., Tosun, 2017) can 
only constitute a first step on a longer path towards a smoother school-to-work transition 
and subsequent economic self-sufficiency among young individuals. These measures may 
well be complemented by private education expenditures, like e.g. in Germany, where the 
private sector invests a substantial amount of money into the dual system of vocational 
education and training (Wolf and Zohlnhöfer, 2009: 231). 
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Next to the finding of diverging economic and educational mobility rates, the analyses of 
well-being effects of social mobility may likewise inform policymakers. For example, the 
use of state-of-the-art methodology allowed for validly estimating both educational gra-
dients in well-being and well-being effects of social mobility across Europe. The reliable 
estimates which proved to be markedly different from previous studies using conven-
tional regression approaches, can serve as a foundation for policymakers to formulate 
effective policy responses to social gradients in well-being (see also van der Waal, Dae-
nekindt and Koster, 2017). Furthermore, the empirical findings suggest that some 
institutional contexts are less effective in separating social mobility from an individual’s 
well-being than others. Among those are the hugely unequal Baltic States, where one’s 
own level of education is most important for the young people’s well-being compared to 
all other country groups. Results further indicated that young people in status-based so-
cieties like the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries, as well as in the Nordic 
countries, experience well-being effects due to net mobility effects over and above those 
due to arriving or stemming from a different status position than their parents. Policy-
makers could build on these results by implementing measures to reduce the impact of 
social origin for the young people’s individual well-being. Likewise, policymakers might 
mitigate net mobility effects in the status-based societies by stimulating public debate on 
the centrality of class and status maintenance for identity.  
Not least, the findings with respect to normative welfare state support can both inform 
public debates and serve as a basis for the assessment of the social legitimacy of the wel-
fare state. The analyses showed that young individuals who are economically upwardly 
mobile significantly differ in their normative welfare state attitudes from non-mobiles, 
being more sceptical toward benefit recipients. Yet, for educational mobility, such differ-
ences that go back to the psychological experience of intergenerational mobility, apart 
from social origin and destination effects, have not been found. Such dynamics of support 
for the welfare state should be taken into account by policymakers and politicians when 
deciding on welfare rights, entitlements and obligations (Roosma, 2016; Brooks and 
Manza, 2007). More generally, the mobility effects found here – for educational and eco-
nomic mobility, but also for mobility expectations in the future – constitute indicators of 
social solidarity and the willingness to share social risks which might impact elections, 
redistributive policies and democratic legitimacy (Oorschot, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). In 
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that sense, the evidence presented here constitutes a contribution to ‘the basic welfare 
deservingness question of “who should get what, and why”’ (Oorschot et al., 2017: xvii).  
7.3 Limitations of this study and avenues for future research 
The present thesis has aimed to investigate social and political consequences of having 
experienced intergenerational mobility. Despite numerous strengths and contributions to 
the literature, the research design as well as the empirical research undertaken have cer-
tain limitations that shall be acknowledged at this point. Some of these limitations may, 
however, point to fruitful avenues for future research under the same theme. 
To begin, this study’s focus was limited to a certain type of social mobility, intergenera-
tional mobility, and focused on young Europeans. The selection of this focus was laid out 
from the beginning. Yet, it would admittedly also be interesting to set the empirical results 
that have been found here in context with other forms of mobility (intragenerational mo-
bility, in particular) and other age groups as well. Future research could build upon the 
results of this analysis and broaden our knowledge of mobility consequences by extending 
both age group and the mobility dimension.  
Apart from the limitations arising from the actual research design, the data I was able to 
draw on brought forth several limitations. In particular, the present analytical approach 
did not allow for a rigorous formal investigation of cross-country differences in mobility 
effects. In the absence of suitable cross-country comparative data – especially due to the 
limited number of countries – macro-level differences in well-being effects of intergen-
erational educational mobility could not be tested in a rigorous way. Although the 
stratified approach used in Chapter 5 already constitutes a major advancement of the lit-
erature (that, to date, mainly focused on the micro-level), it did not allow for formally 
testing the macro-level hypotheses on moderating contextual factors. Using a larger set 
of countries, future research could therefore advance our knowledge on relevant moder-
ating contextual factors such as welfare generosity and income inequality.  
With regard to the political consequences of mobility, it would admittedly also have been 
very interesting to explore the mediating impact of contextual factors such as how differ-
ences in economic circumstances (the difficult situation in the Southern European 
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countries, in particular) and different welfare regime types (especially in terms of how 
benefits are allotted and administered) shape the perception of welfare beneficiaries. Us-
ing a larger set of countries to allow for a multilevel approach, the exploration of cross-
country differences (e.g., the well-known regime hypothesis (see, e.g., Jæger, 2005)) 
could be a promising avenue for future research.  
Apart from that, it has to be acknowledged that the data used in this thesis stems from a 
rather specific time period (2008-2016), which was – to a large extent – shaped by the 
economic crisis. The status quo regarding the extent of intergenerational mobility, as well 
as the associated social and political consequences, may very well have been influenced 
by the economic crisis. With respect to the distribution of intergenerational educational 
mobility, I speculate that the economic crisis may have caused educational upward mo-
bility to be higher and educational downward mobility to be lower than otherwise (since 
students that would otherwise become unemployed tend to stay in the educational system 
and aim for higher degrees). With regard to the social and economic consequences, it 
remains unclear if and to what degree the economic crisis had a mediating impact, since 
different scenarios seem plausible. For example, education may have lower returns be-
cause a lot of young individuals stay longer in education in order to avoid unemployment 
or employment in an inadequate position. On the other hand, education is still a major 
protector against unemployment in times of crisis (Schuck and Steiber, 2018). Not least, 
the present analytical approach constitutes a snapshot of this very specific timeframe. 
Future research could take this study as a starting point for adding a time dimension to 
the topic, e.g. by comparing different points of time with each other. 
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9 Appendix 
Table 9.1: Distribution of educational levels and intergenerational educational mobility by country 
  Own edu: low 
Own edu: 
medium 
Own edu: 
high 
Parental edu: 
low 
Parental edu: 
medium 
Parental edu: 
high 
Upward mo-
bility Stability 
Downward 
mobility 
BE 0.16 0.44 0.40 0.27 0.41 0.31 0.31 0.55 0.14 
CZ 0.03 0.78 0.19 0.03 0.81 0.16 0.13 0.77 0.10 
DE 0.10 0.67 0.23 0.10 0.70 0.20 0.17 0.67 0.16 
DK 0.11 0.46 0.44 0.15 0.43 0.42 0.27 0.52 0.21 
EE 0.11 0.54 0.36 0.06 0.58 0.36 0.20 0.57 0.23 
ES 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.66 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.48 0.08 
FI 0.07 0.54 0.39 0.16 0.52 0.32 0.31 0.52 0.17 
FR 0.10 0.64 0.26 0.32 0.53 0.15 0.39 0.52 0.09 
GB 0.22 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.12 
HU 0.16 0.62 0.21 0.21 0.66 0.14 0.20 0.71 0.09 
IE 0.15 0.50 0.36 0.39 0.46 0.15 0.44 0.50 0.05 
LT 0.11 0.39 0.50 0.11 0.58 0.31 0.30 0.56 0.14 
NL 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.25 0.27 0.45 0.43 0.12 
NO 0.09 0.38 0.53 0.16 0.39 0.44 0.27 0.58 0.15 
PL 0.17 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.47 0.16 0.45 0.49 0.06 
PT 0.47 0.27 0.26 0.84 0.09 0.07 0.43 0.53 0.04 
SE 0.05 0.54 0.42 0.18 0.49 0.33 0.32 0.54 0.13 
SK 0.06 0.71 0.23 0.11 0.77 0.12 0.22 0.71 0.07 
Source: Own calculations based on European Social Survey rounds 4-7; age limit 25-34. 
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Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics on intergenerational economic mobility and expected mobility 
Country Expected Mobility 
 
Economic Mobility 
  upward stable downward Total   upward stable downward Total 
          
Austria 0.39 0.50 0.11 1.00 
 
0.23 0.41 0.36 1.00 
Czech Republic 0.48 0.43 0.10 1.00 
 
0.32 0.38 0.30 1.00 
Denmark 0.41 0.50 0.10 1.00 
 
0.27 0.40 0.33 1.00 
Germany 0.41 0.44 0.15 1.00 
 
0.24 0.41 0.35 1.00 
Greece 0.32 0.34 0.34 1.00 
 
0.10 0.27 0.63 1.00 
Hungary 0.46 0.49 0.05 1.00 
 
0.25 0.47 0.27 1.00 
Italy 0.32 0.38 0.30 1.00 
 
0.32 0.38 0.30 1.00 
Spain 0.38 0.36 0.26 1.00 
 
0.30 0.41 0.30 1.00 
Switzerland 0.40 0.48 0.12 1.00 
 
0.25 0.48 0.26 1.00 
Turkey 0.60 0.32 0.07 1.00 
 
0.43 0.42 0.16 1.00 
United Kingdom 0.41 0.40 0.19 1.00 
 
0.24 0.41 0.35 1.00 
          
Total 0.43 0.41 0.15 1.00   0.27 0.41 0.32 1.00 
Source: Own estimation based on weighted CUPESSE data.  
Appendix 
156 
Table 9.3: Measurement of normative attitudes toward the welfare state 
The moral dimension of welfare state attitudes [Source: CUPESSE two-generation sur-
vey] 
 
Please read the following statements and tell us how much you agree or disagree with 
them:  
[strongly agree (4) - strongly disagree (1)] 
(1) It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work. 
(2) If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work.  
 
Attitudes towards and beliefs on benefit recipients [Source: ESS Round 8] 
Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements about people in [country].  
[agree strongly (1) - disagree strongly (5)] 
(3) Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job.  
(4) Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to.  
(5) Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to.  
 
Perceived consequences of the welfare state (moral dimension) [Source: ESS Round 8] 
And to what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country].  
[agree strongly (1) - disagree strongly (5)] 
(6) …  make people lazy? 
(7) … make people less willing to care for one another? 
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Figure 9.1: ‘If welfare benefits are too high there is no incentive to find work’; mean 
values per country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
Figure 9.2: ‘It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work’; mean values per 
country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted CUPESSE data. 
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Figure 9.3: ‘Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job’; mean values per 
country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
Figure 9.4: ‘Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to’; mean values per 
country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.  
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Figure 9.5: ‘Many with very low incomes get less benefit than legally entitled to’; mean 
values per country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
Figure 9.6: ‘Social benefits and services make people lazy’; mean values per country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted.  
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Figure 9.7: ‘Social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one an-
other’; mean values per country 
 
Source: Own calculation based on ESS round 8, weighted. 
 
